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In this dissertation,

and responsible action.

I

argue that

First,

I

we

ought

to accept

set the stage for this

an agent-causal view of free

claim by highlighting our intuitions

regarding moral responsibility and freedom, and by ruling out competing
positions.

I

support Harry Frankfurt’s claim that responsibility does not require the ability
to do
otherwise.

I

go beyond

this claim,

however,

be the true originator of one’s action, and
incompatible with determinism.

To

compatibilist, “guidance control”

to

argue that responsibility requires that one

that this requires a

bolster this last claim,

I

kind of freedom that

is

argue against the

view of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza.

I

believe the weaknesses of their interesting and compelling view denote
potential

problems for any compatibilist position. After arguing for incompatibilism,
against non-agent-causal incompatibilist views. Specifically,

Kane’s “teleological

to

is

of my project,

I

lay out

that the relation

my

agent-causal view.

between agent and cause

between event and cause. This serves

causation.

argue against Robert

I

argue that

possible and coherent if one accepts a realist view of causes.

Randolph Clarke’s idea

as that

argue

intelligibility theory.”

In the final chapters

agent-causation

I

I

Having shown

that

it

is

to alleviate the

is

the

same

I

appeal

relation

“mysteriousness” of agent-

possible and coherent, and having ruled out competing

IV

views in preceding chapters,
correct view.

I

I

am now

also demonstrate that

it

in position to claim that agent-causation is the

is

a compelling position in

accords with our most basic understanding of ourselves as agents.

its

own right because

it
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION
Why do we care about moral
we do

responsibility and personal freedom?

care about these issues and that

we

nearly always have. In ancient times, as

evident in the writings of Aristotle, the focus
best

life

and

to

turns out to be.

is

is

a person can lead the

credit for)

how good

his life

Today, discussions often center specifically on the conditions of moral

responsibility, or the compatibility

question

was primarily on how

what extent a person can control (and take
1

clear that

It is

of moral responsibility and determinism. The

often whether determinism

would take away

the freedom that

is

required for

moral responsibility.

Sometimes our concerns are
current legal defenses that try to

citing factors that

pleas,

practical in nature. Take, for example, our interest in

exempt someone from being

legally responsible

by

supposedly exempt the person from being morally responsible (insanity

Twinkie defenses,

2

etc.

).

The

idea

is

to get the jury to believe that the

person

cannot be blamed for his actions, thus he should not be subject to legal punishment.
Getting clearer on our intuitions regarding moral responsibility often helps us to

understand and resolve our mixed feelings about these legal cases. Outside the

courtroom,

we

responsible but

not only want to

when we

know when

our friends and acquaintances should be held

ourselves should be held responsible.

blame myself or give myself credit

for the course

of my

life?

To what

To what

extent can

extent can

I

I

blame

See The Fragility of Goodness by Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum 1986).
'

I

believe the Twinkie defense refers to a case where the accused claimed to have
been out of control due
sugar-induced state. For more discussion of insanity defenses, see John Martin Fischer’s
introduction

to a
in

Moral Responsibility (Fischer 1986a,

13).

1

What

others?

(if

any)

is

for

(or your) responsibility

away? What kind of freedom

required?

The puzzles of moral
games

my

factors can take

responsibility and

human freedom

bored and philosophically-minded individuals

are not just elaborate

—

rather, these issues are at the

very heart of some of our most important practical, ethical, and metaphysical concerns.

These issues

really matter to us as

view ourselves and our place

human

persons.

They play

a large part in

how we

in the world.

Because responsibility and freedom are such an important part of our human
perspective,

I

our intuitions
question,

how

I

believe

tell

will

we need

to rely to a large extent

on our human

intuitions.

us about responsibility and freedom? Before trying to answer this

pause briefly

to

answer the following: what

is

moral responsibility and

should the morally responsible agent be characterized? For the time being,

give a rough characterization.

I

will

to

do with being “an appropriate candidate

reactive attitudes and for such activities as praise and

(Fischer 1986a, 12).

will

that

for the

blame and punishment and reward”

3

this characterization in

begin with a story.

I

borrow from John Martin Fischer, who claims

being a morally responsible agent has

With

What do

mind,

A woman, named

we

Flora,

can go on to examine our intuitions.

one day discovers

that her

I

will

beloved

flowerbed has been destroyed. She discovers that her husband, Mo, has run over them
with his riding lawn mower. Should Flora blame her husband? Should

morally responsible? To answer these questions,

we need more

Mo be held

information about the

3

Fischer follows Peter Strawson in writing about the “reactive attitudes.” In “Freedom and Resentment,”
Strawson says “the participant reactive attitudes are essentially natural human reactions to the good or ill
will or indifference

of others towards

us, as displayed in their attitudes

2

and actions”

(P.

Strawson 1993, 53).

incident. Let us consider a

few

different scenarios

(i.e.,

a few different

ways of filling

in

the necessary details).

In the first scenario, Flora finds out that the

warning and
situation,

that

Mo

could not have stopped

our intuitions

tell

Mo

us that

it

mower malfunctioned

without any

from running over the flowerbed. In

should not be blamed

(let

this

us assume that the

malfunction was not a result of any negligence on Mo’s part but resulted from some

We would not blame Mo

defect).

mower to
it

was

the

because something outside Mo’s control caused the

run over the flowers. In

mower

But what
choice? If this

that

if

is all

perform the action

fact,

we might even

say that

Mo did not do

anything

“performed” the “action.”

Mo had

chosen

we know

in this case

undiagnosed psychiatric

to

run over the flowers and did so as a result of his

about the incident,

we would be

and that Flora should blame him. But what

illness (an illness

Mo

did not bring

choose to run them over? If this were the case,

Mo

inclined to say that

if

an

upon himself) caused

we probably would

did

not blame

Mo to

Mo

because, once again, something out of his control caused this to happen.
Finally, let us look at

Mo

chose

to

his wife following a big fight,

would cause her much
to

character and

even

talk

realistic scenario.

Let us suppose that

run over the flowers (and ran them over as a result of this choice) because he

was angry with

caused him

what might be a more

distress.

In this case,

it

and he knew

seems

that

that destroying her flowers

Mo’s pyschological

run over the flowers. This psychological state was caused by

by

state

Mo’s

certain experiences, including his upbringing. In this scenario,

we

could

about physical events in Mo’s brain (perhaps corresponding to his thoughts,

beliefs, intentions, etc.) that

caused his choice (which corresponds to another brain

3

We could add that the

event).

external to

events in the series were caused by physical events

first

Mo (certain external

stimuli ).

4

But whether

we

describe the case

psychologically or physically, the fact remains that in this scenario, there

causes that begins somewhere outside

seems

that the thing to do, then, is to

many of us want

common

can

What makes

we

be able

to

we

should blame

Mo

in this last case,

we

thus (supposedly)

beyond

that

Mo

kind of scenario? After
usually do

Mo

responsibility (or the required kind

all, isn’t this

last

we

should hold a person responsible
to act as

he

did.

in the other scenarios

in the last scenario

5
.

The

Such
in the last

fact that the

does not take away his

—only constraining or compelling causes

Constraining or compelling causes would occur in situations with physical

other scenarios. But others

may

question these suggestions.

“ordinary” causes having to do with
not also constraining (after

1

5

would

See A.

like to

J.

a

scenario?

force or restraint, or psychological compulsion, the kinds of things present in

4

It

blame each other?

was not constrained or compelled

of freedom)

his control.

came before? Some philosophers claim

because

was constrained or compelled

a chain of

from moral responsibility. But don’t

was not somehow constrained or compelled

causal chain originated outside

that.

Mo

in this

from those

philosophers would go on to say that
scenario, but

is

account for the differing intuitions regarding this

this case different

so long as he

can do

exempt

Mo

blame

and

kind of occurrence, one for which

How

that

to

Mo

is

all,

Mo’s psychological

they do originate outside

remain neutral on the mind-body

issue.

Ayer’s Philosophical Essays (Ayer 1994).

4

Who

is to

some of the

say that the

more

state (or physical brain state) are

Mo

in the external world.

As

such, aren

blame

Mo

t

they beyond

after

battle lines are

debate

control)? Perhaps they are constraining and
7

cannot

all.

drawn between those who think moral

of “ordinary” causal chain and those

is

we

6

looks as if we have stumbled onto the compatibilist/incompatibilist debate;
the

It

this sort

Mo’s

often staged in a different way.

and determinism.

In

who

responsibility

think

it is

is

compatible with

But the contemporary

not.

concerns the compatibility of responsibility

It

The Incompatibility of Responsibility and Determinism”

Peter

van Inwagen claims that
determinism

is

the thesis that the past and the laws of nature together

determine a unique future and

is not the thesis that every event has a cause
(“universal causation”). For the thesis of universal causation might be true

and determinism

false.

(Van Inwagen 1986b, 242)

Foi example, universal causation could be true and determinism false if
some causes are
probabilistic, or if some events are caused

goes on

to

appealing

argue that determinism
to causes).

is

by agents with

free will.

then

incompatible with moral responsibility (without

Thus, for an incompatibilist like van Inwagen, the question would

be whether the past and the laws of nature determined that
flowerbed. If so, then

Van Inwagen

Mo

cannot be held responsible.

Stipulating a definition of ‘constraint’ does not help here.
originating outside the agent always take

away

The

Mo

would run over the

Van Inwagen

basic question

is

points to an

whether causal chains

responsibility.

1 am not suggesting that all compatibilists
would characterize the issue in terms of constraint and
compulsion, but something similar does seem to appear in some recent and interesting compatibilist
accounts of moral responsibility. A good example is Fischer and Ravizza’s account
of “regulative control”
versus “guidance control” in Responsibility and Control (Fischer and Ravizza
1998). If causal determinism
is true, we do not have regulative control but
we still may have guidance control. It is guidance control that

is required for moral responsibility according to their
view. Thus, the earlier scenarios of constraint or
compulsion might instead be cases where the agent lacks both regulative control and guidance control.
Their view is discussed in greater detail in my Chapter 3.

8

This complicated issue is sometimes further confounded by the fact that philosophers
on either side of the
debate are often using different definitions or varieties of determinism (e.g.,
sometimes it is causal
determinism, sometimes it is not). More is said about this in Chapter 5.

5

important distinction

—

i.e.

,

the one

In other words,

should

if universal

I

the distinction

even

if universal

investigate

still

causes).

—

causation

believe

relationships, not only

along with

between universal causation and individual causation.

causation

is

false

(i.e.,

surely

important

to

some

we

not every event has a cause),

certain causal chains affect responsibility and

is false,

is

it

how

(a certain

We should keep this distinction in mind

understanding of) determinism.
another distinction

between universal causation and

some

events, including

actions,

freedom (even
still

have

understand these distinctions and to examine the

between determinism and responsibility, but also between (various

kinds of) causes and responsibility.

Many

of the issues surrounding causation are

interwoven with our intuitions about responsibility. Looking
these distinctions will help us determine

what our

at responsibility in light

of

intuitions are really telling us about

responsibility.

Synopsis of Chapters

As

the reader

may have

for moral responsibility.

cannot just accept

it

and

noticed,

Although

move

on.

this

I

have been assuming

claim

We need

is

that

freedom

is

required

we

supported by very strong intuitions,

to consider that there are different kinds

of

freedom (Fischer). Both compatibilists and incompatibilists (regarding responsibility and
determinism) have often assumed that responsibility requires the freedom “to do
otherwise.” This assumption will be examined in Chapter

2.

Here

I

will discuss

Harry

Frankfurt’s famous counterexample in his article “Alternate Possibilities and Moral

Responsibility” (Frankfurt 1988a). In this article, Frankfurt demonstrates that one can be

morally responsible for an action without having been able
situation in

which an agent commits an

act ‘on his

6

to

own’ but

do otherwise. He

in

sets

up a

which another person (or

device)

is

commit

the act if

standing by, ready to intervene. This ‘intervener’ will force the agent to

it

looks like the agent will not go through with

cannot do otherwise than he does; either

way he

will

commit

it.

Thus, the agent really

the act, but he

is still

morally responsible for what actually happens because the intervener does not, in

we

intervene. (For example,

neighbor. Biff,

will not

could say that in the

who has some way of making

Mo and

Flora story there

Mo run over the flowers

if

is

fact,

door

a next

he sees that

Mo

do so on his own).

Frankfurt’s point appears to have implications with regard to the compatibility
issue.

His example seems to be a victory for compatibilists (about responsibility and

determinism), because

and some

sort

it

shows

that there

no

is

real conflict

between moral responsibility

of determination of one’s action. But, as John Martin Fischer points out,

incompatibilists have not been defeated just yet. Fischer claims that the real point of

Frankfurt-type examples

is

that

what matters for moral responsibility

is

what happens

in

the actual sequence of action, not the alternative sequence. Thus, an incompatibilist

could easily claim that while moral responsibility does not require freedom to do
otherwise,

it

being unable

does require freedom from determination
to

do otherwise

is

not the

actual sequence (Fischer 1994, 148-9).

same
9

in the

actual sequence. That

as being necessitated

by some

is,

factor in the

Frankfurt has not really scored a victory for

compatibilists.

In

Chapter

illuminate.

These

last

3,

1

will further discuss the intuitions that Frankfurt’s claims

What kind of freedom

is

required for moral responsibility?

statements require a qualification.

responsibility requires freedom
will require that the agent

I

will

I

will argue that

it

argue for the incompatibilist view that moral

from external determination

himself determines the action.

7

in the actual

sequence.

My agent-causal view

is

a sort of

freedom

that is incompatible with determinism.

I

will argue against the

compelling compatibilist view espoused by Fischer and Ravizza,
they call

guidance control”

in

which something

the only kind of freedom required for responsibility.

is

Fischer gives the following example of guidance control involving driving a car:

The

car’s steering apparatus

right.

But unbeknownst

to

works properly when I steer the car to the
me, the car’s steering apparatus is broken in

such a way that, if I were to try to turn
would veer off to the right in precisely

in

it

the

some other direction, the car
way it actually goes to the right.

(Fischer 1994, 133)

Fischer claims that this kind of control
is all that is

sort

is

entirely consistent with causal

required for moral responsibility.

I

will argue that

of freedom required for responsibility depends on

example.

My intuition is that we need

sequence in order

show

us

is

to

make

this

to

judgment.

know more

My

how we

suggestion

on the origins of our actions

on. Frankfurt has

shown us

that

we

somehow

feel this

fill

in the details

is

that

of the

that

what Frankfurt examples

our intuitions in these cases

in the actual sequence.

certain origins are incompatible with determinism.

for steering to the right so long as he

whether the driver has the

about the conditions of the actual

more than what Fischer claims; they show us

are strongly focused

determinism and

We

I

will argue that

feel that the driver is responsible

originated this action, intended

way, regardless of whether there

it,

is

and so

some

counterfactual intervener waiting in the wings. Discussions about the ability to do

otherwise have led us astray from the heart of the matter; Frankfurt has put us back on
track.

Now that we

are

back on

track,

I

think incompatibilism reveals itself as the

preferable view.

But the incompatibilist faces grave

difficulties.

The

agent to be the true originator of her free action. In order

to

incompatibilist wants the

secure this role as true

origin,

some

agent.

Not only does

to leave us

others).

incompatibilists have tried to break any causal chain beginning outside the

seem

to

be an unrealistic picture of human agency, but

But even more problematic
This

seems

to require)

things

we

be helpful

it

seems

with very few truly free actions (as has been suggested by van Inwagen and

intelligibility.

is

the

problem

that

could be held responsible
to

is

what

I

will refer to as the

problem of

undetermined actions (as the incompatibilist

would be random or chance occurrences and thus not

examine

Robert Kane,

what he

this

10

for.

different kinds

in

Chapter 4 will deal with

calls “Teleological Intelligibility theories”

1

15).

problem.

It

will

of incompatibilist views here.

“Two Kinds of Incompatibilism,” makes

Cause theories” (Kane 1995,

this

the kinds of

to explain

between

(borrowing from Watson) and “Agent

Agent-causal theories (as

on nonoccurrent or nonevent causation

a distinction

how

I

prefer to call them) rely

a person

is

the originator

of (and

is

thus responsible for) his action. Teleological Intelligibility theories do not rely on this
sort

of causation and attempt

causation alone

’

(124).

to “explain incompatibilist free

According

to

agency

Kane, a TI account needs

in

“(a’)

terms of event

some macroscopic

indeterminacy founded on microscopic indetenninacy, and (b’) some account of the
agent’s willing and acting for reasons that will render choices or actions ‘teleologically
intelligible,’

though not determined” (125). The question

will

be whether either of these

types of views can solve the major problem faced by the incompatibilist.

I

will argue that

agent-causal theories can but TI theories cannot.

Chapter 5 will consist of an examination of agent causation.
theory work?

10

See A.

J.

Is

it

How

would such

even possible? Answering these questions will require us

Ayer’s Philosophical Essays (Ayer 1994).

9

a

to get clear

on what determinism

is

how

and

on the Active Powers of Man

Our natural

causation works.

As Thomas Reid observes

in

Essays

,

desire to

know

inability to discover them,

the causes of the phenomena of nature, our
and the vain theories of philosophers employed

have made the word cause, and the related words, so
ambiguous
that they have, in a manner, lost their proper and original
meaning, and yet we have no other words to express it.
in this search,
.

An

.

.

Everything joined with the effect, and prior to it, is called its cause.
instrument, an occasion, a reason, a motive, an end, are called causes.

(Reid 1788,607)

I

believe Reid’s point to be important in our project. This chapter will involve

discussions of agenthood, causal power, and a realist conception of causes. These issues
will allow us to see

how

In Chapter 6,

I

1

will discuss a recent

an agent can be said to “nonoccurently” cause things.

will deal

with further objections to an agent-causal account.

argument by Peter van Inwagen,

agent causation cannot solve the problem of free
objection

in

is

not successful.

which he argues

agent causation)

is

Then

I

will.

in

I

First,

which van Inwagen claims

will argue that

will discuss a recent manuscript

that

van Inwagen’s

by Randolph Clarke,

that there are reasons to believe that substance causation (and thus

not possible.

I

will argue that Clarke’s objections are also not

successful.

My concluding chapter,
will

show what each chapter

superior to other views.

I

Chapter

7, will

contributes to

my

involve putting everything together.

I

conclusion that an agent-causal theory

will argue that Frankfurt

is

shows us the way toward

understanding our intuitions about responsibility but stops short of an actual solution to
the problem. His examples

actual sequence

show us

of action. What he

that

what matters

fails to

other than the agent) in the actual sequence

say

is

10

is

to responsibility

that lack

concerns the

of determination (by anything

also crucial to responsibility.

Compatibilist

views will not give us what

have an

intelligible

we need

here.

Agent causation

account of moral responsibility. But

responsibility requires a

freedom from

all

What

causes.

causes present do not necessitate the action. This

is

is

this

it

what

is

required in order to

does not mean

does require

my

consistent with

is

that

that the actual

agent-causal

view.

With
this project.

that said,

I

would

add a brief word about what will not be included in

like to

Although the following topics are both interesting and relevant,

decided to leave them aside for the time being.

more properly belong
one should decide

if

in the field

I

will not

I

have

be including questions that

of ethics. In other words,

I

will not

be considering

how

an agent has done right or wrong. The question of whether an agent

should be held responsible can be separated from this ethical question.

concerned with some of the finer points of moral responsibility.

I

will also not

be

1

Lastly,

1

will not

be

concerned with the rational justification of our practices of blaming and praising. In his

famous

article,

“Freedom and Resentment,”

P. F.

Strawson suggests that

up these practices regardless of the metaphysical picture and
holding on to them

(P.

that

Strawson 1993). Susan Wolf responds

But the guarantee

that

cannot give

are justified in

Strawson:

we are not behaving irrationally or serving as the
own humiliation and error the guarantee, in other

—

unwitting agents of our

words, that

to

we

we

we cannot be

faulted for taking an inappropriate attitude

—

towards ourselves and our place in the world is not the only guarantee
that one can reasonably wish for.
The pessimist fears that if
.

.

.

determinism is true, then we are no better off than puppets. And the lives
of puppets, the pessimist thinks, are meaningless and absurd.
The fact
that we don’t have to think that our lives are meaningless is of little
.

comfort

if,

for

all that,

our lives

may

actually be meaningless.

.

.

(Wolf 1993,

117)

11

For

a

thorough and interesting discussion of these finer points, see Michael Zimmerman’s

Moral Responsibility (Zimmerman

1988).

11

An Essay on

CHAPTER 2

FREEDOM AND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES
Many

philosophers claim that freedom to do otherwise

is

the kind of freedom

required for moral responsibility. 12 In other words, these philosophers hold that a person

morally responsible for what she does only

is

1988a,

1).

(PAP) (Frankfurt 1988a,

to

to

1).

In this chapter,

and a famous counterexample

this principle

counterexample

on

she could have done otherwise (Frankfurt

This principle has been called the Principle of Alternate (or alternative)

Possibilities

examine

if

PAP

is

to

one of my main goals

it.

I

will be to

will argue that the

successful and stands up to certain crucial objections.

I

will

go

argue that the incompatibilist (about moral responsibility and determinism), also

referred to (in this context) as the “libertarian,” can consistently reject

PAP.

13

Background
In his

famous

Frankfurt attempts to

1

He

988a).

article,

show

“Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Harry

gives a counterexample to

demonstrate that

PAP

fails

morally responsible even

PAP sometimes

of Alternate Possibilities

that the Principle

PAP;

the counterexample

because there could be times when

if that

is

is

false (Frankfurt

supposed

we would

hold

to

a

person

person could not have done otherwise.

plays a major role in the debate over whether freedom and

determinism are compatible. The incompatibilist about freedom and determinism

may

12

For example, Peter van Inwagen claims in “Ability and Responsibility,” that “we are persuaded that we
cannot make ascriptions of moral responsibility to agents who lack free will” (Van Inwagen 1986a, 153).

He

goes on

Possibilities

to

say that this statement

(i.e.,

is

very

much

like (if not the

the principle that responsibility requires the

13

same

freedom

of Alternate
do otherwise) (153).

as) the Principle
to

Obviously “incompatibilism” is not the same as “libertarianism.” But in this context I am mostly
concerned with those incompatibilists who want to say we are sometimes free in the sense relevant to moral
responsibility.

12

try to use this principle as leverage against the
compatibilist.

The

incompatibilist could

claim that determinism entails that one could never do
otherwise. Therefore, the
incompatibilist

and

is

would

would conclude, determinism

is

not compatible with moral responsibility

not compatible with the kind of freedom that matters to us.
Such a philosopher
rely heavily

on

the intuition that

genuine alternative ( truly being able

to

PAP

is

true

and on the intuition

that

having a

do otherwise) requires that one’s action not be

determined.

Compatibilists about responsibility and determinism, however, could
also accept
that the relevant kind

also accept PAP).

of freedom consists

in

being able

These compatibilists could defend

to

do otherwise

their positions

(i.e.,

they could

by arguing against

the incompatibilist’s claim that determinism entails being unable
to

do otherwise. Thus,

‘could have done otherwise’ could be understood differently than

is

incompatibilist.

It

had circumstances

for the

could be understood as something like ‘would have done otherwise
(e.g.,

the past, or the laws) been different.

would remain unconvinced by these arguments. The strong
alternatives require

it

more than these

15

But incompatibilists

intuition that

compatibilist analyses allow seems to

genuine

work

against

these compatibilist positions.

Sometimes
compatibilists

PAP is written as “an agent is free only if he could have done otherwise.” Some of the
who defend their positions by analyzing ‘could have done otherwise’ in a certain way may

not be claiming anything about moral responsibility. What is important is that (most)
incompatibilists and
these compatibilists accept that having alternate possibilities is the kind of freedom
that matters to us.
15

For example, multiple-pasts compatibilists suggest that one can coherently assert both a “can claim”
(you
can refrain from x) and a “backtracking” conditional (if you were to refrain from x,
y would not have
obtained). Local-miracle compatibilists similarly hold that one can assert both a “can
claim” and a “local
miracle" conditional (if you were to refrain from x, some law that held would not have held)
(Fischer

1986a, 34-6).

13

Frankfurt, in “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” presumably

scores a victory for a kind of compatibilism (between moral responsibility
and

determinism) by attempting to show that the Principle of Alternate Possibilities
(Frankfurt 1988a). Another

main goal

is

false

for this chapter will be to demonstrate that

Frankfurt’s counterexample, although successful, does not actually

work against

the

incompatibilist (and in favor of the compatibilist).

Frankfurt

tells

the following story:

—

—

Suppose someone Black, let us say wants Jones to perform a certain
Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but
he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until
action.

Jones
it is

is

make up his mind what to do, and he does nothing unless
him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that Jones is

about to

clear to

going to decide to do something other than what he wants him to do. If it
does become clear that Jones is going to decide to do something else,
Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones decides to do, and that he
does do, what he wants him
Frankfurt goes on to say that

wants him

to

we

to do.

(Frankfurt 1988a, 6)

16

can suppose that Jones does decide to do what Black

do (without Black’s having

to intervene).

In that case,

we would

hold Jones morally responsible even though he does not have an alternative

clearly

(7).

Frankfurt’s counterexample can be seen as an attempt to separate the issue of

whether determinism and freedom

to

do otherwise are compatible, from the issue of

whether determinism and moral responsibility are compatible (Fischer 1986b,
the kind of freedom that

there

is

1 have omitted the subscript
examples in his article.

According

to Fischer,

Thus

74).

relevant to moral responsibility (assuming, of course, that

some kind of freedom

16

17

is

1

relevant) will

‘4’ after ‘Jones.’

Frankfurt believes that

Frankfurt calls ‘freedom of action’ or power

no longer be freedom

Frankfurt puts

it

to

do otherwise}

1

there to distinguish from three previous

we do sometimes have freedom

to do otherwise (what
do what one wants’), but that this sort of freedom is not
required is something Frankfurt calls ‘acting freely’ (Fischer
‘to

required for moral responsibility. All that

is

1986a, 44-8). Presumably, then, someone

who

agrees with Frankfurt on these points could hold one of

14

Again,

if successful,

Frankfurt’s counterexample might, at

victory for compatibilism. This

one’s action can be free in a

is

way

Then

be seen as a

because the example would demonstrate

that really matters

moral responsibility) without having
these terms).

first,

to

(i.e.,

in a

way

more

it is

that

that is relevant to

be undetermined or avoidable

the incompatibilist push for a

how

(in

some sense of

intuitive understanding

of ‘could

have done otherwise’ would become irrelevant because ‘could have done otherwise’

would become

irrelevant if

PAP were

false.

This kind of compatibilism

may seem more

plausible than compatibilism between freedom to do otherwise and determinism.
Also
(as

John Martin Fischer points out)

that

it

may be

difficult to see

why anyone would

believe

determinism “would threaten moral responsibility for some reason apart from

relationship to alternative possibilities” (Fischer 1994, 149)

(I

its

will argue against Fischer’s

claim later on).

With

all

of this

counterexamples
incompatibilists

to

in

PAP have

who

it is

easy to see

why

often

come from

incompatibilists, specifically those

mind,

believe that

to responsibility (see for

we do sometimes

later that this is

on Frankfurt-style

possess the kind of freedom relevant

example, van Inwagen 1986a, Widerker 1995). 18

these incompatibilist philosophers have

argue

attacks

not so. But

more

first, let

Frankfurt-style counterexamples to

It

seems

to lose if Frankfurt is right. Again,

us look at the strategies used

to

I

that

will

argue against

PAP.

these combinations of views: he could be a compatibilist or an incompatibilist with respect to freedom
otherwise and determinism, and also be a compatibilist with respect to moral responsibility and
determinism. And of course those who agree with Frankfurt that we do sometimes have freedom to do

to

otherwise would have to be compatibilists with respect to freedom to do otherwise and determinism, or
they would have to be indeterminists.
18

Frankfurt-style counterexamples to

PAP

are counterexamples that stem from Frankfurt’s original idea.

Such examples are usually fleshed out and amended.

15

do

The

Flicker of

The

flicker

counterexamples

Freedom Objection

to Frankfurt-Style

of freedom objection centers on the idea

to

PAP

are not counterexamples at

alternative possibility that has

been overlooked.

all

Counterexamples

that Frankfurt-style

because they

all

involve

some

In other words, the claim is that

Fiankfurt and his defenders have not provided an example in
which the agent

is

morally

responsible but has no alternative possibilities. These objectors say
that there

is

some

flicker

of freedom involved

The objection
more

in these alleged

takes different forms.

is

that

what Jones

is

is

I

will focus

on involves looking

morally responsible for (Fischer 1994, 139). The

morally responsible for

Thus, Jones really does have an alternative
his

The form

closely at what happens in the actual sequence of the action and
carefully

specifying exactly what the agent
idea

“counterexamples.”

own

is

making

the decision on his own.

—namely, making

the

same decision not on

(Fischer 1994, 139).

John Martin Fischer has an interesting response
that the alternative possibilities said to

“

be robust enough

to

be present (by the

possibility

is

make

it

set

claims

do not seem

to

of alternatives in which Jones does

the case that he actually acts freely?” (142).

Jones being forced

to

make

Jones can either do something on his

him morally

flicker theorist)

He

ground moral responsibility ascriptions” (Fischer 1994, 142).

Moreover, Fischer also asks, “how could adding a
not act freely

to “flicker” strategies.

responsible.

the decision by Black.

own

or be forced to do

it

is

It

The

alternative

seems

that the fact that

not really

why we

We hold him morally responsible because there is

16

hold

some sense

in

which he does what he wants

to

do and because

it is

not the case that he does

because he could not have done otherwise” (Frankfurt 1988a,

10).

Perhaps the flicker theorist would respond by claiming that
fact,

The

robust enough.

flicker theorist

fetched example (this strategy

identify in

to

go

more

to jail for

realistic

might

try to

—

makes some sense

examples). For example,

“only

it

this alternative

in

is,

support this intuition with a less far-

intuitions are

let

sometimes easier

us suppose that a

some crime he has committed. Couldn’t we imagine

man

that this

is

to

supposed

man

has the

genuine alternatives of walking into the prison on his own or being dragged
there by
force?

19

Wouldn’t

the

man be

dragged, and more honorable
this case,

it

seems obvious

seen as more despicable

if

he willingly walked

if he resisted

in to receive his

that there are robust alternatives.

and had

to

due punishment? In

Doesn’t such a case support

the intuition that there are alternatives in Jones’s case because Jones’s
situation

one

in

which there

is

a choice

be

is

also

between doing something on one’s own and not doing

something on one’s own? Unfortunately, the case of the prisoner does not support
intuition,

because

it

this

does not parallel the Frankfurt counterexample.

This prisoner example differs

in that

it

is

reasonable to say that the prisoner does

have a genuine choice between alternatives: he can choose

to resist or to

comply with

his

imprisonment. As Fischer points out, Jones “does not deliberate about and choose the
possibility” of not performing the action

even choose

to resist or

comply with Black’s wishes

alternative sequence Jones does not

in question”; 143).

It

has been brought to

on his own (Fischer 1994, 143). Jones does not
(as Fischer suggests, “in the

form an intention

to refrain

Although Jones may have alternatives

my

attention that

in

Hobbes gives such an example.

17

from causing the volition

some sense of the word,

it

is

difficult for the flicker theorist to

(whereas

we may

all

would add

(I

flicker strategy

support the idea that Jones has robust alternatives

agree that the prisoner has robust alternatives).
to this that

would want

alternatives that aie able to

to

it

seems strange

view these

that

some of those who support

flickers as robust alternatives

ground moral responsibility )."

0

(i.e.,

the

as

My reasoning for this

is that

incompatibilists are usually the ones offering these flicker strategies—
it seems strange to

me

one who suggests

that

are not robust

enough .)

that traditional compatibilist

enough would

same time suggest

at the

forms of alternative possibilities

that

such flickers are robust

21

But perhaps

we

should try to get clearer on what

before deciding which side

meant by a robust

is

alternative

Obviously, Fischer does not want to characterize a

is right.

robust alternative as the kind of alternative required for moral responsibility
(because he
rejects

PAP, he

responsibility).

rejects the idea that

having alternatives

But Fischer does want

relying on the intuition that

someone

genuine, robust alternative. After

all,

intuition in supporting their position?

is

to

is

what

who

say that those

And

of freedom could not possibly be enough

to

who

hold

doesn’t intuition

PAP

hold

morally responsible only

don’t those

required for moral

is

PAP
tell

if

are

presumably

she has a true,

rely

on the strength of

us that this

little

flicker

hold someone morally responsible?

Fischer mentions that in Peter van Inwagen’s Essay on Free Will van Inwagen, an incompatibilist
suggests that “all the actual causal antecedents of a particular event are essential to it” (Fischer
1994, 137).
Thus, on this view, Jones would have alternatives because his performing the action on his own is a
,

different event-particular than his performing the action due to Black’s intervention (i.e., Jones “does
possess the power to bring about a different event particular”) (Fischer 1994, 137). Presumably, van
Inwagen would argue that determinism would rule out our power to bring about any different eventparticulars.

Even putting aside objections

one can

object along the lines that Fischer does. Fischer claims:

that

it

still

is in

virtue

(against van Inwagen) regarding this kind of event individuation,

of the existence of such an alternative possibility

what he does” (Fischer 1994, 140).
21
I,

of course, recognize the lack of a full-fledged argument here.

18

“it is

that

highly implausible to suppose

Jones

is

morally responsible for

So how should we characterize a robust

alternative? Fischer suggests that robust

alternatives involve the following:

On

the traditional alternative-possibilities picture, it is envisaged
that an
agent has a choice between two (or more) scenarios
of a certain sort. In
one scenario, he deliberates and forms an intention to perform an act of a
certain kind and then carries out this intention in an appropriate
way. In at
least one other possible scenario, he deliberates and forms
an intention
perform a different kind of act (or no act at all) and carries out this
intention in an appropriate way. (Fischer 1994, 142)

Thus Jones does not have

a robust alternative because he does not deliberate and carry

out the action in the appropriate

way

in the alternative

sequence

( 1

42)—whereas

prisoner does do this in both scenarios. Although perhaps one could
the Jones

example so

reject this

by claiming

which the agent
would

I

we

that for robust alternatives,

the

somehow modify

that the intervener forces Jones to deliberate, Fischer could

still

both sequences must be scenarios in

acts freely (143).

like to

add some thoughts

look at the Jones example,

satisfies

we

to Fischer’s

can see that there

is

account of robust alternatives. If

no alternative

for Jones that

both of the following conditions: (1) Jones can perform the action, and
(2) Jones

has awareness of the action.

I

would

required of an alternative in order for

like to suggest that these

it

to

two conditions

are

be robust. In the case of Jones, Jones

is

aware of the alternative of performing the action as a result of Black ’s intervention

you

to

prefer,

of refraining from performing the action on his own). There

is

not

(or, if

a very

plausible sense in which an agent does not have a genuine choice between two things

unless he

is

aware of both of them. Although Jones believes he has the alternative of

refraining from performing the action he cannot refrain (because Black will
,

act).

So even

if

we want

to

say that Jones

is

aware of this

19

sort

make him

of alternative, Jones

cannot perform
condition

(1).

this sort

it;

On

of alternative

satisfies condition (2)

but

does not satisfy

it

the other hand, Jones can perform (in a limited sense of perform) the

action as a result of Black’s intervention, but he

not aware of this alternative; this

is

alternative satisfies condition (1) but not condition (2). 22 Unlike Jones, the prisoner has
a

robust alternative because he can comply with his captors or refrain from complying

choose

to

of them.’'

make them

3

take

Thus we have

him by

a

He

force).

can perform these actions and he

way of understanding

the difference

(i.e.,

aware

is

between robust or

genuine alternatives and the kind of alternatives present in the flicker scenarios. These
latter alternatives are

does not save

not robust

PAP (PAP

enough

to

ground responsibility and so

their

presence

really only refers to robust alternatives).

Fischer considers a final response that the flicker theorist might give. Fischer
explains the response as follows:

The

flicker theorist

may

not dispute the claim that the alternative

examples are insufficiently robust

possibilities in the Frankfurt-type

2

The

"

flicker strategist

might object

that the first sort

of alternative (of refraining) and the second

alternative (of performing the act as a result of Black’s intervention) are really the

both conditions for a robust alternative would be satisfied).
distinct alternatives

am

considering them both to be actions, a case could be

forced

to

I

am

because they are distinct sorts of actions.

do something as a

result

1

made

of Black 's intervention

is

same

to

sort

of

alternative (thus,

suggesting, however, that these are

think this

that

is

plausible because although

while refraining

is

1

an action, being

not. This points to the difference

them. Moreover, Fischer seems to imply that the former action would be free whereas the

between

latter

would not

(Fischer 1994, 143). This also serves to distinguish them. If the flicker strategist suggests that they are

both cases of refraining (because the second case could be seen as a case of refraining

on

his

on one
23

own), the objection will not hold because
’s

own

to

the flicker strategist

who

to

perform the action

needs performing an action

be distinct from performing an action.

Another objection

someone

it is

that

might

arise

is

that there

seem

to

be cases

in

which we would want

to

say that

had a genuine or robust alternative even though she was not aware of it (i.e., that awareness
is not required for robustness). But what kind of situation would cause a person to lack awareness of any
performable alternative (including the alternative of refraining)? It seems to me that in any such case, if we
really

were truly convinced
convinced

that the

person was not aware of any performable alternative,

that the alternative in question

was not

accept robust alternatives as the requirement for responsibility

claim that the person
let

is

not responsible in such cases. But

such agents off the hook. For example, the agent could

for failing to acquire

awareness of the alternative

(if

I

(i.e.,

do not

still

we would

it

would seem

20

that those

those

—perhaps

be held responsible for something

robust alternatives were present

point).

also be

who
who accept PAP) would have to
think one who accepts PAP must always

a robust one. At first

at the

appropriate

ground our
wish

to

ascriptions of moral responsibility. That is to say, he may not
argue that the existence of such alternatives in themselves supports

our intuitive judgments that individuals are morally responsible for what

may insist that alternative possibilities must
be present, whenever an agent is legitimately held morally responsible for
what he does. (Fischer 1994, 145)
they do. But he nevertheless

The

idea behind this

move

is that

there

“may be some

other factor which both grounds

our responsibility ascriptions and also entails that there be some alternative possibility”
(145-6).

Fischer, although admittedly unable to give a decisive argument against this final

response, tries to undermine

its

plausibility

by suggesting

that fulfills the required role.

Fie realizes that

determinism

it

prior

is

the factor, but

commitment

does not seem

to the incompatibility

that there is

one might suggest
that

no obvious factor

that the falsity

of

one would do so unless one had a

of determinism and responsibility (Fischer 1994,

146).

I

think Fischer

makes

strength of PAP appeared to

to

freedom

because

it

(to

factor,

it

directly.

it.

lie in its plausibility

(to

might as well be discarded
If there is

that

employing

it

is

as a principle

PAP

upon defenders of PAP.

It

its

direct connection

has had a hold on philosophers mainly

weakened

that

freedom

so as to rely

to

do otherwise

on some other

we ought

to

be looking for

it

and arguing about

then Frankfurt-style examples cannot be said to have

false (and those

as a principle). But

is

and

original

favor of a principle that employs that factor

indeed such a factor,

if this factor exists,

PAP

in

PAP

The

the flicker theorist.

them) intuitively plausible (and true)

for moral responsibility. If

Of course,

shown

good case against

do otherwise). In other words,

seemed

was required

a

it

who

believe

seems

PAP

that the

may now be up

be true would be justified

in

burden of proof will have been thrust

to those

21

to

who

support

PAP

to

argue for their

position (instead of against Frankfurt’s).
a

Dialectical Stalemate’

;

but,

he adds,

As

Fischer says,

we need

seems

it

that

not despair because

we have reached

some of the most

philosophically important and difficult issues often leave
us in such a situation.
us, then, to

make our

It is

up

to

decision based on what seems most plausible and reasonable
to us

(Fischer 1994, 146-7).

What seems most

of freedom are not robust enough

to

plausible to Fischer (and to

me)

is that

flickers

ground responsibility; and so we can conclude

that

moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities
(147).

Widerker’s Objection to Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples
David Widerker constructs a

different sort

counterexamples. Widerker’s main concern

of objection against Frankfurt-style

is that if

Frankfurt’s attack on

PAP

is

successful with respect to decisions, then Frankfurt will have
refuted libertarianism (one
sort

of incompatibilism). In “Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the
Principle of

Alternative Possibilities,” Widerker characterizes libertarianism as the view
that

An agent s decision (choice) is free in the sense of freedom required for
moral responsibility only if (i) it is not causally determined, and (ii) in the
circumstances in which the agent made that decision (choice), he could
have avoided making

Widerker
(e.g.,

tries to

show

it.

(Widerker 1995, 247)

that Frankfurt’s rejection

of PAP does not work

for

mental acts

deciding, choosing, etc.); Widerker adds that mental acts are the kinds of acts that

“constitute the basic loci of moral responsibility” for the libertarian (247). Because

Widerker’s characterization of libertarianism includes a form of PAP
mental

acts,

Widerker fears

that a successful attack

will serve to refute libertarianism (250).

Widerker

starts

concrete and specific.

on

PAP

Thus he attempts

with Frankfurt’s counterexample to

He

on

(with respect to decisions)

to

disprove Frankfurt’s claims.

PAP

and makes

asks us to suppose that a person, Jones,

22

that focuses

is

it

more

thinking about

killing another person, Smith.

and then

to

do so (remember, Widerker wants

decisions). Black can

his

A third person.

somehow

Black, wants Jones to decide to
to consider the

force Jones to

kill

example

kill

Smith

as applied to

Smith, but Black prefers “not to

show

hand unnecessarily” (Widerker 1995, 249). Also, Widerker adds:
Black can be sure that he will have his

way

in

view of knowing the

following facts about Jones and himself:

Jones

(1) If

decide

blushing at

is

at t2 to kill

tl,

then, provided no

(2) If Jones is not blushing at tl

not decide at t2 to

one intervenes, Jones

will

Smith.

kill

,

then, provided

no one intervenes, he

will

Smith.

Black sees that Jones shows signs that he will not decide at t2 to kill
is, sees that Jones is not blushing at tl
then Black forces
Jones to decide at t2 to kill Smith; but if he sees that he is blushing at

(3) If

Smith, that

,

tl,

then he does nothing.

Finally,

suppose that Black does not have

(4) Jones is blushing at tl,

and decides

to

show

at t2 to kill

his hand,

Smith

because

for reasons

of his

own. (249-250)

With

this

tilled in)

is

example

is

mind, Widerker asks whether Frankfurt (with Widerker’s specifics

has “succeeded in describing a situation in which a decision for which an agent

morally responsible

occurrence,

it

is

such

nevertheless

is

that,

though there

is

no causally

sufficient condition for

unavoidable?” (250). Widerker claims that

this is

its

what

Frankfurt wants to achieve with his counterexample. Widerker supports this claim with
the following quote from Frankfurt:

may be circumstances in which a person performs some action
which although they make it impossible for him to avoid performing that
action, they in no way bring it about that he performs it. (Frankfurt 1969,
830,837) (Widerker 1995,248)
There

Widerker adds

that Frankfurt’s point is that in

such a case, the person “cannot in order to

absolve himself of moral responsibility claim that he acted in circumstances that
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left

him

no alternative

to

doing what he did” and

person would have done the same thing

that the

had these circumstances not obtained (Widerker 1995, 248).

Widerker then argues

that the

example does not

described by Widerker above) because either

we

Frankfurt’s criteria (as

fit

are forced to

concede

that the decision is

brought about by “the factor” that makes Jones’s action unavoidable (contrary
Frankfurt wants to say), or

Frankfurt needs

that

it

to be)

we

cannot see

how

the decision

is

we need

sequence, Jones could decide not to

what

really unavoidable (which

(Widerker 1995, 251). Widerker argues

Jones has no alternatives,

to

that in order to ensure

to rule out the possibility that, in the actual

kill

Smith immediately after blushing

at tl (in

which

case Black would not have intervened) (251). In order to rule out this possibility and to

make

we would have

sure Jones really does not have any alternative,

Jones’s not blushing

at tl is a

means

to

assume “that

causally necessary condition for his not deciding at t2 to

kill

Smith. But this

kill

Smith” (251). Widerker seems

that his blushing at tl

is

to suggest that

causally sufficient for his decision to

because blushing

for the decision to kill Smith, then the circumstances

is

causally sufficient

which make the decision

unavoidable do actually bring about the decision (contrary

to

what Frankfurt requires of

his example).

But

is

Widerker right about

this?

It

seems

that Frankfurt could

Widerker’s charge by claiming that although blushing
it is

not really what Frankfurt has in

make

mind when

is

respond to

indeed a “factor” in the scenario,

asserting that the circumstances that

the action unavoidable do not bring about the action (see Frankfurt quote above).

The circumstances include things about Black,
over Jones,

etc.

It

seems

to

me

that

Widerker
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his desire, his

is

mistaken

in

knowledge of and power

claiming that there must be

no causally

sufficient condition” for the occurrence

in order for the

example

to qualify as

of the action

in the actual

an appropriate counterexample to

PAP

sequence

(Widerker

1995, 250, quoted above). Thus, like the flicker
objection, Widerker’s objection to

Frankfurt

If

is

not successful. But

Widerker

is

is

the libertarian then defeated as Widerker
fears?

right about Jones’s blushing being a
causally sufficient condition

for Jones s decision to kill Smith, then,
can’t the following claim be

claim that those

who

accept Frankfhrt’s counterexample have to
accept that an act can be

(causally) determined and at the

required for responsibility)? 2

same time

free (with respect to the kind

of freedom

'

1

Libertarianism, then, (or so

with the counterexample (remember, condition
that the free

made? Can’t one

(i)

it

seems) would be

in conflict

of Widerker’s libertarianism requires

mental act or decision not be causally determined).
Thus, the question

is

again raised whether Frankfurt scores a victory for
compatibilists and against
incompatibilists.

Eleanore Stump, a libertarian, responds

to this in

her paper “Libertarian

and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities” (Stump
1996). In

modifed Frankfurt-style example. In
is

a neurosurgeon

who

if

Jones

does not,

is

example (from Fischer), Black

(the intervener)

make Jones decide

to vote for

Reagan (instead of Carter)

not about to decide to vote for

Reagan on

his

in fact, intervene

nothing about

[this]

.

.

.

Stump goes on

example requires the

is

about to decide

to cite Fischer’s

to

claim

actual sequence issuing in the decision

Widerker says that "a decision is not causally determined ... if prior to
obtain a causally sufficient condition for it” (Widerker
1995, 247, n. 2).
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that

own. But, of course. Black

because the monitor shows that Jones

vote for Reagan (and does so) (Stump 1996, 74).
that

she uses a

puts something into Jones’s brain so that he can monitor
and

control Jones in order to

is,

this

this paper,

Freedom

its

occurrence there does not

and action

way

to

proceed

in a deterministic

way

that satisfied the libertarian, then Jones

...

if

it

proceeds in a non-deterministic

can be held morally responsible, even though

he could not have done otherwise”’ (Stump
1996, 74). Thus, according

and Widerker disagree over whether the example
does require
deterministically

I

will try to

determine

who

should take note of a few things: as discussed

some

example changes

now

is

s

in

another

like blushing) before his decision, the

time to force Jones to decide

first

that the

neural firings.

1)

what follows. But

Widerker holds

was blushing)
to do.

In

first,

that there

we

must be

for the decision, so

Stump’s paper, the

to

is

of a sign (blushing),

that if Jones

as

was used

shows no such

in

inclination (or sign,

neurosurgeon would not be able

to intervene in

vote for Reagan (Stump 1996, 75).

some antecedent mental

25

state.

She claims

that

neurosurgeon uses a highly sensitive neuroscope

The neurosurgeon

with certain decisions. Thus,

sequence

proceeds

attempts to demonstrate that Frankfurt-style counterexamples
do not

require that there be

example so

that the decision

way— the antecedent state to be detected by the intervener is

example. Widerker’s idea

Stump

it

could detect what Jones was going

a mental state (an inclination), instead

Widerker

right in

earlier,

causally sufficient condition (in his example

that the intervener

Stump, Fischer

whether the example violates one of Widerker’s
conditions of

(i.e.,

libertarian freedom).

to

we

also

knows

that certain

we

can modify the

that

can detect

sequences of firings correlate

can say that the firing of neurons

a, b,

c (neural

corresponds to Jones’s decision to vote for Reagan, while the firing of

This part of Stump’s argument,

Some of Stump's

it seems to me, will not apply to an antecedent
sign, such as blushing.
other arguments will directly apply, however.
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neurons

x, y,

26
z (neural sequence 2) corresponds to Jones’s decision
to vote for Carter.
If

the neuroscope detects the beginning of sequence
2, the intervener will interrupt the

sequence so that the decision does not come about; he will then do something

to

bring

it

about that Jones decides to vote for Reagan (Stump
1996, 77-8). With these revisions in
place, there

no longer some antecedent mental

is

bringing about the decision

does

it

that

the firing of neuron a

is,

correlate to any mental state or act.

There

is,

Stump

as

defines libertarian

)

state that is causally sufficient for

points out,

still

is

not a mental state or

a

problem

for the libertarian (as

Widerker

that there

need be no preceding mental

act, inclination, etc.,

she has not shown that the decision need not be causally determined. After

whole neural sequence of firings

to vote for

among

Reagan

nor
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defender of Frankfurt. Although Stump’s amendment to the

example may demonstrate

interactions

act,

...

is

the causal

all,

“the

outcome of the chain of causal

the individual neurons constituting the sequence”; thus, the decision

“is

determined by the chain of causal interactions among the neurons

of the sequence” (Stump 1996, 79).

But Stump has

a response to this charge as well.

She claims

that there

is

a version

of libertarianism that does not require that a free decision not be causally determined.

She claims

that

Aquinas

is

one such

libertarian as

Part of her support for promoting this

is

Peter van Inwagen (Stump 1996, 80).

somewhat ‘weaker’ version of libertarianism

is

to

'6

In her unpublished paper “Alternative Possibilities

and Responsibility: the Flicker of Freedom,” Stump

points out that “the correlation between a mental act or state and the firings of neurons

is a one-many
Only when the whole sequence of neural firings is completed, do I have the mental act. ...If the
of the whole neural sequence correlated with a mental act is not completed, the result isn’t some

relation...

firing

truncated or incomplete

act.

It’s

no mental

act at all”

(Stump unpublished,

8-9).

”7

Widerker considers this possible response and suggests that it could be claimed that a decision
mental action that does not have the structure suggested by Stump (Widerker 1995, 252-3).
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is

a simple

claim

according to Widerker’s formulation of
libertarianism, only extreme Cartesian

that,

dualists could

be

libertarians.

This

is

because such a libertarian would have

only those mental acts that are not so

much

hold that

to

as correlated with patterns of neural
firings

can count as morally responsible or free” (Stump
28
1996, 80).
This leads Stump

what

that

required for libertarianism

is

outcome of a causal chain
claims that this

is

a decision be free “only if

it

is

be causally determined

of libertarianism,

it is

is

it

is

claim

not the

that originates in a cause outside the agent”
(note that

not sufficient for libertarianism but

act or decision not

this version

is that

to

Stump

necessary, 80). Thus, that an

not necessary for libertarian freedom.

not a problem that Jones’s decision

is

On

determined by

the firing of neurons because these (in the actual
sequence) originate from within Jones. 29
It

seems

Stump has fended off Widerker’s

that

One might
seem

that

Stump

determinism.

It

is

objections by modifying libertarianism. 30

object that Stump’s libertarianism

is

hardly libertarian at

all.

should be pointed out, however, that although libertarianism
must

require that freedom

is

it

need not

incompatible with certain events being detennined by certain

other events (e.g., actions being determined

to

may

advocating some kind of compatibilism between freedom and

require that (the relevant kind of) freedom and determinism
are incompatible,

Stump seems

It

by events

internal to the agent).

(I

would add

be suggesting that a libertarian (in Widerker’s ‘stronger’ sense) would
need to rule out
determined by “the chain of causal interactions among the neurons of the

that decisions are causally

sequence” (Stump 1996, 79, quoted above). Stump holds that the only way
to do
Widerker s kind of libertarianism) is to deny the strong connection between
(and therefore

to

be

a Cartesian dualist).

Stump does not seem

this

(while maintaining

decisions and neural sequences
to allow any other options for this kind of

libertarian.

Of course, one
this is

I

could argue that there must be causes outside the agent that lead to the firing
of these
that neither science nor philosophy has shown that

Stump attempts to block this move by arguing
true (Stump 1996, 81-8). I will be discussing this

neurons.

assume

(so long as

that this final step

we can

issue further in later chapters.

of the argument will work with respect to an antecedent sign, like blushing
maintain that blushing originates within the agent).
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here that

need not require that freedom

it

is

incompatible with certain events being

determined by agents.) The libertarian must
believe that determinism as a doctrine
about
the entire world

is false (i.e., it is

not true that everything

is

determined), but need not

believe that nothing can be determined.
Perhaps what troubles those
objection

is that it is

determined. But

we do

Stump could respond

is

is

necessitated

that matters

what

because that

is

is

that the libertarian intuition that

really the intuition that

we

freedom

is still

free

internal to the agent

how we

the libertarian

and responsible so long as causal
31

.

are the source

In other words,

it is

what

is

I

Will

s

own

argue

mental faculties, her intellect and

internal

of our own actions and decisions

For example, Stump points out that Aquinas holds
that “the essence of freedom
agent

is

are not genuinely free if

by something outside of us. Perhaps even

does not mind admitting that the agent
factors are limited to

this

the free actions and decisions in this
case that end up being

incompatible with determinism
everything

who make

will, are the ultimate

is

32
.

that the

source of my free

act,

later that not all external

causal factors should be ruled out. It does not seem plausible
to
cannot be any external influences i.e., influences that, in
some sense, act as causes— in
order for an act to be free (these points were suggested
to me by Vere Chappell). Stump does discuss
influences. She suggests that while “it is uncontroversial
that neural events are causally influenced

—

insist that there

events outside the agent,

by

isn’t at all clear that

they are causally determined by events outside the agent”
84). Then later she claims that “if either causes outside
the agent or sheer accident is
responsible for neural events correlated with the agent’s acts
of intellect and will, the ultimate source of the
action isn t the mind of the agent” (Stump
1996, 85). It seems we ought to interpret Stump as claiming that
an external cause does not take away freedom so long
as it is not a sufficient cause (in her words, so long as
it is not “responsible” for the
neural events— see quote above). There do seem to be some complications.
it

(Stump 1996,

First

of all,

that willing

in

another

article,

Stump seems

can be “influenced

to

make

a distinction between influence and cause. She says

important ways (but not caused, constrained, or compelled) by previous
choices (Stump 1990, 270). Although Stump is talking about
previous choices here (which could be taken
to be internal influences), she uses ‘influence’
in such a way as to suggest that it is not a cause. This seems
to

in

go against one

being

more

intuitive sense of ‘cause’ and leads to some confusion when she
talks about neural events
causally influenced” (above). Nevertheless, I think Stump is justified in
understanding ‘cause’ in a
restricted sense; but perhaps this should be spelled out more explicitly
in her article.

Secondly, one

might claim

When

that

Stump

also ought to spell out exactly

are they responsible and

when

is

how

these external influences play any role in action.
the intellect responsible (aren’t external influences at least partly

responsible even in free actions? If not, in what way are they influences at all?).
Some of these issues will
be addressed in later chapters. It is these sorts of confusions that I believe need
to be dealt with when

discussing responsibility.
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and not something outside the agent” (Stump
1996,
appear

be safe

to

PAP). Thus,

in

80).

So

Stump and Fischer

far.

claiming that the libertarian can defend
Frankfort (thus rejecting

at this point,

it

appears that Frankfort’s counterexample cannot be
used

against the incompatibilist in favor of the compatibilist.
But
objection. This objection, if successful, will cause a

we must

problem only

consider one more

for the

libertarian/incompatibilist defender of Frankfort-style
counterexamples. In other words,
it

will

work towards showing

that Frankfort

The
I

will call this objection

that the neurosurgeon, or the

could be

counterexample

Fallibility

Objection

the fallibility objection” because

mechanism which he

The idea behind

fallible.

does indeed help the compatibilist position.

relies

for Carter

and the mechanism

is,

there

is

some

(and

is

nothing

is

that the only

way

to

in the

fails to

going

to

to

operate

decide to vote

thus unable to stop this decision and bring

about the decision to vote for Reagan) and so Jones does decide

seems

on the idea

monitor and control Jones,

mechanism

possible world in which Jones

fails

centers

Jones has the alternative of deciding

vote for Carter instead of Reagan if the neurosurgeon’s

That

to

this objection is that there is

to rule out the possibility that

correctly.

on

it

claim that the mechanism cannot

to

vote for Carter.

fail is to

rely

It

on

determinism. In response, one might suggest that whereas the action of the mechanism
determined,

it

unrealistic.

How

in

is

not the case that everything

would

it

come about

an indeterministic world?

It

seems

that

is

is

determined; but this suggestion seems

such a mechanism operated deterministically

that in order for the

In Chapter 4, 1 will argue that the only kind oflibertarianism that
determines her free and responsible action.

30

counterexample

is intelligible is

one

in

to

work,

which the agent

determinism would have
does not allow.
freedom; there

It

is

seems

is

33

true.

But

that if one is

this is

we seem

an altemative^iecidmg

an mdeterminist there

Is the libertarian

to vote for

Carter-that Jones

many

libertarian)

a flicker of

mechanism could

(in

some

not a world that

a lost traveler:

is

is

is

one

is

an indeterminist,

both aware of and that

fail).

defender of Frankfurt doomed then?

Jones can decide to vote for Carter. This
fails is

more than

is

to get the following result: if

he can perform (because the mechanism can

possibility that the

something Stump (or any

genuine (or robust) alternative. Applying the
conditions for

a

robustness as given above,
there

be

to

do not think

I

possible world)

because the world

fail,

in

The

so.

does not mean

that

which the mechanism

accessible to Jones (we hear an echo of the words heard
by

“you can’t get there from here”). John Martin Fischer makes the

following point about ‘can’:

Now

one way of analyzing the “can” of freedom is in terms of the
between the actual world and other possible worlds. That

relationship

very roughly,

is,

not unreasonable to say that an agent can do
just in
case there exists a possible world suitably related to the actual world
in
which the agent does X. Of course, there is considerable disagreement

about

how

X

it is

to specify the “suitable relationship” referred to here,

general idea

is

that can-claims, being

modal claims of a

but the

certain sort,

correspond to claims about possible worlds. (Fischer 1994, 90)

My suggestion

is

that the

world

in

which the mechanism

fails is

not suitably related to the

actual world.

Obviously, the world in which the mechanism
imagine.

example

It

does not,

at first,

stipulates, the actual

appear

world

to

is

fails is

not difficult for us to

be so different from the actual world. But as the

one

in

which Jones

is

about

This interesting objection comes from comments made by Phillip Bricker
of moral responsibility and alternative possibilities).

the subject

31

to

decide

at a talk

to

vote for

given by Stump (on

Reagan.

I

do not think

it is

inconsistent (or unrealistic) to hold (similar to

what Stump

says about neural sequences) that at this point Jones must decide to vote
for Reagan
unless

someone intervenes

(in other

words, the decision process, once begun, cannot be

altered without unusual intervening circumstances).

It

seems reasonable

to

suggest that

within the conditions of the example, the only worlds accessible to Jones
are those that

diverge from this point.
point, Jones

The

failure

of the mechanism changes nothing because at

already about to decide to vote for Reagan.

is

One might suggest

that

this

is

it

possible for the neurosurgeon to have wanted Jones to vote for Carter
instead. But again,

we

can stipulate

35

as part

of the example

Black’s decision has already been

I

believe,

that at this point

(when Jones

made and Jones cannot

on the basis of the preceding points,

is

about

to decide),

access that world from here

that the indeterminist

can

36
.

still

defend Frankfurt-style counterexamples against PAP. This means that Frankfurt does
not

do as much

to help the compatibilist position as

some may

think.

But Frankfurt does a

great deal for enhancing our understanding of intuitions about moral responsibility.

Fischer points out, Frankfurt-style examples
responsibility

is

what happens

in the actual

show us

that

what matters

for

As

moral

sequence of action, not the alternative

sequence. Thus, the incompatibilist position

is

not ruled out just yet.

An

incompatibilist

could claim that while moral responsibility does not require freedom to do otherwise,

34
1
‘

am

if a

fact,

As

here employing what Fischer calls the “Principle of the Fixity of the Past.” This principle
states that
person’s performing a certain action would require some actual fact about the past
not to have been a
then the person cannot perform the act” (Fischer 1994, 9).

I

recall, at the

same

by Stump (see

talk

about the example to avoid these objections.
inspired

I

it

n. 33),

Bruce Aune argued

My response to

that

one could make stipulations

the fallibility objection

may have been

by Aune’s comments.

suppose one could object

other than Black’s

that Jones’s decision process could

mechanism

would be markedly

different

(unless

we

hold that determinism

be interrupted and changed by something
I would argue that such worlds

is true).

from the actual world and thus not indicative of robust alternatives for Jones.
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does require freedom from (complete) determination
being unable to do otherwise

is

not the

same

in the actual

as being necessitated

than the agent himself) in the actual sequence
(Fischer
I

will

go beyond what Fischer claims

than this— they

show us

that

is

a

994,

1

to suggest that Frankfiirt

our intuitions

freedom

48-9).

In the next chapter,

examples show us more

The kind of freedom

focused on the

that matters to us, as

that is incompatible with determinism.
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is,

by some factor (other

in these cases are strongly

origins of our actions in the actual sequence.

illuminated by Frankfurt,

1

sequence. That

CHAPTER

3

COMPATIBILISM AND INCOMPATIBILISM
In the

previous chapter,

we saw

that Frankfurt

respect to the compatibility issue. In this chapter,

I

examples can be neutral with

will argue that although

one can

consistently accept the success of these examples
and be either compatibilist or

incompatibilist (with respect to responsibility and
detenninism), there are strong
intuitions at

work on

the side of incompatibilism. John Martin
Fischer

neutrality claim (see previous chapter), but

with respect

to

our intuitions.

He

comes down on

claims that he cannot see

“would threaten moral responsibility

for

some reason

apart

makes

the

the side of the compatibilists

why

causal determinism

from

its

relationship to

alternative possibilities” (Fischer 1994, 149).
Thus, according to Fischer, although

can be an incompatibilist

much

I

show us

of our actions
the agent

is

possibilities.)

what Frankfurt examples show us

is

more than what Fischer

our intuitions in these cases are strongly focused on the origins

in the actual

sequence. These are incompatibilist intuitions.

responsible for his action so long as he

shown us

that

we

feel this

somehow

originated

it

We feel that
and intended

way, regardless of whether there

counterfactual intervener. Frankfurt has put us back on the right track.

are on track,

we must

for incompatibilism,

(with

do with alternative

that

an ^ Frankfurt has

some

we

to

will argue that

claims; they

-

examples, one does not have

plausible reason to do so (presumably, previous plausible
reasons for embracing

incompatibilism had

e* c

after accepting Frankfurt-style

one

Mark

I

Ravizza).

look more closely

at

our intuitions. In order

will first argue against the compatibilist

Then

I

view

to

will discuss the incompatibilist intuitions
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Now that

make my

set out

is

case

by Fischer

more

directly.

it,

Fischer seems to

wonder about

the following question:

responsible for an action even if causally determined
to do

person can be responsible even
that an action

if

unable

He

the freedom that

is

on

all,

we

a person be

can see that a

do otherwise. Fischer argues against the idea

to

Would Picasso be any

true? (Fischer 1994, 149). Fischer goes

is all

After

must not be part of a causally determined sequence

or the “agent’s own.”

control”

it?

Why couldn’t

to

in

less creative if causal

order to be “creative”

determinism were

claim that something he calls “guidance

required for moral responsibility (Fischer 1994, 159).

gives an example of guidance control. Imagine the case
of driving a car:

The

car’s steering apparatus

right.

But unbeknownst

to

works properly when I steer the car to the
me, the car’s steering apparatus is broken in

such a way that, if I were to try to turn it in some other direction,
the car
would veer off to the right in precisely the way it actually goes to the
right.
(Fischer 1994, 133)

Fischer claims that this kind of control

Does

real question,

of course,

is

whether the driver

of freedom required for responsibility. Don’t

intuition is that

order to

make

we need

this

this

makes

to

know more

is

in the

example

we need more

really has the

information here?

about the conditions of the actual sequence

judgment. Furthermore,

driver s steering the car

why

entirely consistent with causal determinism.

intuition favor the compatibilist after all?

The
sort

is

I

believe

it

causally determined or not.

makes

The

My
in

a difference whether the

difficult question to

answer

is

a difference (since, as Fischer points out, alternative possibilities are
no

longer the issue).

Fischer and Ravizza: Guidance Control
Obviously, then,

we need

to get a better sense

Control, co-authored by Fischer and

Mark

of this view. In Responsibility and

Ravizza, this “guidance control” approach
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is

laid out in

Dennett

more

The two authors seek

detail.

(Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 26).

Dennett’s Elbow

Room

to “rectify a deficiency

They quote

noted by Daniel

the following passage from

:

What we

—

fear

determinism

is

or at any rate a very important part of what

the prospect that determinism

would

we

fear

—

in

rule out control, and

we

very definitely do not want to lose control or be out of
control or be
by something or someone else like a marionette or puppet.
We want to be in control and to control both ourselves and our destinies.
But what is control, and what is its relation to causation and
determinism?
Curiously, this obviously important question has scarcely
been addressed
by philosophers. (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 26-7)

—

controlled

,

Fischer and Ravizza then lay out a complex view detailing the
kind of control they
believe to be required for moral responsibility.

They begin by arguing

(again) that

we need

not possess the “sort of control that

involves alternative possibilities” in order to be held morally
responsible (Fischer and

Ravizza 1998, 29-30). They make a distinction between “regulative
control” and
“guidance control”:

Guidance control of an action involves an agent’s freely performing that
action .... Regulative control involves a dual power: for example,
the
power freely to do some act A, and the power freely to do something else
instead (where “doing something else” may be simply refraining from
acting at all, or “doing nothing”). Alternatively, one could say that
regulative control involves the dual power to exercise guidance control:
the power to exercise guidance control of A, and the power to exercise

guidance control of something else (instead of A). (31)
Regulative control
that

it

is

the sort of control involving alternative possibilities.

not required for moral responsibility by appealing

counterexamples
chapter).

is

to the Principle

Guidance

control, then,

to the Frankfurt-style

of Alternative Possibilities (discussed
is

what they
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call the

They argue

in the

previous

“freedom-relevant” condition for

moral responsibility.

It is

an important part of their theory
that guidance control

compatible with causal determinism. Thus,
moral responsibility

is

is

compatible with

causal determinism.

Let us take a closer look at guidance
control. Fischer and Ravizza lay out a
few
different “ingredients” that are required
for guidance control.

One of these

ingredients

reasons-responsiveness, which will be discussed in
more detail below. Another

mechanism” or “mechanisms” by which
mechanism must be
Ravizza recommend

the agent’s

that in assessing

way of ensuring

be a useful

importance of which

because

is

(it is

own mechanism—more on

on the process(es) or “mechamsm(s)”
to

a person acts

that

we

moral responsibility

is

the

important to note that this

this later).

we

Fischer and

focus not on the agent, but

that lead(s) to the agent’s action.

They believe

agent

this

focus on the actual sequence of the action (the

demonstrated by the Frankfiirt-style counterexamples).
This

in Frankfurt cases, the

is

is

is

not reasons-responsive (because she cannot do

otherwise) but the mechanism that brings about the
action in the actual sequence

is

reasons-responsive (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 38).

The crux of their view
instance)

is

that the

mechanism by which a person

must be moderately reasons-responsive

in order for there to

acts (in a given

be guidance control

and thus moral responsibility. 38 They roughly characterize
moderate reasonsresponsiveness

(MRR)

in the

following way:

Obviously, for Fischer and Ravizza, “acting freely” will be
compatible with causal determinism.

They

arrive at

moderate reasons-responsiveness by

first

ruling out

weak and strong

reasons-

responsiveness:

important to distinguish different kinds of responsiveness to
reasons. Strong
reasons-responsiveness of the mechanism issuing in action requires
a tight fit between
sufficient reason and action; this is too much to demand for
moral
It is

responsibility.

reasons-responsiveness requires a loose
too

little to

demand

for

fit

between

moral responsibility. (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 243)
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Weak

sufficient reason and action; this

is

This kind of responsiveness, then, requires that an agent act
on a

mechanism that is regularly receptive to reasons,
reasons, and at least weakly reactive to reason
.

some of which

.

are moral

(Fischer and Ravizza

.

1998, 82)
In their concluding chapter, they give a helpful

summary of the

finer points

of moderate

reasons-responsiveness:

A mechanism of kind K is moderately

responsive to reason to the extent
holding fixed the operation of a Ai-type mechanism, the agent would
recognize reasons (some of which are moral) in such a way as to give
rise
to an understandable pattern (from the viewpoint
of a third party who
understands the agent s values and beliefs), and would react to at least
that,

one

sufficient reason to

do otherwise

(in

some possible

Thus, with moderate reasons-responsiveness, the idea

used

in acting (e.g., practical

is

to

scenario). (243-4)

hold fixed the mechanism

reasoning) and look at other possible worlds. Note that

moderate responsiveness only requires

that the agent react to a reason to

one of these worlds. The agent (via the given mechanism) needs

to

do otherwise

be able

to

recognize

various reasons (some of which are moral) and there needs to be

some

which the agent

sufficient reason.

Added
mechanism be

we would

s

action

to this

would actually be

account

his own. This

is

is

different

due

to

some

in

possible world in

the requirement (mentioned earlier) that the agent’s

important

in

order to rule out certain situations in which

not want to hold the agent morally responsible even though the mechanism

is

Strong reasons-responsiveness is too much to require because it would give the faulty results that the
potentially weak-willed person or the morally imprudent (or blameworthy) person is not
responsible. This
is because strong reasons-responsiveness requires these
conditions: “if
[the mechanism in question]

K
were
and there were sufficient reason to do otherwise, the agent would recognize the sufficient reason
do otherwise and thus choose to do otherwise and do otherwise” (41). These conditions are not satisfied
the cases mentioned above. As for weak reasons-responsiveness, the requirement is
only that “there

to operate
to
in

exist

some possible scenario

agent recognizes

this reason,

responsibility because

would respond

to

it

some

which there is a sufficient reason to do otherwise, the
and the agent does otherwise” (44). This is not enough for moral

(or possible world) in

gives the faulty result that an insane person

sufficient reason that

is

bizarre or does not

strength of reasons (65-6).
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is

fit

morally responsible

if that

person

a regular pattern dealing with the

moderately reasons-responsive. Fischer and Ravizza
say the following about a

mechanism being

the agent’s

Someone
way.

s

own:

being morally responsible requires that the past be a certain
[in their previous chapter] by

We motivated this point (in part)

reference to certain cases in which the histories behind
the configuration
of mental states seemed to rule out moral responsibility. In such
a case,

we

claimed that the mechanism from which the agent acts is not, in
an
appropriate sense, the agent’s own. Thus, in order to establish
whether the
mechanism from which an agent acts is his own, we must attend to aspects

of the history of the action.

More

specifically, we have suggested that the past must contain
a
taking responsibility.” Taking responsibility, we believe, is a
necessary feature of moral responsibility. It is part of the process
by

process of

which a mechanism leading (say) to an action,
(Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 207)
Their claim, then,

we must

is

that in order to

becomes one

determine whether a given mechanism

’s

own.

is

one’s own,

look

at

whether the agent has “taken responsibility” for

responsibility

is

one of the three stages of becoming a moral agent (the three stages are

it.

On

their view, taking

“training,” “taking responsibility,” and “being held responsible”;
210), There are three

conditions, or requirements, of taking responsibility.

The

first

requirement

is

that the

individual “must see himself as an agent; he must see that his choices
and actions are
efficacious in the world” (210).

accept that he

agency

is

The second requirement

is

that the individual

“must

a fair target of the reactive attitudes as a result of how he exercises this

in certain

himself specified

contexts” (211).
in the first

The

third

requirement

two conditions be based,

in

is

that “the individual’s

view of

an appropriate way, on the

evidence” (213).

Problems with the Guidance Control View

My objections to

the

Guidance Control position mainly center on

“mechanism” and especially with how

it

qualifies as one’s
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own.

I

this notion

of a

will not argue that

it is

never important
rather,

to

look

the

at

mechanism by which one

will argue that relying so heavily

I

are

acting in a given circumstance;

on a mechanism-based view as opposed

agent-based view can be problematic for reasons
that
that the agent-based

is

I

hope

view poses fewer problems because our

more deeply rooted than those regarding mechanisms.

I

will

it

should do so

important to keep

no view ever

is).

in

is

defense

intuitions

and

perfectly legitimate, reasonable, and
unsurprising— it

mind

that the

view

is

I

an

believe

agency

will also argue that a

sensibilities.

is

just

not advanced from neutral ground (as I’m sure

Also, Fischer and Ravizza directly defend
compatibilism by impugning

the central principle of an important incompatibilist
argument.
to their

clear.

intuitions regarding

mechanism-based view walks hand-in-hand with
compatibilist
That

become

to

I

will state

my objection

later.

As discussed

in the last section,

responsibility requires that the

Taking responsibility

is

Fischer and Ravizza hold that moral

mechanism which

leads to the action

the crucial part of making a

agent takes responsibility for

and Ravizza 1998, 215).

is

the agent’s

is

own.

mechanism one’s own. 39 What

the

“acting from a particular kind of mechanism" (Fischer

My main objection centers on

these claims.

I

will illustrate

with an example. Let us imagine that a neurosurgeon
decides to perform an experiment

on a newborn baby. He figures out a way

to

manipulate certain neural pathways that will

serve as the basis for the baby’s practical reasoning mechanism.
the future,

when she

when

the child

is

He

fixes

them so

that in

able to use her practical reasoning, she will (on any occasion

uses practical reasoning) always weigh the options and do whatever
she

The reader may notice that Fischer and Ravizza claim that taking responsibility
making a mechanism one’s own (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 207). But it
is

remainder of the process consists

of.

40

is

part of the process of

unclear to

me what

the

believes will produce the most utility. In cases
in which she uses her practical reasoning

mechanism, she
is

a

will

never be weak-willed, amoral (assuming acting according

to utility

moral principle), or act on a different moral principle.
Moreover, she will never

know of the

experiment.

Let us say that she goes through the proper stages
of moral development (she

undergoes moral “training,” “taking responsibility,” and
“being held responsible”;
Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 210). She takes responsibility
for her practical reasoning

mechanism by

satisfying the three conditions laid out

she comes to see herself as an agent, she sees that she
attitudes,

238).

It

and she comes

to these

seems reasonable

practical reasoning

reasons-responsive.

that

it

makes sense

situations

be able

to

—

would conclude

I

respond

will

specifically,

it

for others to

that

her actions do

have certain

attitudes

believe these things are appropriately based

it

her own. The mechanism will also be

to sufficient reasons to

will respond to reasons

hold her morally responsible

She sees

that she properly takes responsibility for her

mechanism and makes
It

a fair target of the reactive

that she satisfies these conditions.

towards her as she has towards them; and
I

is

is,

views of herself through appropriate evidence (210-13,

have effects on the world; she sees

on her evidence. Thus,

by Fischer and Ravizza. That

when she

do otherwise

of increased

utility.

uses this mechanism

in alternative

Therefore,

(at least

we

will

on

occasions with no other responsibility-undermining circumstances).

My objection,
lor her actions

then,

that

I

have strong

intuitions against holding her responsible

on these occasions because she has been “programmed”

But on Fischer and Ravizza
according

is

to the utilitarian).

s

I

account, she

would ask

is

to act this

morally responsible (and praiseworthy

the following questions of those

41

way.

whose

intuitions

do not accord with mine:

responsibility

between the person

in

isn’t there at least

my

example and

manipulated? Wouldn’t you question your

own

an intuitive difference

a person

in

whose brain was not

responsibility if you

came

to learn that

such a manipulation had been practiced on your
brain?

Perhaps someone would contest

my

claim by suggesting that although she could

not help what the neurosurgeon did to her, perhaps
she had significant control over

whether

to take responsibility for this

will not work,

mechanism. Thus, she

responsible. This

is still

however, because of the following claim made by Fischer
and Ravizza:

Our account of taking

responsibility requires that an agent come to have a
of dispositional beliefs about himself. He need not put these
beliefs into words appropriately, nor need he explicitly
deliberate about
the beliefs, entertain them, or otherwise be
consciously aware of them.
Taking responsibility is a matter of having certain beliefs, and
certain cluster

it is not
evident that an agent can voluntarily control the having of these
beliefs.
(Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 238) 40

I

would suggest

that this claim,

my

coupled with

agent’s lack of knowledge about the

neurosurgeon’s actions, demonstrate that the agent really does not
have adequate control

over whether she takes responsibility for
It

seems

clear to

me

that

guarantee responsibility. This

view

is

misleading

in a

way

is

that

making

why

I

this

a

mechanism.

mechanism one’s own

working from an agent-based view

better with responsibility.

done without ad hoc

It is

stipulations.

But

The agent

it is

in a

making

difficult to

and yet

we

It

does not

a

Perhaps

is not.

my

it

is

mechanism one’s own

imagine

how

this

could be

mechanism-based view seems

interesting to note that this statement, although relevant to

the opposite objection to the
responsibility

too easy.

believe that working from a mechanism-based

possible to modify a mechanism-based view so that

would accord

is

current point,

is

made

in

to play a

response to

one I give. The objection is that some agents never seem to have taken
want to hold them morally responsible. My objection is that some agents have
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secondary and indirect role when really the agent should
be primary.

and Ravizza that looking
not the whole story.

As

at the

mechanism can be very

mentioned

useful and informative, but

for their claim that Frankfurt-type

mechanism-based view (Fischer and Ravizza 1998,
earlier) that the

agent

is

38),

disagree.

I

sequence, but he

is

They claim

(as

not reasons-responsive in the actual sequence of a

responsive. Although the agent cannot do otherwise,

I

it is

examples support a

Frankfurt example (because he cannot do otherwise) but that the

not responsive to reasons:

agree with Fischer

I

grant that he

mechanism

is

reasons-

see no reason to claim that he

I

would not respond

responsive to reasons in the sense that in

to

is

reasons in the alternative

some possible world

(without intervention) he would respond to reasons (remember, on their
view, moderate

reasons-responsiveness requires that the thing in question— in this case the
able to respond to a sufficient reason to do otherwise in

This sort of mechanism-based view seems to
sensibilities.

It

works from the assumption

responsibility are compatibilist concerns.

action or the

that

mechanism

that leads to

It

we

assumes

to

care about in assessing moral

that

we

accept,

it

care about the history of an

only to a certain extent— i.e., only to the extent

it is

perfectly reasonable

view should work from these compatibilist assumptions. But the

incompatibilist wants a broader and

To

scenario).

go together with compatibilist

one has gone through normal moral development. Again,

that their

this.

it

that all

me

some possible

agent—be

the extent that their

more sweeping sense of freedom and control than

view works from assumptions the incompatibilist

cannot sway the incompatibilist.

taken responsibility and yet we do not want
and Ravizza do not deal with my objection.

to

It

appears that

we have

reached an impasse.

hold them morally responsible. As far as
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will not

I

can

tell,

Fischer

Defending Incompatibilism Against Fischer
and Ravizza
Fischer and Ravizza might claim that this
impasse

by
are

their criticisms

two

sorts

partially

of the major arguments for incompatibilism. They
claim

overcome

that “there

of arguments for the incompatibility of causal determinism
and moral

responsibility: Indirect and Direct” (Fischer

away with

is at least

and Ravizza 1998, 151). They quickly do

the indirect kind: the indirect sort of

argument claims

that

determinism and

moral responsibility are incompatible because determinism
and alternative possibilities
are incompatible.

Because Frankftirt-type examples show

that

moral responsibility does

not require alternative possibilities, the indirect arguments
ultimately

The Direct arguments

rely

on

a special principle

which Fischer and Ravizza

the Principle of the Transfer of Non-Responsibility
(or Transfer
that Fischer

and Ravizza will

defend. Transfer

criticize.

And

it is

fail.

NR).

this principle that

I

It is

call

this principle

will attempt to

NR states that:
(1)

I

fp

obtains, and

no one

is

even partly morally responsible for

p\ and

They go on

(2)

it
p obtains, then q obtains, and no one is even partly morally
responsible for the fact that if p obtains, then
q obtains; then

(3)

q obtains, and no one is even partly morally responsible for
(Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 152)

to state the

If causal

argument

q.

for incompatibilism:

determinism

is true, then there is some state of the world in the
connected by the laws of nature to any action A that
one performs in the present. But since no one (alive now) is even partly
morally responsible for the state of the world b in the distant past, and no

distant past b that

one

is

b to A,
action

is

even partly morally responsible
it

A

follows that no one
that is

performed

They mention Peter van Inwagen’s claim
argument)

is

intuitively plausible

is

for the laws of nature that lead from
even partly morally responsible for any

in the present.

that Transfer

(153)

NR (employed

in the

and they mention van Inwagen’s challenge
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previous

to critics to

produce counterexamples (Fischer and
Ravizza 1998, 153). Fischer and Ravizza
believe
they can meet this challenge (154).
Fischer and Ravizza begin by claiming
that Frankfurt-type examples
“call into

question a principle closely related to Transfer
(Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 155).

They then claim

examples can also serve as counterexamples
from Transfer

differs

NR in that

(roughly) that if an agent, 5,

^

^ is

is

NR,” which they dub “Transfer NR*,”

it

that

to Transfer

substitutes an agent,

not responsible forp and

not responsible for (1 57).
q

counterfactual intervener (Ralph)

“with certain modifications, the

They give

would ensure

that

NR”
'S',

is

But of course,

intervention) to detonate

They claim
because Betty (5)

example

in

which a

an avalanche occurred (by detonating

own

explosives to create

does decide (without

is

successful in defeating Transfer

responsible for the avalanche
(q), even though she
is

NR*. This
is

NR by modifying the example

in the following

is

not responsible

thus not responsible for the fact that if Ralph

then the avalanche must occur
( q ) (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 156).

defeat Transfer

claims

not responsible for “ifp then

a Frankfbrt-type

in the actual sequence, Betty

example

for Ralph’s presence
(p) and

(p),

it

them (155-6).

that the

is

NR*

for ‘no one’. Thus,

explosives) if the agent (Betty) did not decide
to detonate her
the avalanche.

(155). Transfer

is

present

They attempt

to

way: they substitute the

natural forces of erosion for Ralph, and say that
“had Betty not placed dynamite in the
crevices,

some

ice

and rocks would have broken free

avalanche....” (157).

They claim

that Transfer

responsible for the erosion (p) and no one

is

at

T2, starting a natural

NR is defeated because although no

one

responsible for the fact that if the erosion
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is

occurs (p ), then the avalanche occurs
( q ), Betty

of the avalanche ( q

(i.e., it is

My objection
controversial, but

I

false that

to these alleged

believe

it

no one

is

is

am

I

suggesting that Betty

avalanche but

is

is

is

probably somewhat

intuition.

misleading because they falsely represent what Betty
for.

occurrence

responsible for the avalanche) (157).

counterexamples

be supported by

to

in fact responsible for the

is

think their arguments are

I

primarily (or directly) responsible

not primarily responsible for “the occurrence of the

primarily responsible for “detonating explosives.”

1

believe there

is

considerable intuitive plausibility to the idea that agents are
primarily responsible for
actions,

and only indirectly responsible for consequences. 41

intended to be a principle about primary responsibility,
the argument for incompatibilism (as stated

determinism

is true,

“no one

is

i.e.,

On my

view, Transfer

about actions.

42

NR

is

Notice that

by Fischer and Ravizza above) claims

that if

even partly morally responsible for any action

(Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 153,

my

emphasis). Although Fischer and Ravizza are here

discussing the incompatibility (or compatibility) of moral responsibility
and determinism
(rather than

freedom and determinism), we cannot ignore the

directly connected to responsibility than are consequences.

suggest that

if

one wants

to

impugn an argument

It

fact that free action is

seems reasonable

for the incompatibility

more

to

of responsibility

would add

that sometimes we should not even be held responsible for the direct consequences
of what
wonderful example can be found in the popular children's book Harry Potter and the Goblet
of
Fire (Rowling 2000). Near the end of the book, the hero, Harry, generously and from
benevolent motives
encourages his competitor to grasp the goblet of fire with him (whoever grasps it first is the
winner of an
important contest). As a direct result, Harry and his friend are magically transported to the vicinity
of the
I

we

do.

A

evil villain.

Unbeknownst

to

Harry, the villain had set

callously kills Harry's competitor.

think

I

we

The

should hold Harry responsible for

will grant that, as

easily be revised to

it

do

stands, Transfer

so.

I

do not think

it

up so

competitor's death

is

would happen. The villain then
of Harry's actions, yet I do not

this.

NR is not explicitly
it

that this

a direct result

is

necessary

46

to

do

limited to actions.
that here.

But the principle could

and determinism, one ought
actions).

to

speak

to the

primary target of responsibility

(i.e.,
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Our

social

and legal practices tend

purposes. For example,

let

emphasize consequences for practical

us suppose a man, Greg, puts arsenic in
Tony’s drink with the

belief and intention of killing him.
that another

to

As

a result

man, Bert, puts what he believes

of this action, Tony

to be arsenic, but

dies.

what

is

Let us suppose

actually a

harmless powder, into Nancy’s drink with the
belief and intention of killing her. Nancy
is

unharmed.

Greg and Bert

Intuitively,

sentences them differently,

are equally blameworthy.

however—presumably

The law charges and

for various practical reasons (e.g., the

impossibility of being certain about others’ intentions,
the desire to send a strong message
to potential criminals that

more

serious

harm equals more

serious punishment).

Fischer and Ravizza apparently have quite different
intuitions from mine. In

support of their view that

we

hold people directly responsible for consequences, they

suggest an example:

Consider the case of the Exxon Valdeez. The captain was
(presumably)
morally responsible for the way he steered his ship, and thus
for his

But

actions.

we

are very

we are not just (or even primarily) interested in his actions;
much interested in fixing moral responsibility for the

consequence—the huge, damaging, and

costly oil slick. (Fischer and

Ravizza 1998, 92)

Although
and

I

would grant

that these

that

we do

hold the captain responsible for these consequences

consequences become our main concern,

I

would add

that the

consequences are actually the evidence of his blameworthiness, not the
target of it. Had
the accident been a “near miss” due to
the captain

some

intervention of some other agent or event,

would be equally culpable. Perhaps many people would not hold him

After writing

this, I

came

across an article by David Widerker, in which a similar point
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is

made

responsible in that case, but that

evidence against him (perhaps

That

it

is

only because they would not see such damning

would not have even made

their intuitions differ

from mine

is

the news).

further suggested

by

guidance control of a consequence (and thus moral
responsibility for

their conditions for

it).

They claim

that

The agent displays guidance

control of a consequence insofar as the
consequence emanates from a responsive sequence.
It is necessary, in the
context ot a consequence that is more than
simply a bodily movement, to
distinguish two components of the sequence
leading to the

consequence.

The

component is the mechanism leading to the bodily movement,
second component is the process leading from the
bodily

first

and the

movement
for the

to the event in the external world. We
shall say that, in order
sequence leading to a consequence to be responsive,
both the

mechanism leading to the bodily movement must be moderately
reasonsresponsive and the process leading from the bodily
movement to the event
in the external

world must be “sensitive

to action.” (Fischer

and Ravizza

1998, 107)

Their suggestion
there

is

is

that in addition to their prior

an additional requirement: while holding certain things
fixed, the agent’s

performing a different bodily movement must
1

10).

moves

requirement of reasons-responsiveness,

In other words, if the

result in a different

consequence (108,

same consequence would occur no matter how

his body, the agent is not responsible for the consequence.
This

process was not “sensitive to action.”

William Rowe,

where the dog
(the switch

is

in

which a dog

is tied.

is

To

illustrate their point,

tied to train tracks.

The agent has

it

is

the agent

because

they cite an example from

Track #1 and Track #2 converge

within his power to switch the train to track #1

previously set to track #2). Thus, the train will

still

hit the

dog, regardless

of what bodily movement the agent makes (Fischer and Ravizza 1998,
109). But
this

example quite

differently.

this

The agent

is

I

assess

responsible for “throwing the switch.”

Whether we hold him blameworthy or praiseworthy

(Widerker 2002, 319).
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for

doing so depends upon whether

in

throwing the switch he intended

save the dog,

to

believed his actions to be ineffective, then

we do

the dog, or otherwise. If he

kill

not hold him blameworthy. If he

believed his throwing the switch to track #1 would
guarantee that the dog would die a
painful death,

we blame him

for

throwing the switch.

My suggestion, then,

that their

is

We are not really (directly) responsible for

additional condition bears no weight.

consequences, regardless of whether our bodily movements are
able to affect an outcome.

We really have no

control over whether our bodily

directly responsible for

movements

making bodily movements with

are effective.

we are

But

certain beliefs about their

effectiveness in mind.

It is

significant that Fischer and

Ravizza use an example pertaining

to

consequences. Counterexamples using actions (instead of consequences) cannot
be
generated. Let us see why. In their avalanche example,
q

is ‘the

occurrence of the

avalanche.’ In an example using an action instead of a consequence,
q will be
action, perhaps ‘detonating the explosives.’ Their

stands for the

a result

and

example

same thing whether the avalanche occurs

relies

some

on the notion that q

as a result of Betty’s actions or as

of natural forces (presumably so long as the avalanche occurs in the same place

at the

same time

notion that

we need

plausibility

of their example comes from the

not differentiate between these sorts of events just on the basis of

their causal history (although

Although an action

The

either way).

is

even

also a type

this

may be

of event,

it

is

questioned). But what about actions?

highly plausible to assert that

some

of the causal history of an action are essential features of that action. Thus, when
attempt to generate a counterexample,

we

fail,

because q ends up standing for two

different things (e.g., ‘Betty detonating explosives,’ versus ‘a rock falling
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on the

parts

we

detonator’ or even ‘Betty intentionally detonating’
versus ‘Betty being forced to
detonate’).

To
The

return to the crucial point,

I

alleged counterexamples to Transfer

Transfer

NR applies to

consequences.

NR remains unscathed.

maintain that Transfer

I

NR involve the dubious assumption that

have argued

responsible for consequences, and that Transfer

that

we

are not primarily

NR is meant to

apply to actions (and that

a counterexample cannot be generated using actions).
Because Transfer

very strong argument for incompatibilism

still

NR

still

stands, a

stands.

Taking Stock
Let us take stock of where

we

are now.

I

have argued

that Fischer

mechanism-based view of moral responsibility does not support our
is,

in a

manner of speaking, too easy

to

make

moderately reasons-responsive one) one’s

via “taking responsibility.”

some appeal

intelligence (AI)

example,

in the

—computers have been programmed with an

will

one

that

maximizes the desired

come even

result

The computers

(we can imagine

it

a

would add
such as

not enough for moral

computer industry— specifically the

similar to the ability to respond to reasons.

the

is

because

(i.e.,

I

to historical factors

taking responsibility.” Moderate reasons-responsiveness
responsibility. For

intuitions

the relevant sort of mechanism

own

here that their view cannot survive without

and Ravizza’s

field

ability that

of artificial

seems very

evaluate scenarios and choose

someday, these

that

closer to the ability to respond to reasons). Obviously, on the

abilities

view

espoused by Fischer and Ravizza, these computers would not be held responsible because
they never underwent the important process of becoming moral agents and taking
responsibility for the relevant

mechanisms. But we have seen
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that this process

does not

always guarantee responsibility,

As

either.

are held responsible according to the

I

argued

earlier,

we

get cases of people

view of Fischer and Ravizza, who

who

intuitively should

not be held responsible.

After arguing against the effectiveness of their guidance control
view,

argued that their objection to a major incompatibilist argument does
not hold.
that their objection relies

I

on

the faulty notion that Transfer

NR applies

to

then

I

I

claimed

consequences.

believe this puts incompatibilism in a good position. Obviously,
objecting to one

view does not guarantee the

compatibilist

picked what

I

tiuth

that other compatibilist

perhaps less plausible ones. Moreover,

have purposely

examples. This

is

what

I

I

will attempt to bolster the case for

at

our intuitions, especially in Frankfurt-type

turn to in the next section.

The Case
would

I

views would rely on similar principles, or

incompatibilism by looking more closely

I

1

believe to be one of the most effective and plausible compatibilist views.

would maintain

First,

of incompatibilism. But,

like to

comment on

for Incompatibilism

a claim

made by

from which Frankfurt-type examples come (“Alternate

Frankfurt in the famous article

and Moral

Possibilities

Responsibility”). Frankfurt suggests a principle to replace the original Principle of

Alternate Possibilities.

He

states the principle as follows: “a

responsible for what he has done if he did

otherwise” (Frankfurt 1988a,
than the original to those

initial plausibility

many

to

who

10).

it

person

is

not morally

only because he could not have done

This principle appears to be a more plausible principle

accept the success of Frankfurt-type counterexamples.

probably leads

many

conclude that compatibilism

is

to accept

it.

And

accepting

it

probably leads

on surer footing than incompatibilism. This
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Its

is

because in

responsibility.

acted

In other words,

it is

difficult to see

how determinism would

why would determinism

rule out our

lead to the result that a person

only because he could not have
done otherwise”?

But

I

really

new principle

believe this

lauded by those

it

of this principle,

light

mean

who

is

ambiguous and misleading (and need not be

accept the success of Frankfiirt-type
counterexamples).

otherwise”? If we view “because...”
as the beginning of an answer
did he do what he did?,”

we

situation (e.g„ “because he

because an

evil

What does

say that a person did something
“only because he could not have done

to

see that

numerous descriptions can be

to the question,

filled in for

had a compulsion,” “because a gun
was held

neurosurgeon forced the appropriate neurons

to fire”).

to his

“why

any given
head,”

do not think

I

these various descriptions can be
assimilated under the heading “only
because he could

not do otherwise.” The lesson

counterexamples

We need
we do

is

to replace

this,

I

think

we

should take away from Frankfiirt-type

that looking to the ability or inability
to

PAP

we

compatibilism. That

with something that does not appeal

will

is, I

come up

think

we

will

fruitful.

doing otherwise.

come up with something

to a

claim

made by

that accurately

ability

When

shows us

and the sort of

Fischer (mentioned earlier),

Picasso would indeed be less creative
if determinism were
Picasso’s creativity remains intact even
if

masterpieces.

is

not

that matters.

Responding

brush

to

is

with something that does not rule in favor
of

what determinism would threaten—namely,
our originative
freedom

do otherwise

I

it

true.

were somehow

I

I

would suggest

that

can accept that

his “destiny” to paint

cannot accept that his creativity remains intact
if every stroke of his

predetermined— in such a

case,

something important has been
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lost.

As Robert

Kane

notes in his

book The Significance of Free

intuitions that true desert,

autonomy,

Will, incompatibilists rely

creativity, individuality,

on the

and uniqueness (along with

moral responsibility), require a freedom from determinism (Kane
1998, 81-9).
the intuitions brought out

believe

I

by Frankfurt-type examples accord with these incompatibilist

intuitions.

Of course
actual sequence

the

is

main

intuition that

comes out of Frankfurt-type examples

what matters for responsibility (not the

ability to

what

and

in the actual history

is

something

significant in assessing responsibility

of the action.

else, as incompatibilists

It is

is

the

do otherwise). But

highlighting the actual sequence, these examples also reveal something
else.
that

is that

They

in

reveal

what actually occurs inside the agent

not whether the agent could have done

previously asserted.

It is

whether the agent actually

did something he himself originated and intended to do. In emphasizing
the importance

of the actual sequence,
is like.

This

we

also

emphasize the importance of assessing what

one of the crucial elements

is

that gets

overlooked

in

this

sequence

arguments relying on

PAP.
Determinism threatens the agent’s originative role and
Let us return to

my very

first

example

his wife, Flora. In this example,

mower.

Mo

is

unaware

over the flowers

if

(in

my

Mo runs over his wife’s

not do so of his

moral responsibility.

introductory chapter) concerning

that his neighbor, Biff,

Mo will

his

is

own

Mo

flowers with his riding lawn

standing by, ready to force him to

accord.

and

We think Mo

running over the flowers (even though Biff is standing by),

if

Mo

is

mow

responsible for

originated his action.

believe that if we were to compare the case of Mo with another case (let’s say, of
Larry),

we would

see this

more

clearly.

Let us suppose that determinism does not hold in
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Mo’s

I

world but

that

it

does

with his wife just as

My intuitions
and

it is

in Larry’s.

Mo does.

in these

Thus, Larry runs over the flowers because
he

But

in Larry’s case,

cases suggest that

it is

is

angry

predetermined that he will do

Mo has a sort of freedom that

Larry does

so.

not—

the sort of freedom that matters for
moral responsibility 44
.

One might

object that

I

am

objector might say that there

otherwise

obviously

I

being inconsistent with previous points (in the previous
chapter). The
indeed some “flicker of freedom” (i.e., a flicker of freedom

is

to

believe the freedom necessary for moral responsibility

originator of one’s actions. But with Fischer,

is

present)

do

when one

is

the

I would hold that these “flickers” would
not be robust enough
ground responsibility even if they were present. Thus, perhaps
if “flickers” are found, I would have to
ultimately concede that PAP is not actually false.
But I could maintain that it is still a misleading and
ineffective principle that should be replaced by
one that captures our intuitions more directly.

to
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CHAPTER 4
KINDS OF INCOMPATIBILISM
The purpose of this chapter
incompatibilism.

is

to deal directly with the

The objection can be described

in the

most pressing objection

to

following way: The kind of

action that qualifies as free (in the relevant sense)
for the incompatibilist necessarily

involves something that

is

undetermined. As such, the action would seem to be a random

or chance occurrence and therefore not the kind of thing
an agent should be held morally

responsible

for.

Thus, the incompatibilist version of a free and responsible
action makes

no sense. In “Two Kinds of Incompatibilism,” Robert Kane highlights
claims that in order to respond to

of incompatibilist views

to consider

both types of views to see which

Kane

it,

s distinction is

we must

first

realize that there are

(Kane 1995, 115-17).

objection and

this

two

In this chapter,

distinct types

1

will

examine

can resolve the problem.

(if either)

between what he

calls “Teleological Intelligibility theories”

(borrowing from Watson) and “Agent Cause theories” (Kane
1995, 117). Agent Cause
(or

what

explain

I

call

how

agent-causal) theories rely on nonoccurrent or nonevent causation 45
to

a person

is

the originator of (and

is

thus responsible for) his action.

Teleological Intelligibility (TI) theories do not rely on this sort of causation.
Instead,

they attempt to “explain incompatibilist free agency in terms of event
causation alone”
(124). According to Kane, a TI account needs “(a’)

founded on microscopic indeterminacy, and

(b’)

some macroscopic indeterminacy

some account of the

agent’s willing and

acting for reasons that will render choices or actions ‘teleologically
intelligible,’ though

not determined

(125).

Kane argues

that TI theories can resolve the

randomness, whereas agent-causal theories cannot.
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problem concerning

Kane
the

states conditions for incotnpatib.list

main incompatibilist

intuitions.

He

freedom based on what he regards as

lays out an “Explanation
Condttion”

and an

“Ultimacy Condition”:

(The Explanation Condition) A free
action for which the agent is
ultimately responsible is the product
of the agent, i.e., is caused by
t
e agent, in such a way that we
can satisfactorily answer the
question “Why did this act occur here
and now rather than some
other?” (whichever occurs) by saying
that the agent caused it to
occur rather than not, or vice versa, here
and now

(i)

(The Ultimacy Condition) The free
action for which the agent is
is such that its occurring
rather than not here
and now, or vice versa, has as its ultimate

(ii)

ultimately responsible

or final explanation the
aSent here and now.
(Kane 1995,

^ ™ CaUSe d ^

120)

Kane claims

that the

problem

required tor incompatibilist

for incompatibilists

freedom— are

is

that these

in conflict.

As he

Condition implies indeterminism, but indeterminism
makes

two conditions-both

puts

it

it,

“the Ultimacy

difficult to satisfy the

Explanation Condition” (122). Kane goes
on to argue that agent-causal theories (which
require both conditions) cannot solve the
problem. This
theorist

were

to claim, in order to satisfy the

is

because

if the

agent-causal

Explanation Condition, that the agent

performed some action (rather than doing otherwise)
because of her character and
motives, there

would be

a regress of responsibility. This regress

satisfying the Ultimacy Condition:

them? According

to

Why did

the agent

Kane, some agent-causal

would pose problems

have these motives? What caused

theorists (such as Taylor) “disallow”

explanations in terms of reasons or causes in order to
stop this regress. But this

does not solve the explanation problem because

it

does not

tell

us

why

performed the action instead of some other (123). Kane
then claims

An

account of nonoccurrent causation will be given

in
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subsequent chapters.

move

the agent

that other agent-

causal theorists (like Chisholm) do allow reasons
to be part of the explanation

45

in

by relying

eibmzian notion that
1

23).

Kane claims

of the following

A over action

that this

possibility:

may

incline without necessitating'”

cannot solve the explanation
problem

suppose

i,

is

which the agent does choose

explatn her chotce?

either.

that the agent's
reasons incline

B. If reasons do not
necessitate,

(and there are cases

we

reasons

We cannot appeal

This

is

because

her to choose

act, on

possible for the agent to choose
B).

If the agent chooses B,

he, reasons.

We must appeal

cause. But this does not really
explain her choice, either,
according to

Kane then

(Kane 1995,

turns to TI theories to see
if they fare

any

better.

He

B

how can

the agent-

Kane

(124).

gives

more

specific conditions (corresponding
to the origtnal two) that
he believes a successfitl TI

theory must satisfy:

(UR) An agent has ultimate
responsibility for the choice of
A and the
choosing otherwise = it is “up
to the agent here and now”
(
in the sense of
u imate responsibility whether
the agent chooses A or
chooses otherwise)
just in case the agent’s
choosing A here and now rather
than choosing
8
otherwise, or vice versa
(whichever occurs)

’

0)

C0ndi i0n

1

wilUlw^T
is the agent’s

if will that
ot
(2)

!

ls

^,
effort

the int entional termination of
an effort

of will, and

6

ationallty Condition) the agent
(rl) has reasons for doing
so
TI!
^
(w ichever
occurs), (r2) does it for those
(tor those reasons) compulsively,

reasons, (r3) does not choose

and

choice that the reasons for which
it is
weightier reasons, more worth acting
(3)

(r4) believes at the

made
upon

are in

time of

some sense

the

that [sic] their alternatives,

(The Ultimacy Condition) given the
facts of the situation, no other
explanation (other than the conjunction
of (1) and (2)) for the agent’s
choosing A or choosing otherwise
(whichever occurs) is possible
unless that explanation can in
turn be explained by the
conjunction

of

) and (-) itself (i.e., the
explanation provided by
(1) and (2) is
ultimate or “final”). In particular,
any explanation of the agent’s
making the effort of will in (1) and of the
agent’s having the character
and the reasons or motives for choosing
in (2) will not also explain
the
eVen though t 1 ) and 2 win explain
the choice. (Kane 1995
( )
46
?o?‘^
125-6)

(1

For simplicity,

I

have omitted Kane’s footnotes.
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Kane claims

that there are

two problems

that

TI theories (and presumably any

incompatibilist theories, such as
agent-causal theories)

(which corresponds
that

to condifion
(1)) is the

must

face.

condition (2))

the

is

it

problem

first

problem of dual production. The problem

“indeterminism seems to undermine the
idea that the agent

outcome whichever way

The

is in

control of the

goes” (126). The second problem
(which corresponds

problem of dual

rationality, “indeterminism also

the idea that the choice will be
rational whichever

way

discussion back to agent-causal theories
briefly to

make

it

is

seems

to

to

undermine

goes” (127). Kane brings the

the point that these theories have

trouble with dual rationality for the
reasons already stated (concerning the
Explanation

Condition above).

He

goes on

to

claim that they also have trouble with
dual production.

Agent-causal theories cannot deal with
condition (1) (which deals with production)

because

has to do with efforts of will.

it

An

effort

of will would be

occurrence which would cause a regress
of events. But
things without actually doing something
else

leave us in confusion “not only about

another (rationality), but also about
(production)” (127).

Kane claims

why

how

(i.e.,

to

a fiirther event or

say that the agent causes

some

without any event occurring) seems to

the agent produced

one

effect rather than

the agent produced one effect rather
than another

that agent-causal theories fail

because they do not

explain dual rationality and dual production;
and these, he claims, are the elements of free

agency

that

He

most need explaining (141).

then returns the discussion to TI theories and
attempts to explain

theory can meet the conditions he has laid
out.

On

his theory, the actions for

are ultimately responsible are choices
or decisions (see

appear in condition

(1).

The

efforts

how

UR), not the

efforts

which we

of will

of will “precede the choices and terminate
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a TI

in

that

them”

(Kane 1995,

They

127).

are “mental efforts directed
at getting one’s ends (purposes,

intentions) sorted out” (127).

choice)

He

claims that the “paradigm
cases” of free action (or
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morally

are cases in

(e.g.,

which we struggle between conflicting
motives or reasons,

choosing

to steal or not) or prudentially
(e.g„

choosing to overeat or not)

(127-8). In these cases, the conflict and
thus the effort can be explained
character, etc.

thinks

it

is

Such things can explain why the agent
makes the

wrong

to steal)

and

why

it is

an effort

(e.g.,

either

by motives, past

effort (e.g.,

because he desires

because he

to steal

something) (129).

Being able

to explain this effort in

terms of these motives and beliefs,

not lead to a regress of willings,
suggests Kane. This
to

Kane,

that

we

is

important

to his

cannot attribute ultimate responsibility to
an agent until

can only be explained by the fact that

be worried about whether

it is

responsible (Kane 1995, 120).
responsibility further

back

was caused by

it

the agent or

some cause

Kane claims

indefinitely.

that his

This

is

we

find

her; otherwise,

will not

does

view. According

something

we

outside the agent that

view

etc.

will

is

always

ultimately

push ultimate

because his Ultimacy Condition only

requires that the prior character and
motives, or the prior character and motives plus
the
effort,

cannot explain the choice. (Presumably

ultimate responsibility
or whether the agent

be no explanation for

is

if

they did explain the choice, then

would be pushed backwards because we would want

to

know how

responsible for those things.) Ultimacy does not
require that there

why

the effort

is

made

or

why

the agent has that character or those

motives (128). The choice, then, can be fully
explained “by saying that the agent (with
such and such a prior character) intentionally
terminated the effort of will (condition
(1))

The points of this chapter do not seem to require that
we carefiilly distinguish action and choice so
have not been concerned with doing so (in general,
a choice can be seen as a mental action).
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I

for such

and such prior reasons or motives (condition
(2))” (128,

example,

if

an agent chooses

the agent

is

ultimately responsible for this (in a direct

to

my

have another helping of ice cream,

we

sense—more

For

italics).

determine whether

will be said later

about derivative responsibility) by seeing whether
the agent’s character, motives,
etc. (e.g., desiring ice

cream, being hungry, wanting

to lose weight,

effort,

being weak-willed,

struggling between these conflicting reasons,
etc.) folly explain the choice. If they do,

then

it

appears that the outcome has been determined by these
things and the agent

ultimately responsible.

choice, then

we

to folly explain

If,

on the other hand, these things do not

folly explain the agent’s

can hold the agent ultimately responsible, even though

why

the agent has this character and these motives and

particular struggle. Thus, a free choice (one for

which

we

not

is

it

may be

is

involved in this

possible

can hold the agent ultimately

responsible) requires additional explanation (beyond
motives, character and effort)

—

it

requires that the agent intentionally terminated an
(indeterminate) effort of will.

Kane wants
choice

is

us to suppose that the effort of will

undetermined.

He

is

indeterminate and thus the

gives a quantum analogue: in quantum physics,

it

undetermined whether an isolated particle will penetrate a thin atomic
barrier

outcome

is

is

(i.e.,

the

undetermined like our undetermined choice) because the position and

momentum of the particle

are not both determinate

(i.e.,

the process

is

indeterminate like

our indeterminate efforts of will) (Kane 1995, 129).

To

those

who wonder how we can have

terminated the effort the one

by saying

that “the agent

the weightier reasons”

way

came

(Kane

1

an explanation of why the agent

rather than the other,

Kane answers

to believe at the time that these

were

that

all

we

explain this

things considered

995, 138). In other words, by choosing, the agent makes
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those reasons the weightier
ones

vacuous.

that this is circular, but
no,

Furthermore, he believes Ultimacy
requires a kind of circularity:
"such an act

‘ultimate’ or ‘final’ because

is

Kane admits

(1 35).

i,

is in a

way

‘self-explaining’” (138).

Kane

believes his

vtew incorporates both the dual
production condifion and the
dual rational,* eond.tion
(or, if

you

We can

prefer,

we

failed to resist,

solves the dual production
problem and the dual rationality
problem,.

how

explain

temptation,

i,

the agent produced the

outcome

either

way:

if

he gave

in to

can say that the choice was
produced by the motives which
the effort

whereas

if he

chose the moral path, we can
say that the choice was

brought about by his effort
(because

it

was an

effort to resist temptation)
(137)

scenario, these things (e.g., the
effort, the motives) are
the agent's. Thus, the

Willed by the agent either
the action either way.

way

Kane

(137). This

is

his

way of claiming that the

also bolsters his Production
Condition

In either

outcome

is

agent caused

by appealing

to

Elizabeth Anscombe’s Inaugural
Lecture, “Causality and
Determination" in which she

argues that something can be
caused without being determined.
Thus, “one can be said to

cause or ‘produce' an outcome
even

(Kane 995,
1

satisfied

will

due

143).

c

^

outcome

is

not inevitable given one’s effort”

for the dual rationality condition,

to the fact that the

have acted

fnrm

As

if that

Kane suggests

that this is

agent will have reasons for the
outcome either

for those reasons (134).

n P“ ons t^ane IWi,

138).

But Kane suggests
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that this is not

vacuous’ rather

it is

way and

Problems with Teleological

Intelligibility

Although Kane comes up with
an interesting and
end his position will no, work
f„r v , r i„„ s reasons,
Kane’s position,

1

also

hope

to highlight the

Theories

intricate view,

I

believe in the

examtntng the problems with

problems that would face any
tncompa.ibtlis,

theory relying solely on
event causation.

One problem

centers

on explanation. Although

complex issue of explanation,
Firs,

I

believe

of all, there may be strong
reasons

some

I

do no. wish

dtgress into the

general points ought to be
brought out.

to dtsagree

with Kane concerning what
needs

be explained and wha, should
be considered an adequate
explanation for a free action.

some

instances,

Kane

requtres too

much from an

explanation,

other cases, too

little.

In

"Agent Causation," Timothy
O’Connor makes the following point:

Kane

clearly

is

presuming that there is only one type
of adequate
explanation of a choice, the type
that explains why only
that choice cm, Id
1 ' po,nt n ,he asenrs

sZZZT
unsupported

The agency

:

theorist

T

may

JTbTS

cheerfully concede that

ar PredUded by
f
theo^-i’e”
e xP lan ahons that
y
cite

are described

by

his

factors that

could put an observer in a
position to predict outcomes
with certainty. And though we
may grant that
explanations of that sort are highly
desirable for scientific purposes
,

(among others), no reason has been
given why we cannot allow
explanations that account for an
occurrence by characterizing it as
the
reely mitiated behavior of an
agent motivated by such and
such a reason
(O Connor 1995a, 190, his footnotes
omitted)
O’Connor’s point seems
free action.

Although

1

to

be that Kane

is

requiring too

much from an

do not think Kane actually requires

outcomes with certainty

(after all, the effort

require that an explanation

tell

us

why

needs

the agent here

otherwise, or did otherwise rather
than doing
statistical or probabilistic

to

that

explanation of a

anyone be able

to predict

be indeterminate), Kane does

and now did

A (Kane

1995, 122).

A rather than

doing

Kane even adds

that

explanations will not suffice because such
explanations only
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tell

us that the agent

misH, have done

either

each option; these explanations
do no,
than doing

Shouldn’t

I

otawise

we

some

in

the agent did

that

we

should.

is

As O'Connor

points

no explanation of “why

I

good or

in

was a probability

A here

why is

and

for

now rather
strong?

i,

1

9 3>. There

may

which no choice presents

S9)<> In other words, there
rather than B.

is

likew.se be cases
itself as preferable

no, always an answer to

Presumably Kane wants

reasons did the agent do

A here

and now?).”

to

ater in his artjc|(,

,

,

here

acted just then (rathe,
than a,

other time)" if (within a
certain time frame) any
time
l

now

why

(122). This is a strong
re,„,reme„t. Bn,

wh.ch there

(O'Connor 995 a,

1

us

that there

require this sort of
explanation?

do no. think

nray be cases

tell

A or B and

is

as

good as any other

wh.ch either choice
the res.

why

is

equally

(O'Connor 995 a,
l

the agent did

A here and

use a reason explanat.on
here (for wha,

He

has already claimed that a
probab.lis.ic

or statistical explanation
of a free (and therefore
undetermined) action will not suffice.

Bu, a reasons explanation
cannot give us reasons where
there are none.” Requiring
t h ese
reasons

is

asking for too much.

There

is

evidence that

in other

ways, Kane

explanation. Indeterminist
views like Kane’s
to

determine which

among

a range

is

fail to

asking for too

show “how

it

of possible courses of action he

little

from an

can be up

to

an agent

will actually

>

en

880 " 8 explanation,
1995, e?)

I

mean “an explanation

in terms

of reasons for which the agent
did

it”

/•

(Ginet

not have a
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undertake” (O’Connor 1995a, 191). 52

I

believe the problem

use of a quantum analogue (mentioned above).

compared

to the “penetration

He

It is

underscored by Kane’s

claims that our choices can be

event” in quantum physics

toward an atomic barrier (Kane 1995, 129).

is

when

a particle

is

undetermined (although a probability

can be assigned) whether the particle will penetrate
the barrier or not, due
indeterminacies in

efforts

momentum and position,

its

of will could be

like this

etc. (129).

Kane wants

the

probability and statistics do not give us what

quantum analogue makes sense

actions; but that

is

not

all

we

to

to

suggest that our

indeterminate process— perhaps correlated to

indeterminate brain processes (129). But the problem
with the analogy

noted by Kane earlier

moving

if

we want merely

is

we

the problem

need. Perhaps

a scientific explanation of our

want. In his article, “Toward a Credible Agent-Causal

Account of Free Will, Randolph Clarke makes

the following remarks (about his

own

agent-causal view):

and explanation are paradigmatic of scientific understanding,
appears that agent causation neither contributes to nor detracts from
such understanding. Its contribution, rather, would be to our
understanding
of ourselves as moral agents. We believe, most of us, that we are morally
If prediction

it

responsible for

much of what we

a condition of the possibility

something

like the

of how

can be what

we

do. Agent causation, it may be argued,
of morally responsible agency. Affirming

is

view sketched here, then, would give us an explication
we seem, from the moral point of view, to be.

Importantly, the explication provided would be one that is consistent with
ourselves from the scientific point of view. (Clarke 1995

how we view
210 )

Clarke makes an important point: our philosophical discourse about
free action

aimed

(or should be,

I

would argue)

at

is

really

gaining an understanding of our free and moral

O Connor explains that views that allow for reasons to cause actions without determining them
Kane s view seems to do) are superior to simple indeterminist views that do not allow this

(as

causal link. This

is

because views such as Kane’s can

(O Connor 1995a). More

will

at least provide for reasons explanations (even if they ultimately
be said about simple indeterminism later in the chapter.
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fail)

We need

agency.

human

make

to

sure this

is

consistent with our scientific understanding
of

we are not primarily

behavior, but

would probably respond

that his

interested in a scientific explanation.

view gives us more than a

scientific

because reasons and motives explain
our efforts of will. But

what we need.
determinants”

If

we

are to be moral agents,

we need

understanding

does not get us

be the “undetermined

use Clarke’s phrase; Clarke
1995, 204) of our actions.

(to

from Kane’s view

is

the basic intuition that

significantly different

we

What

do indeed determine what

we

is

missing

We are

do.

from isolated particles— and merely
adding reasons and motives

indeterminate processes does not get us

all

the

way

influence our actions or increase their
probability,

does not accord with intuition because
the agent

to

this still

Kane

by not allowing the agent

Kane recognizes

that

he

is

to

it

to true

we

not just

own

amount of control away from

action or choice.

limiting the control of the agent, but
he sees this as a

required concession for the incompatibilist.

He makes

the following argument:

W e have already seen that absolute or complete control
finite agents, if it

We do

determine them. 53 Kane’s view

takes a significant

determine his

moral agency.

to

means

that choices are not limited

is

not available to

by heredity,

environment, and conditioning. What else could
absolute or complete
control over choice

mean? Given the present objection, one could guess
might mean the choice was determined by a
determinate effort of
the agent, which was in turn determined
by character and
that

it

motives, so

given the character, motives and

Kane might say

that

To

I

am

is, I

was

inevitable.

But

that,

if

begging the question against

insist that the

acts

effort, the result

his view:
explanation [of action that Kane offers]

is

inadequate given

all

these

suspect, to tacitly

unless they are

assume that reason explanations cannot adequately
explain
deterministic. For what is missing seems to
be that the reasons and the

do not determine the outcome. But, given the nature
of this debate, such an
is question begging in the
extreme. (Kane 1995 139)
distinguish my objection from the one Kane
is referring to here. I am suggesting
effort

assumption

1

would

P

like to

n

a

“

‘

nadequate

that his

0t

eca use

su gg ests

reasons and effort do not determine the outcome,
but
the indeterminate effort to something
determinate would not
e
6 ex P aaatl0n adequate. First of all, his
explanation is inadequate because on his view, the
agent
lacks the control required for responsibility
and many kinds of free actions are ruled out But
most
importantly, his view is inadequate because it
does not allow that the agent determines her actions.
tor
for a
I

’

11

numb of reasons Merely
^ changing
number
,

.

I

1
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S

haV ' already jested, ° bs °‘»“
because the former implies

s ncompatible with
.^nooiliLTith’
/T control,
ultimate
,‘

determinism and the

But Kane obviously assumes there

latter

is

»nh»l

indeterminism. (Kane 1995, 140)

no middle ground between
his limited form of

control and absolute control.
According to the agent-causal
theorist, an agent can have
a
significant

amount of control by determining

(i.e.,

agent-causing) his action. This kind
of

control does not conflict with
ultimate control because this
kind of control does not imply

determinism.

Kane seems

or insupportable.

would make up

for

efforts” but

seems

solve

He

the

little.

outcome

He

to

suppose that

either unimportant

suggest that nonoccurrent causation
would introduce problems and

and

why

absolute and not limited?

determinated chose

is

uncertainty and limitation produced
by indeterminate

raises the following questions:

certain

kind of determinacy

considers whether “the introduction
of nonoccurrent causation

some of the

to

thrs

are these

What more

A rather than

B

outcomes certain?

will

or

how does

B

nonoccurrent causation

Why

be explained “about

is this

why

sort

make

of control

the agent

rather than A, if we are told
that the agent chose

A (or B) nonoccurrently?” (145). He suggests that
although some myste^ may be
present in his view, especially
concerning quantum

phenomena (perhaps most notably

“the mystery of indeterminate
efforts of will, described by
quantum analogies”),

nearly as troubling as the mysteiy
of nonoccurrent causation (141). His
view

is

it is

not

that

“nonoccurrent causes do not explain
what most needs explaining by an
incompatibilist
theory of free agency, namely, dual
production and dual rationality”
(141).

My suggestion

is

that

Kane

is

making

a lot

of faulty assumptions here.

Nonoccurrent causation, when properly
understood,
explanation because

it

will

show how

it is

that free
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will significantly

add

to the

and moral agents determine their

own

choices.

How

it

do

will

this will

be

left to later

possible according to agent-causation
is

is

chapters. Also, the sort of control

significantly less limited than

not absolute in the sense that nothing affects
or delimits

of control, nonetheless. The mystery of Kane’s
theory
indeterministic causation (as he supposes);

described by his theory

has yet to be solved.
rationality, but

determined

own

how

(i.e.,

the kind of thing

is

What most needs
it is

that an agent

it

is

we

is

54
it,

but

it

is

Kane’s version.

a significant kind

not specifically the mystery of

the mystery of how the sort of choice

are really responsible for. This mystery

explaining

is

not dual production and dual

can be morally responsible for an action that

is

not

not determined except, according to agent-causal
views, by the agent’s

agent-causation).

My suspicion

is

does not appreciate the
that in order to

understanding

be free
is

that

that

full

Kane

(like others

Kane

who espouse

indeterminist views like his)

force of a crucial incompatibilist intuition. This intuition

in the relevant sense,

we must be

the authors of our actions.

is

My

believes he has accounted for this intuition with his Ultimacy

Condition, and suggests that ultimacy implies indeterminism
(Kane 1995, 146).

He

“
claims that indeterminism confers the following power on
agents: the power

make

choices which can only

and finally be explained in terms of their own

to

wills (i.e.,

character, motives, and efforts of will)” (146).

But

let

us look

more

closely at this Ultimacy Condition.

explanation allowed for a free action

is

It

says that the only

the conjunction of (1) and (2),

i.e.,

the intentional

termination of an effort of will, and the agent’s reasons (see conditions
above).
difficult to see

what would

For instance, Clarke suggests

really

be

lost if

that an agent

we were to

find out that our efforts

"can cause only what
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It

is

It is

of will

naturally possible” (Clarke 1995,

were actually determined.
detemtined due

to

Isn’t

it

conceivable that our efforts of will
could be

something other than our reasons
o, motives (perhaps something

physical inside the “willing” part
of „ ur

reasons or mottves)?
just because

the choiee

it

still

is

(I

own

brains that does no. correspond to
our

do not think we need

to

suppose

that the effort

undetermined

is

an effort .) In this sort of situation,
wouldn’t the reasons explanation of

be in terms of one’s

own

will

and the only reasons explanation

terms of

the conjunction of
(1) and (2)?

I

satisfied

assume

that

Kane would argue

that in this case,

Ultimacy would not actually be

because Ultimacy does not just
specify reasons explanation.

the final and only explanation

would not be

in

it,

would

not be satisfied (as explained above).
But

seems

to

be explained). As Kane

“ultimacy implies indeterminism”
(Kane 1995, 126). In

character plus the (determinate)
effort

that in

some sense

there

is little

this case, the

fully explain the action

think there

I

is

something

is

that in

must be an indeterminate process
(perhaps by correlating

and ultimacy would
to

be learned here.

to

one case the

case— what

extra

effort

of will

some quantum

indeterminacy) and in the other the effort
of will can be a determinate one,
really gained in the first

motives and

power

is

I

do not see

really given to the

agent? Apparently the extra power
has to do with this intentional termination
of an
indeterminate effort of will. But
authorship and agency

we

how

It

difference between Kane’s view and
the view of a

compatibihst. If the only difference between
the two

what we have

in this case,

terms of the agent’s will (because

whatever factor makes the process
detemiinate would have
puts

And

is this

feel so sure that

enough

we have?

68

to

bestow upon us the kind of

Perhaps what leads Kane astray
free actions are actually like

”

is

that

According

he has an implausible view of
what our

Kane, “the paradigm cases of
undetermined

to

free choices are those
involving i„„ er struggle and
effort

against countervailing inclinations(Kane

such conflict (as

many of our

we have ultimate

1

995,

1

of will which must be exercised

34) and that choices that involve no

choices do not) “are not the
paradigms ofchoices for whtch

responsib.lity in the incompatibilist
sense" (133),

We only have

responsibility for these latter
sorts of choiees in a derivative
sense (i.e„ because

responsible for

conflicts) (144),

Kane agrees with

These assumptions about our
to

assume

that

choice (he relies on PAP).

according

to

him

to

effort

Kane) presupposes

(or else

no

effort

we

ordinarily believe they do

free choices or actions

we must have

An

past

Peter van Inwagen that this
implies that free choices

or actions occur less frequently
than

Kane seems

we are

making our present character and
motives what they are through ou,

(Kane 1995,

seem unfounded.

robust alternatives in order to

of will (which

that the agent is

is

a required

aware

that

make

143).

First
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of all,

a free

element of free choice

more than one option

is

open

would be made). Because ultimacy
implies indeterminism (Kane

1995, 126), the effort must be indeterminate;
thus, the agent must also be able
to choose

from among the options. Both
conditions for robustness are
already

shown

(in

in the relevant sense).

If I

the problems of dual rationality
and dual production

no longer as important

to

be able

This idea comes from comments

Kane

is

I

hope

Chapter 2) that an agent need not have
robust alternatives

be morally responsible (and free

how

satisfied.

referring to van

to explain the

made by Lynne

Inwagen ’s “When

is

the Will Free?.”

in

have

order to

right about this, notice

become somewhat

outcome of the

Baker.
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am

to

effort either

deflated:

way. This

it is

strengthens

my

claim that dual rationality and
dual production are not what most

earlier

need explaining.

From an

intuitive standpoint,

seems plainly

it

false to

me

that efforts

of will

(which presuppose robust alternatives) are
required for free choice. Sometimes a
decision or course of action presents
itself as the only thing to do and
in

many

we

cases

are (and should be) held responsible
for such an action (and not just in
a derivative
sense).

that

57

Incompatibilists often support their theories
by appealing to the strong intuition

we really

feel that

intuition is to

act freely

is

it is

often than

believe they are justified in doing so.
But if this

Kane

allow

it

to

do

its

job—my

intuition tells

me

that

or van Inwagen seem to allow.

Kane’s view of free choice or action

is

sometimes

example, one of his problems with agent-causation.
Kane claims

problematic for the agent-causal theorist to use
the notion of “inclining without

necessitating” because

toward

I

we must

further evidence that

unrealistic. Take, for

that

act freely.

have any weight,

much more

There

we

A (see above).

it

does not explain

why

the agent chose

B when

reasons inclined

But his characterization of the situation here
seems much too

simplistic. Usually the picture is

much more complex.

In the case

where the agent

appears to have chosen one option even though
reasons inclined toward the other, there
are at least

two possible explanations.

In

many

types of reasons are inclining the agent one

I

believe Susan

cases, the situation

way and

Wolf and Eleanore Stump both make

is

such that certain

other types of reasons are inclining

this point.

Also, Clarke says:

emphasize here that I do not believe that a libertarian need
require, for
agent be able to do anything significantly different
from what
I

free will, that

an

she actually does. If an
agent has very good reason to perform an action of
a certain type (A’ing), and if she has
no reason not to, then, although it may be causally indeterminate
when she A’s, or exactly
how she A’s, it may not be naturally possible that she not A. So long
as she is an
undetermined determinant of her A'ing, it seems to me that it
ought to be allowed that
she acts with free will. (Clarke 1995, 212, n.
6)
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1

way (Kane himself uses

the agent the other

possibility, not entertained

by Kane,

for an agent to act irrationally

and

this idea in his efforts

that the agent acts irrationally.

is

be responsible for the action.

still

act this

way

is

something introduced

into

agency by agent-causation

sometimes do

mystery.

of will). Another
It

58

seems possible

That

part of the mystery of agency. This mystery

—

rather,

it is

is

we
not

a pre-existing

59

Does

the failure of Kane’s

view imply the

failure

of other indeterminist (and non-

agent-causal) views? Not completely, but the prospects look bleak. Let us look at an

alternative

view called simple indeterminism. According

O’Connor

to

the simple

indeterminist “claims that a (causally) simple mental event of the proper sort

volition), if causally

agent

who

is its

undetermined,

subject”

is

intrinsically

(O’Connor 1995a, 186,

(e.g., a

such as to be under the control of the

his footnotes omitted).

Such

a

view

appears to avoid some of the problems of Kane’s position, but O’Connor argues that this

view

will not

work

we

for the following reason:

cannot simply appeal,

as, for

example, Ginet (“Reasons Explanation of

Action”) does, to internal (and referential) relations between concurrent
intention and prior motives,

on the one hand, and

that

same concurrent

intention and the decision (or action), on the other. Without the mediation

of a (necessarily causal) ‘mechanism of control’, prior motives cannot
explain a decision, even though (as it happens) they may coincide with

it.

(O’Connor 1995a, 195)
O’Connor’s

intuition here is that “agent-control

ourselves to have over our

O’Connor

actions

—

is

clearly causal in nature” (186).

here. In this sense, simple indeterminism
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As O’Connor

59

More

will

own

—the type of immediate control we take

says, “don’t

we sometimes make

be said about the mystery of agency

may

fare

irrational decisions?”

in

71

agree with

worse than Kane’s view.

(O’Connor 1995a,

subsequent chapters.

I

189).

As O’Connor
them

(as

explains, views that allow for reasons to cause actions without determining

Kane’s view seems

allow this causal

link.

This

to do) are superior to

is

simple indeterminist views that do not

because views such as Kane’s can

reasons explanations (even if they ultimately
indeterminist views will ultimately

fail

fail).

1

at least

believe other (non-simple)

because they will not be able

have the type of control required for moral agency.
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provide for

to

show how we

CHAPTER

5

AGENT-CAUSATION
In previous chapters,

have attempted

I

to

show

that Frankfurt-type

(along with other considerations) should lead us to incompatibilism.

I

have also argued

that agent-causal theories are preferable to other incompatibilist theories

illustrate

how we can be

agent causal theory,

general. Before

it

is

The focus of this

possible and

will

how

be necessary

moving on

to

chapter, then, will be to demonstrate

A Few
far,

I

make

to these projects,

certain claims about causation in

however,

it

will

is

future.

and what

it

it

is not.

nomic

(to

will

be important

a few

espousing.

name

a few).

states fix a

Each kind

is

a theory about the

believe that each of these

is

And

predetermine a unique
that past beliefs, desires,

with nomic, the laws of nature

essentially causal

together with the laws can determine a unique future

(i.e.,

is

world

unique psychological future. With causal

determinism, a chain of causes fixes the future.

for causal relations

what

There are numerous species of determinism:

that the past together with certain factors serves to

and other psychological

I

make

to (roughly) characterize

Presumably, the claim of psychological determinism

the future.

am

to

have not made any distinction between different kinds of determinism.

psychological, causal,

which holds

I

be useful

Notes on Determinism and Incompatibilism

For the purposes of this chapter
determinism

how

such a theory might work. In explicating an

remarks about determinism and the kind of incompatibilism

Thus

because they

responsible for our free actions (by being “undetermined

determinants” of our actions).
an agent-causal theory

examples

is

—

that

the only

for the laws to

laws are descriptive, so one would have

73

is,

to

way

fix

the past

have implications

say that they describe

which causes

the parameters under

are essentially causal,

will call simple causal

fix the future

sometimes there

is

60
).

Although

all

forms of determinism

a need to distinguish them. For example,

determinism could be true and nomic determinism false

(i.e., if

chain of causes fixed the future but these causes did not operate under laws). For
purposes, however, what

which

most important

is

entails that all actions are

is

what

I

a

my

recognizing that any type of determinism

predetermined

is

incompatible with the kind of freedom

relevant to moral responsibility (presumably in each of these types of determinism, the

unique future that

is

Now we can

human

fixed will include

say what determinism

is not.

(made by van Inwagen, Clarke, and others)
every event has a cause)

is

causes need not necessitate
principle that every event

actions).

Here

it

is

crucial to reiterate the claim

that universal causation (the principle that

not equivalent to any type of determinism. This

—they

is

can, for example, be probabilistic

caused

is

61

because

Thus, the

.

not enough to fix a unique future

is

62
.

Agenthood
True freedom requires not only
factors, but also that

beliefs

60

63

in the

This point

is

not be predetermined

it

the other hand, on

As Thomas Reid

“conceived
61

On

.

my view,

claims, “a law of nature

mind of a

is

by

internal factors such as desires

by external
and

an agent acting freely must be an

not the efficient cause of any event” but

is

something

rational being, not a thing that has a real existence” (Reid 1788, 628).

accepted by many.

Anscombe

Wesley Salmon discusses
1993b). Clarke supports this view and uses it

(Anscombe

that a free action not be predetermined

1993).

argues for

it

convincingly in “Causality and Determination”

probabilistic causation in “Probabilistic Causality”
to bolster his agent-causal theory (Clarke 1995;

(Salmon

more

will

said about this below).
62

Clarke makes a

lot

out of this distinction.

He embraces this principle of universal causation as highly
it.
He claims that this “allows for our ability to

plausible and reconciles his agent-causal theory with
predict and explain
63

human behavior” (Clarke

Thomas Williams attributes a view like
Choice of the Will” (Williams 1993, xii).

1995, 204).

this to

Augustine

74

in his Introduction to

Augustine’s

“On Free

be

“undetermined determinant" of his action (see Chapter

On my

consistent.

view, a free action

is

4).

Let us consider the concept of agenthood.

who

acts.”

On my

concept of action. There
actions (in

agent.

is

some sense of the

term).

To understand agenthood

The

sort

goldfish

is

of being

to

how

A goldfish, however,

in its fullest sense, then,

suggest that an agent

broadly

is

we

is

construe the

not morally responsible for anything

it

not a full-fledged moral

we ought

To be an

which we can appropriately

certain crucial mental capacities.

entirely

which a goldfish can do things and thus perform

differences between the person and the goldfish.

must be the

is

mean?

One might

view, this depends on

a sense in

believe that this

determined not by something inside the agent

but by the agent himself as an agent. But what does this

merely “one

I

to look to the

agent in the fullest sense, one

attribute

moral responsibility.

does, because the goldfish lacks

A goldfish does not have

the capacity for reflective

practical reasoning, the ability to deliberate, or the ability to understand that his actions

are efficacious in the world.

distinctions, nor

on the other hand,
to

This

goldfish does not have the capacity to

make

ability to

ability to act with intention

will

last

plans and execute them.

and purpose.

A

free action;

what

is

that these abilities

required

is

make moral
6

'

The goldfish

full-fledged moral agent,

have these capacities (and probably many others

be exhaustive). The reader should note

on every occasion of a

64

The

does he have the

does not have the

meant

64

—my

list is

not

need not be exercised

the capacity to exercise them.

suggestion comes from Fischer and Ravizza in Responsibility and Control (Fischer and Ravizza

1998,238).
65

This last suggestion comes from Thomas Reid, as explicated in the unpublished paper, “Planning,
Character and Agent-Causation: Reid’s Third Argument for Moral Liberty," by Gideon Yaffe. Yaffe
explains that “in the third argument, Reid attempts to derive the claim that

causes of their free actions from the fact that
(Yaffe unpublished,

we

are

endowed with

1).

75

human beings are the agentmake and execute plans”

the capacity to

I

think

it

reasonable to suggest that there could be something like degrees of

moral agenthood.

If

someone possesses

agent in the fullest sense. But

let

us suppose that someone has

mental capacities, or has some (or
a child develops mentally, he

the relevant mental capacities, she

all

all)

of them only

fully a

who

begins to

test his

66
.

For example, think of a

boundaries through small acts of defiance.

disobeys his parents and smacks the cat even though he knows not
certain degree,

we

hold the child responsible for

this.

The degree

responsible corresponds to the degree of moral agenthood present

development as an agent
child

—or

at least to

would be more blameworthy

in

would say
to the

that

it is) is

some

do not think

held responsible for

degree; something

in

is

it

to

this.

if

I

He

A dog who

intentionally

think that to a

which we hold him

(i.e.,

his mental

perceive this development).

sense.

owner (assuming

degree that a normal adult would be

I

come

how we

to.

such an instance. Furthermore,

regard an intelligent pet as an agent in

sofa out of anger towards his

Thus, perhaps as

moral agent. This

understanding goes along with degrees of moral responsibility
toddler

a moral

but one of the required

all

to a certain degree.

becomes more and more

is

An

older

we might even

purposely chews up the

this is a possibility

But of course, he

—many dog owners
is

not held responsible

she intentionally destroyed the sofa.

plausible to suggest that an agent-cause can occur to a certain

either agent-caused or

varying degrees

is

it

is not.

Thus,

just to say that a full-fledged

to

claim that agenthood can

moral agent will be able

to

agent-cause a wider range of actions and will be held more morally responsible for those
actions. For example, perhaps

my

labrador retriever agent-causes

some of his

actions

(such as his seemingly premeditated bids for attention) and not others (such as his

bb
I

believe Michael

Zimmerman

has such a view.

76

instinctive lunges towards small

human

moving

animals). Perhaps

adult, his agent-caused actions are

compared with a normal

fewer and his instinctive actions more

numerous. Moreover, his responsibility, even for those agent-caused actions,

would be
all

for

the

attributed to a

same

normal human

adult,

The implication here

capacities.

moral responsibility,

it is

is

less than

because the dog presumably does not have
is

that although agent-causation

is

required

not always sufficient for moral responsibility.

Causal Power
If the

agent as an agent

is

to determine his free actions, the agent

must agent-

cause them. This requires that the agent have causal power. Simply put, causal power
the ability to cause something (for an agent,

it is

is

the ability to cause an action).

Something has causal power because of certain properties

it

possesses

67

For an agent,

.

these properties will probably include the mental capacities discussed in the last section.

It

seems quite possible

different kinds

that different properties could give rise to causal

of things

“water solubility”

(just as different

chemical properties give
Thus,

in different substances).

agents turn out to have causal power,

it

may

if

power

in

rise to the property

of

any other kinds of objects besides

not be in virtue of having the sorts of mental

capacities mentioned above, but in virtue of having a different set of properties: these

different properties are

will not

07

what gives

rise to causal

be a free action but something else

This suggestion about properties

is

power. In these cases, what

is

caused

68
.

made by both O’Connor and

Clarke. In Chapter 6,

1

discuss Clarke’s

suggestion that these properties could be seen as either dispositional or relational.
68

In

Essays on the Active Powers of Man, Thomas Reid says the following about external objects that
to have “some motions and changes in them”:
Our first thoughts seem to be, That the objects in which we perceive such

appear

motion have understanding and active power as we have.

77

Acceptance of this picture allows for a crucial point
suggests,

we

are

now

in a position to see that

to

be made. As Clarke

agent causation can involve the same

relation as event causation: “the only difference

between the two kinds of causation

concerns the types of entities related, not the relation” (Clarke 1995, 207). 69 This claim

powerful because

it

causal theories: that

entirely different

removes what used
is,

—

i.e.,

The

be considered the main obstacle

the idea that agent-causation

is

we must

a realist conception.

central idea behind

to agent-

something special, mysterious, and

from event causation (Clarke 1995, 207).

powerful claim, however,
causes

to

In order to support this

espouse a certain controversial conception of

70

any

realist

account

causal relations are not

is that

“reducible to other states of affairs, including the non-causal properties

of,

between, events” (Tooley 1993, 172). Thus, causes are

add

ontological

is

makeup of the world. The more popular

on the other hand, do reduce causation

real things that

reductionist accounts

to these other states

and relations
to the

of causation,

of affairs. Reductionist

accounts pose a problem for agent-causal views. Clarke puts the problem this way:

The most

familiar accounts of event causation are reductionist, aiming to

analyze causation in terms of such noncausal and nonnomological features
as constant conjunction or counterfactual dependence, or in terms of the

“Savages,” says the Abbe Raynal, “wherever they see motion which they cannot
account

for, there

they suppose a soul.” (Reid 1788, 605)

Reid’s suggestion appears to be that these objects do not really have active power.
these objects do not have understanding and thus do not act. But

some
69

we can

One might

object here that

it

is

strange (or even impossible) for the

same

(i.e.,

relation to hold in cases

that with other relations.

70

this

where

events in the event-to-event

causal relation, versus substances in the agent-to-event causal relation). But

owe

agree with Reid that

objects have causal power.

the first relata of each relation are in different ontological categories

I

I

leave open the possibility that

we have no

trouble accepting

For example, the spatiotemporal relation holds between both objects and events.

point to Jonathan Schaffer.

O’Connor does not agree

that the

two kinds of causation are

conception of causes (O’Connor 1995a, 175).

78

the

same. Even

so,

he supports a

realist

modalities of necessity and sufficiency. Certainly, if any of this type of

account of event causation

same

is

correct, then agent causation cannot

be the
be

relation as event causation. For agent causation plainly cannot

either the constant conjunction

of an agent and an action type or the

counterfactual dependence of an action on an agent, nor can

it

consist in

an agent’s being a necessary or sufficient condition for the performance of
a particular action. (Clarke 1995, 207, his footnote omitted)

It

does not make

much

sense to suppose that an agent could be constantly conjoined with

action types or that an agent could be a condition for a particular action. Moreover,

reductive analyses of agent-causation would take

agency as envisioned by the agent-causal

away

the

would eliminate

theorist: they

A realist account,

agent as the true free source of his action.

allow that the agent really brings about his free action and

some

most important element of

is

we must adopt

a realist view. If we

agent-causation involve the same relation,

Clarke goes on

to say, a realist

want

we must

account of causes

to

power of the

on the other hand, would
not merely related to

reductive way. Because a reductive analysis of causes does not

causation,

the

work

it

in

for agent-

claim that event-causation and

adopt

may be

view

this realist

preferable

for both.

anyway due

As

to the

“grave difficulties” reductionist accounts have suffered (208) (see below for one account

of these

difficulties).

A Realist Conception
Do we

really

have enough evidence

of Causes

in favor

of a

realist

conception of causes?

Before citing some of the difficulties with reductionist accounts,
the intuitive

Anscombe

power behind

realist accounts.

let

us look to

some of

In “Causality and Determination” Elizabeth

argues for a realist conception of causes. She claims that

There

is

attended

something
to,

and yet

to

observe here that

still

lies

so obvious as to

under our noses.

seem

consists in the derivativeness of an effect from

79

trite.
its

It is

It is little

this:

causes. This

causality
is

the core,

the

common

arise out of,

of causality

feature,

come

in its various kinds.

of, their causes.

Anscombe

points to the intuitive notion that a cause

effect;

not reducible to something else.

it is

picture of causality

—according

to

a real thing

which brings about

attempts to turn the

its

Humean

which causes are nothing more than constant

causation does not require analysis

is

is

Anscombe

conjunctions of one kind of event preceding another

This

Effects derive from,

(Anscombe 1993, 91-2)

(i.e., it is

—on

its

head.

Anscombe

basic or primitive) because

it

is

argues that

observable.

71

not the only approach a realist about causes can take, however. In “Causation:

Reductionism versus Realism,” Michael Tooley suggests what he sees as a preferable
view: “the view that causal concepts are theoretical concepts, so that causal relations can

only be characterized, indirectly, as those relations that satisfy some appropriate theory”

(Tooley 1993, 190). For

my

purposes, either realist view will work.

idea behind any realist account

71

This interpretation of her argument

(Sosa and Tooley 1993,
72
1

72

Again, the central

is

that causal relations are not “reducible to other states

is

made by Sosa and Tooley

in their

of

“Introduction” to Causation

13).

tend to agree with Michael Scriven’s claim in “Defects of the Necessary Condition Analysis of

Causation” that “the concept of cause
as the concept of number:

we cannot

is

fundamental to our conception of the world

define

it

in

in

much

the

same way

terms of other notions without conceptual or ostensive

As Hume recognized, our reasoning about the
Thomas Reid points out in Essays on the Active Powers

circularity” (Scriven 1993, 56, his footnote omitted).

external world

is

through cause and

effect.

And

as

of Man we come to see cause and effect in the world because we first notice our (causal) ability to affect
things in the world (Reid 1788, 603ff). These sorts of considerations lead me to believe there is something
basic and fundamental about the notion of “causing” or “bringing about” or being a “source.” But is this
observable as Anscombe seems to claim? It seems to me that at the very least, we can have observational
,

evidence of causes and give

Anscombe

points out,

it

status equal to other observational evidence scientists are willing to use (as

“someone who says [we can never observe

not going to count anything as ‘observation of causality’”;

does

this

prove

its

causality in the individual case]

Anscombe

1993, 92). But even

is

just

if this is right,

primitiveness? Against philosophers like Anscombe, Tooley claims that observational

knowledge does not seem
1993, 190). Tooley gives

enough to support the claim that causation is analytically basic (Tooley
example that scientists can observe electrons in cloud chambers but the
concept of electron is still able to be analysed (190). But Tooley goes on to mention David Armstrong’s
“more sophisticated” argument for the primitiveness (due to the observability) of causes which discusses
the difference between perceptual knowledge involving inference and the non-inferential variety;
Armstrong claims that one can have non-inferential knowledge of causes (Tooley 1993, 190). Regardless, I
think there is a good deal of intuitive plausibility to the idea that causes are primitive. But again, my agentlike

the

causal view does not depend upon this particular claim.

80

affairs” (Tooley 1993, 172).

in

There

is

strong intuitive plausibility to the idea that a world

which events merely follow upon one another

not the

is

same

as a

world in which one

thing can actually bring about another.

Tooley gives two arguments against reductive approaches
says this in summarizing the

In the case

first

He

to causal relations.

of his arguments:

of causal

relations,

1

advanced two

there were the objections that focused
direction of causation.

I

upon

sorts

the

of objections.

First,

problem of explaining the

argued that a reductionist approach

is

unable

to

provide a satisfactory account of the direction of causation either for
certain very simple universes, or for inverted universes, unless one

is

prepared both to define the direction of causation in terms of the direction

of time, and

The underlying

idea of the

to

adopt a

first sort

there are causes and effects but in

realist

view of the

of objection

which there

is

is

latter.

(Tooley 1993, 192)

that there are possible

worlds in which

no way “to distinguish between the

direction from cause to effect and the inverse one from effect to cause” just by looking at

the underlying structures of the events (180).

which there are only two uncharged

He

gives the example of a simple world in

particles rotating

enter into causal relations because they exert gravity

result (180).

upon one another and accelerate

e.g., this

is that

simple world will be symmetrical

we would need

in

time (180). The crux of the

a realist conception of causes to be able to say which

thing “brings about” the other in this simple world because

factors such as temporal direction.

we cannot

rely

on underlying

73

Tooley summarizes the second

73

as a

Certain features of our actual complex world will not be present in this

simple world:

argument

around one another. The particles

sort

of objection as follows:

More specifically, Tooley claims that this simple world, although causal, “is also a world that is utterly
devoid of changes of entropy, of propagation of order, and of open forks” (Tooley 1993, 180). These are
the sorts of features (existent in the actual world) that we often rely on in determining the direction of
causation (180).

Secondly, there were the under-determination objections, the thrust of

which was

that causal relations between events are not logically
supervenient even upon the totality of all non-causal facts, together with
all laws, both causal and non-causal, plus the direction of causation in all

potential causal processes. (Tooley 1993, 192)

The second
event M.

sort

It is

of argument employs the following kind of example: event P causes

possible that there

(both intrinsic and relational) as

another event,

is

M, but which

M*,

that has all the

properties

simultaneously and are qualitatively indistinguishable

(A and A*)

(i.e.,

their

that exist

mental contents are the

every instant) (187). Let us suppose that identity over time “must be analysed in

at

terms of causal relations between different events in the history of the enduring entity
question” (a view which Tooley finds plausible and supportable) (187). P and

“any two temporal
slices

not

is

slices

of mind A, and P* and

M*

and where

M*

has the same properties as

M.

If

in

M will be

be the corresponding temporal

[will]

of A*” (187). This would then be an example where P

M*

74

not caused by P (187). Tooley asks us to

is

consider the logical possibility of two immaterial minds

same

same

we

is

causally related to

M but

allow that this sort of example

possible, then causal relations are not reducible to non-causal facts; the non-causal

facts leave out the causal relations

fail to

distinguish that P

I

think these

is

(i.e., all

the non-causal facts about P, P*,

causally related to

M, and

M*

M but not to M*).

two arguments provide adequate reason

for being skeptical

of

reductionist views and for giving realist views a try.

Agents as Causes
Simply

put, an agent causes

something just as an event does: by bringing

Certain properties the agent possesses allow

this.

74

At

first,

one

may

about.

question the

In a footnote, Tooley restricts properties to those which do not involve particulars
from the Grand Canyon does not count as a property”) (Tooley 1993, 187, n. 12).

82

it

(e.g.,

“being 5 miles

of an agent

plausibility

events. But

it

is

(i.e.,

a substance) entering into a relation usually reserved for

an unwarranted assumption to believe that only events can enter into

causal relations.

not too difficult to understand and identify the sources of this assumption.

It is

The evidence of cause and

effect observed

the form of one event followed

by another:

followed by the eight ball moving away
relationship

between cause and

necessarily temporal,

of events

—

it

effect.

makes sense

the cause-event followed

are misleading.

Going back

to

by

scientists

(and other observers)

is

usually in

the cue ball strikes the eight ball and this

is

We observe a temporal

in a certain direction.

Because our experiences and observations are

for us to

by

couch our talk of cause and effect

in terms

the effect-event. But these temporal observations

Tooley’s example of the simple world,

we

see that

we

cannot always rely on the direction of time, or more specifically on “the temporal
direction in

which order

is

time; Tooley 1993, 180).

propagated” (because the world he describes

this

75

broader picture give us enough reason

(besides events) to enter into the causal relation (after

terms of events)?

It is

all,

to

allow other entities

Tooley’s example

not an air-tight argument, of course, but

reason to consider other

symmetrical in

We need a broader picture of the world beyond our

unidirectional temporal experiences.

But does

is

entities.

It

I

believe

it

is still

put in

does give us

appears that our assumption that events are the only

causal entities arises in the following way:

we have

these temporal observational

experiences (we see one event followed by another),

75

we

accept the

Humean

As Tooley acknowledges, it is possible (though not desirable) to be a realist with respect
of time (Tooley 1993). Presumably, since the time of Einstein, however, science has made
less tenable.

83

notion that

to the direction
this possibility

such experiences

we come

to the

possible to

is

of events) are the only

Humean

know about

event so this

know

(i.e.,

we have

(regarding cause and effect),

conclusion that these experiences correlate with

causation

(i.e., all

we have knowledge

is all

sort

we

of),

experience

and then

is

this picture

of causality

we assume

Essays on the Active Powers of Man. His claim

is

is

it is

one event followed by another
that

indicative of the metaphysical status of cause and effect.

But competing with

that

all

the one

what

it

is

possible to

76

Thomas Reid

illustrates in

that our notion of causation in the

world comes from our direct experience of causing things ourselves (Reid 1788, 603ff).

The implication here
that

is,

is

that

we

can experience cause and effect

between an agent and

as a relation

although there will be an event
the effect will be an action

—

his action (not

or process

which

is

—on one

in a

way Hume

77

rejects,

merely between events,

side of the relation. In other words,

an event or process). But

how do we

decide which

picture to accept?

If we

should), then

have already accepted the

we

can accept that

it is

realist

account of causes (as

I

have argued

that

we

possible to experience causation as something real in

the world, not reducible to a constant conjunction of events (or to anything else). There

seems

to

be no reason

to

hold on to the idea that this real relation (of causation) can only

be found between events.

76
It is

not even clear that this

experience
event.

owe

I

77

is all

we

experience with regard to cause and

effect.

It

seems

that

we

also

contributing conditions or circumstances (discussed below) that help cause the
to ignore these things and to place emphasis on some triggering event as the cause.

many of the

Our tendency
this point to

See Enq.

78

is

Stephen Griffith

Sect. VII.

(Hume

(this issue is also

discussed

in

Chapter

6).

1999).

78
with metaphysical ones. But I think
1 realize that epistemological issues are intertwined
consider where our assumptions originate in order to see if those assumptions are justified.

84

it is

relevant to

As

limited

Sometimes

it

human

beings,

makes sense

we must make

to see the

world

in

choices about

how we

carve up

reality.

terms of events, sometimes in terms of

processes (more will be said about processes below), sometimes in terms of states of
affairs, objects, substances, etc.

idea that an agent or even

properties to enable

it

On my

view, there

some (non-agent)

is

no adequate reason

to rule out the

physical object could possess the appropriate

to enter into a causal relation

with something else

79
.

One might

object that causal relations must be limited to events because causation requires that the

cause be temporally prior
not

make

With agent-causation, the objection goes,

to its effect.

sense to say that an agent

is

temporally prior to the

does not work, however, because there

backward causation

is

the possibility

why

think this objection

of simultaneous and even

80

causal theorist: if agent-causation

explain

I

does

.

Temporal considerations, however, do

we

effect.

it

is

raise a legitimate question for the agent-

not in terms of events

(it is

actions occur at one time rather than another?

how

nonoccurrent),

The answer

quite simple and partly concerns the role of desires and beliefs. This

is

is

can

actually

what we turn

to in

the next section.

The Role
Although the agent-causal theory

of Desires and Beliefs

is

a theory of incompatibilist freedom,

it

allows,

and even requires, that the agent be limited by certain conditions. As Clarke suggests,

The occurrence of certain

prior events will be a necessary condition of an

agent’s causing a certain event. Absent those prior events, the later event
79

See also Sosa and Tooley (Sosa and Tooley 1993,

relations,

1),

who

claim that states of affairs can enter into causal

and David Lewis (Lewis 1993, 195) who suggests that events are not the only things

that

can

cause.
80

See David Lewis’s “Causation”

in

which he rejects a certain solution because “it rejects a prion certain
backward or simultaneous causation (Lewis 1993, 203).

legitimate physical hypotheses that posit

85

will not

be naturally possible, and an agent can cause only what

is

naturally possible. (Clarke 1995, 204)

I

will call these events “contributing conditions.”

affairs

birth

add

that certain states

of the agent, any events

that led to the agent’s

will also include the agent’s desires

being

in his current circumstances,

and beliefs (although not every desire and

belief will play a causal role in every free action).

sl

These conditions

will act as partial

causes of the agent’s free actions but will not determine his free actions. This

if

causes are probabilistic (as Clarke suggests; 204).

It is

these conditions as not sufficient in themselves but only

agent-cause.

discarded

role

8

"

in this case).

There are many

It is

only

when

the raging fire ensues.

necessitating

Also,

understand

together with the

partial or contributing

causes of the

fire.

contributing conditions are the dryness of the brush on which the cigarette

lands and the wind conditions at the time.

81

when joined

we

possible

Let us look at an analogous example with event causation. Suppose a

of the agent

fire.

also possible if

is

cigarette starts a raging forest fire (for simplicity’s sake, let us ignore the

lit

Some of the

the

of

can be contributing conditions.) These conditions will include events such as the

They

etc.

will also

(I

it.

to

the

wind do not alone cause

these conditions are joined with the landing of the cigarette that

Still,

these conditions influence what happens without

The same can be

we might want

The dryness and

human

said with

free actions.

allow that some desires and beliefs are part of the action

“Agent Causation" (O’Connor 1995a, 182) (although it
this suggestion is meant to be a part of his own view or if it is merely made in
For example, a complex act of deliberation will include desires and beliefs.

O’Connor suggests

in

82

is

itself as

Timothy

not clear to

the context

me

whether

of an argument).

Although perhaps part of the inspiration for my suggestion, INUS conditions (see John Mackie's "Causes
and Conditions"; Mackie 1993) are quite different from what I am proposing here. On my understanding,
views such as Mackie's are meant to be reductionist attempting to analyze causation completely in terms of
,

necessary and sufficient conditions.

86

If

it

happens

that contributing conditions

“crowd out” the agent-cause on some

occasions, then the agent will not act freely on these occasions. For example,
that

someone

hands over

my

head for protection.

baseball bat about to

situation,

to

my

all

is

and desires

“no room”
But

let

cause

my

head,

my

by immediately

that

over

my hands

case so strongly affect

agent-causation.

raising

my belief that there

us say

my

is

a

belief about the pain involved in such a

my hands

to raise

us go back to free actions.

free actions can

react

of the bat-wielding agent, and

action of raising

in this

left for

me

I

seems possible

come down on my

possible to suppose that

there

It

beliefs about the intentions

avoid intense pain,

my beliefs

my head.

raises a baseball bat over

let

is

my

head.

It

my

also

acute desire

seems

not freely performed because

my action

—

much

so

so, in fact, that

83

What

is

important here

have contributing causes, then there

is

is

that if

we

accept that

no problem with timing. The

timing of free actions can be explained by the timing of these contributing causes. Clarke
claims that

The agent-causal view

thus has the

same resources

causal view of human agency to explain

why

action at a certain time, rather than earlier or

such as her acquiring
not

at

some other

new

as

does a wholly event-

an agent performs a certain
later.

reasons, that explains

If there is

why

an event,

she acted then and

time, then both sorts of views have available an

explanation. If there

is

no such event, then neither

sort

of view has

available an explanation. (Clarke 1995, 204)

In other words, these partial causes

can explain the timing of an action just as well when

they are partial (as on the agent-causal view) as they can

(as

83

on the wholly event-causal view).

This

is

I

agent-caused

my

when

they are the whole story

action of going to the door at

not to suggest that every agent in such a situation would not agent-cause her action.

may have mastered

their physical reactions to

while playing Helen Keller

in the

such things. There

is

Some

a story that the actress Patty

agents

Duke,

play The Miracle Worker, had so mastered her reactions that she was able

87

this

time because

I

just

came

to believe that

someone was knocking on

however, nothing can explain the timing of an action. In such cases,
to say that there is

true

no reason the agent performed the action

whichever view

we

But more needs

now

Sometimes,

it.

we must be

satisfied

rather than later. This

is

accept.

to

be said about desires and

beliefs.

It

seems quite

clear that

agents have both occurrent desires and beliefs (which can help explain timing, as

discussed above) and long-standing, or dispositional, desires and beliefs. Both types can

be contributing conditions, or

partial causes,

of free actions. For example,

help a drowning victim, this could be partially caused by

helping others

is

a

good thing

drowning victim before

me

to do, as well as

in

required for free action, however.

some

beliefs or other in order to

It

will, is

As

even be an agent

and beliefs are

fits

84

well with our intuitions about acting for certain

.

.”

when

she acts with free

(presumably these reasons are her

goes on to say that “her acting for that ordering of reasons

itself a

complex event, one

to resist

any flinching

(in

a

is

.

her acting on (or for) certain of her reasons.

He

to

long-standing belief that

No particular desires

Clarke suggests, “what an agent directly causes,

beliefs and desires).

choose

does seem necessary, though, that an agent have

This characterization of action
reasons.

I

my occurrent belief that there

by

need of my help.

my

if

that consists, in part,

is

of her behavior’s being caused by those

keeping with her deaf character) when stage

lights accidentally fell right

near her

during a performance.
84
1

do not think the mere capacity for belief is enough

agent cease to have any beliefs while

still

here.

Under what

remaining an agent?

agent can freely act against his beliefs (as in an irrational action

say that the agent
beliefs.

is

of circumstances would an

— although perhaps

to

suppose that an

it is

more

plausible to

would fall under this requirement (This is the case unless we reject the idea
of knowledge. This point was suggested to me by Vere Chappell).
would cause all his own beliefs while ours would come from various sources.

Even God

God

sort

might be plausible

acting on certain beliefs while acting against others). But here the agent at least has

as an agent

that belief is a necessary part

Presumably,

It

88

reasons” (Clarke 1995, 205, his footnote omitted).
rule out the possibility

of irrational actions
appears to be (and
here

is that

(that

is,

many

is

of free

really acting

is

is

should add here that

What

irrational actions.

whether the agent

1

is difficult to

acting against

all

do not want

I

determine

to

in the case

reasons or whether he just

on strange or unlikely ones). 85 But what

important

is

agent-caused actions can be explained in terms of the agent’s reasons

the agent’s beliefs and desires). Thus, in these cases, the agent-caused action will

be rational (Clarke 1995, 205). And rationality

is

an important feature of free action

(Clarke 1995,206).

The Agent-Caused Action
In the previous section,

we saw how

actions. This helped us understand

as occurring at

importantly,

desires and beliefs

how we can

to

know what

into play in our

explain our actions as being rational and

one time rather than another. But much

we want

come

still

the agent-caused action

needs

is

to

be explained. Most

supposed

Obviously, although agent-causes are nonoccurrent, actions occur

means

that there

this exertion

must be some exertion of causal power

William

Rowe

is

to

discusses the regress problem in

specifically discussing the agent-causal

Reid’s Essays on the Active Powers of Man.
Reid’s theory,

85

On

this subject,

behave

not

It

has led

some

event,

it is

the agent

of Freedom.”

view of Thomas Reid, as

Rowe

when an agent

“Two Concepts

characterizes Reid’s

wills

some

whose

act of will

it is.

set out in

view

action, the act

an event and, as such, requires a cause. If the act of will
is

a time. This

argue that the agent-causal view suffers from a regress problem.

Rowe

On

at

like.

The nature of

that is temporal.

has caused problems for the agent-causal theorist in the past.

some philosophers

be

to

as follows:

of will

is free, its

is itself

cause

Being the casue

Clarke says that “although our freedom of the will might consist partly in an ability to
more desirable if it is the freedom to determine which of several genuine

irrationally, free will is

alternatives one will rationally pursue” (Clarke 1995, 205-6).

89

of the act of will, the agent must

[sic]

agent-causation.

Thus

satisfy Reid’s three conditions

the agent must have had the

power

to

of

bring about

the act of will as well as the

power to refrain from bringing about the act
of will, and she must have exerted her power to bring about the act of will.
It is the last of these conditions that generates an infinite regress of events
that an agent must cause if she is to cause her act of will. For what it tells
us

that to

is

produce the act of will the agent must exert her power

about the act of will.
such,

it

Now

an exertion of power

too must have a cause.

On

is itself

an event.

to

bring

exertion of power

it

As

Reid’s view the cause must again be

the agent herself. But to have caused this exertion the agent

had the power

to bring

must have

about and must have exerted that power. Each

is itself

having the power to cause

an event which the agent can cause only by
it

and by exerting

that

power. (Rowe 1995,

161)

Thus, claims Rowe,
Reid’s theory of agent-causation,

when conjoined with

the principle that

every event has a cause, leads to the absurdity of an infinite regress of

agent-produced exertions for every act of will the agent produces. (162)
In other words, Reid’s

view seems

to require that in order to

perform an act of will, an

agent must perform an exertion of his causal power. But in order to perform this
exertion, the agent

must perform another

exertion because the exertion

Rowe
this regress.

suggests that

Rowe

is

exertion, etc.

(I

say he must “perform” an

an event which must be agent-caused).

we must

significantly

modify Reid’s theory

in

order to avoid

claims that

Although some actions (moving one’s arm,

e.g.)

can be caused by the

agent only by the agent exerting his power to produce his action of

of will are produced directly by
by means of exertions that are distinct from the acts of
will produced. To deny the possibility of the latter is simply to claim that
thus if there is no exertion
ultimately only events can be causes of events
of power by the agent (and no other event causes the volition), no act of

moving

his arm, other actions such as acts

the agent and not

—

will can

be produced. But the whole idea of agent-causation

is

that agents

are causes of events, that in addition to event-causes there are causes of a

wholly different kind

—

agents.

90

(Rowe

1995, 163)

Rowe

attempts to solve the regress by suggesting that acts of will require no “prior”

He

exertion in order to be agent-caused.

does seem to hold, however, that some actions,

such as bodily movements, will require prior exertions.

Rowe

is

What

is

unclear to me,

He

suggesting separate standards for acts of will and bodily actions.

acts

of will are produced directly and “not by means of exertions

acts

of will produced” (quoted above). This

produced by exertions, but exertions identical
produced by no exertions

The

at all.

latter

ambiguous

is

to the acts

whether

is

says that

that are distinct

from the

as to whether acts of will are

of will, or whether they are

does not seem

make much

to

an agent cause something with no exertion of causal power? Also,

this

sense;

how

could

would suggest

separate standards for acts of will and for bodily acts (no exertions versus exertions).

The

former, however, does bring us closer to solving the regress problem.

The key

to solving the regress

acts freely, the exertion

of power just

Rowe’s claim (quoted above), an
right to

me.

problem
is

lies in the

the action.

act of will just

is

On

suggestion that

the exertion of power. This

“can be caused by the agent only by the agent exerting his power

moving

his

arm” (quoted above),

86
.

It

may be

seems plausible

to

suggest that in

is

a bodily

that

Rowe

bodily movements, he
will he

owe

may

he means

be suggesting

cases, the exertion

It

this

to

process which

86

by

Rowe seems

such an action.
caused

if

that the

some

by doing y”
Vere Chappell.

to

agent cannot directly cause

In these

with acts of will.

confusing two different meanings of ‘by’
take ‘by’ to

produce his action of

will be said about processes below).

is

may

to

movements

cases, the agent directly causes a

the action, just as

it is

that bodily

seems

only acts of will can be directly

is

take “I do x

this point to

movement (more

that

agent

the former interpretation of

do not agree with Rowe, however, when he claims

I

when an

in

‘I

do x by doing

y.’

With respect

to

mean ‘in order to’ or ‘by means of,’ whereas with respect to acts of
mean “my doing x amounts to my doing y in which case x = y.
1
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Giving priority
first

place.

to acts

of will seems

We trace actions backwards to

to

be what

acts of will

problem

starts the regress

in the

and then wonder what comes

before them, and so on. In a sense, saying that every action requires a prior act of will

somewhat (although not
requires that

we

perform

87
it.

Acts of will are certainly one class of actions

(and likewise sometimes trying to do something

them

special status. Clarke

An

we perform

perfectly) analogous to saying that every action

first try to

makes

is

is itself

an action), but

we need

not give

the following remarks:

power is simply the obtaining of this
between her and an event. An agent need not do
if by that is meant perform some action
in order to cause

agent’s exercise of her causal

[causal] relation

anything

—

—

something. Thus, agent causation

some

special kind

of action

not fundamentally the performance of

is

that then causes one's bodily

Nevertheless, the causal power that such an account

Clarke’s agent-

no more “magical” than that which we
events. For an event need not perform any action in order to

causal one] attributes to agents
attribute to

movements.

[i.e.,

is

cause another event, and event causation

is

not fundamentally the

occurrence of some third event between cause and effect;

it

is

fundamentally the obtaining of a relation between the two. (Clarke 1995,

209)

88
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This point comes from statements made by Gideon Yaffe in his unpublished paper, “Planning, Character
and Agent-Causation: Reid’s Third Argument for Moral Liberty.” Yaffe says:
(1) If a person succeeds in doing something voluntarily that she tried to do, she did not do
two things but only one. To try and to succeed is ontologically no different from just
succeeding. (Yaffe unpublished, 3)

Yaffe goes on

to

say that

“it

seems

likely that the appearance

of regress problems with agent-causalism

derives from a failure to notice that (1) is true” (3). Interestingly, he characterizes Reid’s view in the
following way. He suggests that “Reid thinks of the exerting of power as the familiar process of trying to

do something,” and

that “the effort

rightly attributed to the agent

Reid

is

something distinct from the volition that is
do something,” (3). But Yaffe claims that
(note that this goes against Rowe’s account above).

discussing here

whenever she has

is

a volition to

Reid does not classify tryings or exertions as events (3)
Specifically, Yaffe says their status is at least different from “ordinary events like actions” (3). In a
“as relation or
footnote, he suggests that Reid was not particularly concerned with how to classify trying
event, or what have you” (n. 18). Although their ontological status is somewhat mysterious, Reid believes

—

exertions to have real metaphysical import, according to Yaffe

(3).

It

appears that Reid himself could then

solve the regress problem by denying that these exertions are events. But the mysteriousness of these
exertions

is

just

what has prevented agent-causal theories from being taken
this way, his view is still in some trouble.

seriously. Thus,

even

if

Reid

escapes the regress
88

Apparently, some philosophers do assume that a realist conception of causes entails that there be this
In an interesting paper about agent causation, Erik Wielenberg claims that “because the non-

third event.

reductivist [about causes] holds that causation

the cause

—he must say

that a’s causing

is

a real, positive relation

of b does introduce

92

—

the production of the effect by

a further event.

The

further event has a and b

(I

would merely add

to Clarke’s

account that sometimes

order to cause another, but his point
regress problem

is

solved once

we

is

well taken that

we do

we need

in fact

do one thing

in

not always do so.) The

realize that these exertions are not

some

additional

event or action that require an additional cause. These exertions of power are either the
action-event or part of the process that

is

the

complex

The Individuation

action.

of Actions

Questions about acts of will and bodily actions raise the very complicated issue of
action individuation.

I

think

we

can, and should, allow for a broad range of possibilities.

Actions are diverse and complex. Whatever the agent (as an agent) directly causes
action

action

(i.e.,

whatever enters into the agent-causal relation as the second relatum

89
).

It

seems plausible

to

suppose

with a broad range of types of action

what counts as an
will

be said

to

action.

90
.

that the agent

Thus,

have been caused by the agent.

in the action

agent-causal relation as the second relatum

its

It

constituents” (Wielenberg unpublished, 3,

—

can enter into the causal relation

can and should be open-minded about

seems reasonable

I

to suggest that

that

some

because they will not enter into the

instead, they will

n. 4).

an

an

Obviously there will be things extending outside the agent

of these things will not be included

as

we

is

is

do not think the

be caused by the agent

realist

must multiply events

in this

way.
89

As Clarke

points out, “agents enter into such relations

[i.e.,

agent causation] only as

first relata,

never as

second relata” (Clarke 1995, 207).
"ideally the individuation of an action would be a matter for discovery, as opposed to being a matter for
decision or stipulation
characterize

it

— we would have

as an action.

This

decide upon the most appropriate

decide whether to look

at

is

to find out

what entered

into the relation with the agent in order to

not to say there would be nothing to “decide.”

way of interpreting

We would still

or carving up reality. For example,

have

to

we would have

to

actions or at sequences of neurons firing (more will be said about this below).

My point here

is that although we can decide how to interpret any observations, we cannot simply stipulate
what enters into the causal relation with the agent. With a realist conception of causes, there will be a real
answer to the question, “what did the agent directly cause?” This is the agent’s action. But for all practical
purposes, it is impossible to have certainty about the answer.
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indirectly in virtue

of the fact

that

something the agent did caused them.

In other

words,

the causal relation in these cases could be between the agent’s action and further events
or states of affairs.

On my

view, these further events or states of affairs are beyond the

Some might

agent’s direct control.

argue that

this

view of human action does not allow

us to identify and individuate our actions easily. But

Perhaps any theory which allows us

why

should that job be easy?

to individuate actions easily

would necessarily lead

us to do so inaccurately (due to the inherent complexity of acting).

But
that

some

it

is

worth speculating on different sorts of actions.

1

would

like to speculate

actions are not events, but processes. In “Causality: Production and

Propagation,” Wesley Salmon argues for the acceptance of processes as basic entities in

causality

(Salmon 1993a, 155).

types of actions.

transmitting a

He

mark

(

1

think his ideas

may

suggests that a causal process

1

56).

He

is

give us

some

insight into certain

capable of transmitting signals or of

gives the following example:

we have

—

a very large circular building
a sort of superyou will with a spotlight mounted at its center. When the
light is turned on in the otherwise darkened building, it casts a spot of light
upon the wall. If we turn the light on for a brief moment, and then off
again, a light pulse travels from the light to the wall. This pulse of light,
traveling from the spotlight to the wall, is a paradigm of what we mean by

Suppose

that

Astrodome,

if

—

a causal process. (156)

Let us draw an (admittedly imperfect) analogy to

that with certain actions,

it

does not

make

human

action.

Let us suppose

sense to slice things into events, but rather, to

look at the whole process. For example, raising one's arm can be seen as an actionprocess rather than an action-event (such as an act of will) because the act of raising one's

arm has some

duration.

94

Admitting that some actions are processes rather than events allows the following
point to be made: sometimes the target of agent-causation

return to the arm-raising example. In simple terms,

process, not the

I

is

a

whole process. Let us

agent-cause the whole raising

muscular contractions or the beginning of some neural sequence

first

(although these things are certainly part of what happens). Like the spotlight,

say that the agent transmits a sort of signal.

And

whole

The

91

action.

I

it

takes to raise the arm), not just to a

intuition here is just that the agent’s causal

am

could

like the spotlight, this signal is

transmitted over a length of time (namely, the time

singular event.

we

power

relates to the

not denying that something within the agent causes the firing of

neurons or the contraction of muscles, just as Salmon

is

surely not denying that the

turning on of the spotlight causes the existence of light at each point between the

spotlight and the wall.

The point here

is

that the signal is transmitted throughout the

process and the agent-causal relation holds for the whole process.

This notion of actions as processes appears to be reminiscent of a view advanced

by Anthony Kenny

in Action,

Emotion and

Will.

According

to

Kenny, verbs can be

divided into three categories based on their "tense-implications": static verbs
understand, love, be taller than), performance verbs

lift),

(e.g.,

or activity verbs (e.g., listen to, ponder on, enjoy)

observes that "states

may

last for a time,

and

activities

performances take time" (176). For example, Joe
for five years

(until his brother hits a

growth

discover, learn, build a house,

(Kenny

963, 175).

1

go on for

may be

(e.g.,

taller

Kenny

a time" but "only

than his younger brother

spurt, for instance).

Likewise, Joe

may

11

Donald Davidson suggests that “doing something that causes my finger to move does not cause me to
finger; it is moving my finger” (Davidson 1980b, 49-50). Although Davidson is not making a
point about processes here, his point seems to lend credence to the idea that with bodily movements what

move my

95

is

Mozart symphony for

listen to a

may

take longer, and

(whereas
that

it

it

itself

five minutes (whereas the

may

last longer).

does not take five minutes

performance of the symphony

Kenny goes on

to listen to Mozart).

only performance verbs can be done quickly or slowly:

slowly, but not to

know French

indefinitely or they

may

A has

phi-ing implies

"it is

house

to point out

possible to learn French

slowly" (176-7). Also, performance verbs "come to a

end and are finished," whereas

definite

to build his

But Joe takes five years

cease" (177).

"activities

Kenny

and

may be

states

prolonged

explains that with performance verbs,

not phi-ed, whereas with other verbs

A

is

phi-ing implies

A

is

A has phi-

ed (172). He gives the following examples:

On the other hand,
man is building a house, he has not yet built it.
am living in Rome it does not follow that have not lived in Rome; on
the contrary, told that I am living in Rome you may at once ask me "And
how long have you lived in Rome?" (172)
if a
if

.

I

.

.

I

Although Kenny's observations are interesting and valuable (and
issue with any of his assertions),

I

would

like to distinguish

processes from his notion of performance verbs.

On my

my

I

notion of actions as

account, an action that

process cannot be meaningfully divided into other actions. For example,

arm above

my head,

there does not

seem

to

do not take

be much point

in

when

is

I

to C,

C

to

D,

etc.

The

raise

my

dividing this action into

events such as individual muscular contractions or individual motions from point

B

a

A to

B,

action of building a house (an example of the performance verb

category), on the other hand, can easily and meaningfully be divided into other actions

(e.g.,

constructing the foundation, erecting walls, nailing parts together,

Presumably, an agent directs his causal power

caused
relation

not

is
is

some

prior event

which then causes

the

between agent and the bodily movement

to these smaller actions

movement

that

96

is

etc.).

whereas he does

via a causal chain; rather, the causal

the action.

not do so in the arm-raising example.

92

In fact,

do not think an agent could build a

I

house without intentionally performing smaller actions, whereas he could raise his arm
without intentionally performing smaller actions.

These distinctions are important. Although Kenny's observations are insightful

much

(and probably too often ignored), they do not do

power

agent-causal

to

do

to

understand

so).

I

believe that seeing

how

be

relates to his actions (and to

some

to illuminate

fair,

how

an agent's

Kenny probably never intended

actions as processes, on the other hand, does help us

an agent's causal power relates to his actions. But nothing about

agent-causal view depends on the acceptance of

Explanatory Value:

Is

some

my

actions as processes.

Agent-Causation Reducible

to

Other Sorts of

Causation?

Now

that

we have

(I

hope) a better understanding of what an agent-caused action

the following objection

is like,

must be faced.

It is

causation has no explanatory role to play. If this
other sorts of causation.

cause

my

Why aren’t we just

free action this just

desires (as

opposed

explained by

to

means

being caused

my desires

is

sometimes claimed
the case, perhaps

it is

reducible to

satisfied with the suggestion that

that the action is

—

that agent-

irreducibly

caused by

—by me)?

If

when

my unique beliefs

my

1

and

actions can be

and beliefs and agent-causation has nothing

to add,

why

accept

it

as a theory of free action?

92

This

is

not

to

say that an agent could not direct his causal power to raising his arm from point

B

A

to

B,

some cases, the agent is not directing his
causal power to these smaller actions but to the action of raising his arm above his head. Moreover, it
seems quite clear that the agent cannot direct his causal power to the firing of neurons or to certain kinds of
muscular contractions (I should make one qualification here. Some people may be able to direct
themselves toward making some sorts of muscular contractions because they know more about physiology.
But even so, it is questionable whether in the case of raising one's arm such an agent could actually contract
his muscles as an action separate from raising his arm. How would one do this other than by actually
then from point

raising

it

or

to

C,

etc. if

he wanted

to.

The

point

at least trying to raise it?).

97

is

that in

I

am

suggesting that agent-causation

other sort of causation).

93

This

is in

is

not reducible to event-causation (or any

part because the sort

of freedom that matters

to us

(the sort required for responsibility) is not guaranteed without agent-causation (see

Chapters 3 and 4) (see also Clarke’s statement, quoted below).

But perhaps there

is

another reason. In “Freedom to Act,” Donald Davidson gives

a fascinating example:

A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding
another

man on

a rope, and he might

know

that

by loosening

his hold

on

the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and

want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet
might be the case that he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he do
intentionally. (Davidson 1980c, 79)
Davidson gives the example

to highlight a

problem he must overcome

if

he wants

it
it

to give

a causal analysis of free action. According to Davidson

the only

hope

for the causal analysis is to find states or events

which are

causal conditions of intentional actions, but which are not themselves
actions or events about

them can

He

intelligibly

which the question whether the agent can perform

be raised. (72)

suggests the following analysis:

A can do x intentionally

(under the description d) means that if A has
x (under d), then A does x. (73)

desires and beliefs that rationalize

Although his suggestion seems quite reasonable, his climber example leads

The problem

is

that his analysis

to difficulties.

does not account for these “wayward causal chains” (79).

does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional. In other words, even

It

though the climber’s desires and beliefs rationalize his loosening his hold,
follow that the climber loosens his hold intentionally.

93
1

add “any other

just because

by

events.

I

sort,”

The climber’s

it

does not

beliefs and desires

because one could claim that agent-causation is not reducible to event-causation
states of affairs (such as long-standing beliefs) rather than

some of our actions are caused by
am saying more than this.
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way

cause the loosening, but not in the

Davidson never

intentionally.

they would need to in order to say that he acted

fully resolves the difficulty, yet insists that

we

not

abandon a causal theory of action (80-1 ).

The agent-causal
theorist explains the

theorist can,

however, resolve the

example by claiming

that the climber

The agent-causal

difficulty.

does not agent-cause his

loosening of his hold. His beliefs and desires cause the loosening without him, so to
speak. Thus the climber does not act freely (or intentionally).

If,

on the other hand, the

climber had, contrary to the example, loosened his hold intentionally, the agent-causal
theorist could explain this

his desires

and

by claiming

that

he agent-caused his loosening, together with

beliefs.

Davidson would not accept
causation on the grounds that

it

this strategy.

He famously

argues against agent-

has no explanatory value. In “Agency,” he poses the

following dilemma for the agent-causal theorist:
Either the causing by an agent of a primitive action

is

an event discrete

which case we have problems about acts of
the will or worse, or it is not a discrete event, in which case there seems to
be no difference between saying someone caused a primitive action and
saying he was the agent. (Davidson 1980b, 52)
from the primitive action,

Davidson says

that

we

a discrete event). This

event

is

is

If

it is

not a doing” (52).

event)

cannot embrace horn one (that the causing of a primitive action

is

because

an action or not. If it

assumption.

is

in

is,

we would

He goes on

just as troubling

then be forced to decide whether this discrete

then our original action

not an action, however,

to

we have

was not

primitive, counter to our

the strange notion of “a causing that

say that horn two (that the causing

is

not a discrete

because

Then what more have we
than when we say he was

is

said

when we say

the agent caused the action

the agent of the action?

99

The concept of cause

seems

play no role.

to

ordinary causation

is

.

.

What

.

that

distinguishes agent causation from
tale of two events is
same token, nothing is explained.

no expansion into a

By

possible, and no law lurks.

the

(52-3)

In

“Agent Causation,” Timothy O’Connor discusses Dav idson’s dilemma and

claims to avoid

it.

This

because, according to O’Connor’s view, the causal relation

is

is

not between the agent and the action but, rather, “the relational complex constitutes the
action” (O’Connor 1995a, 182). Presumably, Davidson’s

assumption

that “the

agency theory maintains

between the agent and

his (free) action"

however, does not maintain

this.

action.

O’Connor appears

In fact, the

relation is the

same

is

what

as that

it

means

why we need

to

owe

this clarification to

not between agent and

is

that the causal relation is

between

causes her action; and the

We

actually cause or determine

that the causal relation

can be held morally

what we

do.

I

do not

does not hold

must avoid Davidson’s dilemma some other way.

Erik Wielenberg. In his unpublished paper, “In Defense of Agent Causation,”

he explains O’Connor’s position.
cause] their actions

I

is

(in event-causation).

be pushed into claiming

between agent and action. Thus,

1

maintain that agents cause events,

to say that the agent

between events

we

O’Connor’s theory,

181).

94

power of the agent-causal view

responsible for free actions because

94

to

the

an irreducible causal relation

disagree with O’Connor’s claim that the causal relation

agent and action. That

see

is

(O’Connor 1995a,

but that these events are not their actions.

I

that there

dilemma depends on

He

claims that on O’Connor’s view, “agents do not a-cause

—primitive or non-primitive.

[i.e.,

agent-

Primitive actions just are a-causings, and these a-

causings are in turn part of the non-primitive action” (Wielenberg unpublished,

1

1).

Wielenberg also

explains that for O’Connor, “primitive actions are what the entire schema, ‘SAe’ refers to,” where ‘S’

ranges over agents, ‘A’ stands for the agent-causation relation and
understanding,

O’Connor holds

‘e’

ranges over events

(9).

So on

my

that agents cause events but that these events are not actions (primitive or
,

non-primitive). Later in his paper, Wielenberg claims that according to O’Connor, agents specifically

cause volitions (12).

100

I

avoid his dilemma by disagreeing with the claim (quoted above) that the concept

of cause plays no role

(if

we embrace horn

significance of the fact that

presupposing a causal

when we say

‘he

Causation

relation.

What Davidson seems

two).

is

was

the agent of the action,’

I

with different

miss

we

95

And

if

we

we

can say that Davidson

agent-causation: what distinguishes

it

is

is

We need

are

relation but

wrong about what distinguishes

that in agent-causation, as

causation, an agent with rational capacity and moral responsibility

causal relation.

the

accept a view closer to

do (whereby event-causation and agent-causation are the same
entities),

is

inherent in the very concepts of agency and

action (thus, the concept of cause does play a role).

Clarke’s, as

to

opposed
is

to event-

entering into the

not even deny the existence of some appropriate law.

Clarke

suggests that “causal relations are grounded in laws of nature” and that there could be “a

law of nature

to the effect that

any individual who acts with such a capacity

practical reasoning] acts with free will” (Clarke 1995, 208).

assumption seems

to

be

that agent-causation

explanation of human action.

I

that

in its

disagree.

my brain

my picture of action is

Davidson’s overriding

cannot go beyond event-causation

Perhaps some would make the objection
scientist could look inside

[as reflective

in

more physical

and see things happening as

I

terms. Let us say a

act.

Doesn’t this show

inherently flawed because clearly the scientist sees sequences

of events (and no agent-causation)? But what does the scientist really see? Let us

suppose that he sees

electrical

a series of discrete events?

95

To be

impulses moving along neural pathways. Can he really see

Most

likely, the scientist will see

something more akin

to a

Davidson does recognize that “causality is central to the concept of agency” (Davidson 1980b,
seems to deny that there is something explanatory about positing an agent as the cause of
something. This seems to be begging the question against the agent-causal theorist.
fair,

53), but he

101

“process” or “processes.” In any case,

and decide what
observations

about what

how

tells

reality

for

—what

is

crucial, though,

human agency, we

the process into events, but

We run

how

into a Zeno-like

dividing thus making

it

is

seen

us about reality. Presumably scientists often must interpret their

among

events and

making decisions

count as observational evidence of some phenomenon ). 96

up

when looking

events?

(and the scientist) can interpret what

(e.g., inferring certain relationships

to

to slice

it

we

will

is

that if

miss what

small should

we

we make

paradox with

this

our slices too small

are looking for.

we go? How do we

We can choose

We

could slice

individuate these

approach whereby

we

keep

will

impossible to reach our goal.

The agent-causal

theorist is

sometimes accused of seeking

of human action by positing something more mysterious,

false,

to solve the

and lacking in

explanatory value. If this were the proper thing to do, the objector says,

merely posit an “agent” tor any mystery? For example,

why

mysteries

why

don’t

we

not posit a uranium agent to

explain the mysterious unpredictability of the decay of uranium ? 97 But (the agent-causal
theorist will respond) the cases are not analogous.

we

are moral agents

—persons who perform

are morally accountable.

We have prior reason to believe that

actions,

make

decisions, etc. for

which we

We have no reason to believe that uranium is like this.

There

is

no problem of free will for uranium that would be solved by the existence of a uranium
agent

96

97

98

98
.

See also

n.

72 of this chapter.

This objection comes from comments

made by

Phillip Bricker.

We can leave open the possibility that there could be some sort of substance (but not specifically agent)

causation at work

phenomena

(e.g., if scientists

came

to

believe that event-causation alone could not explain the

involved).

102

Explanatory value
alone that

we

is relative to that

If

it

is

the timing

are seeking to explain, event causation
should be our focus (and even here,

event causation can

fail

due

randomness of certain phenomena).

to the

explain the timing of human actions,
relation to) the agents in question.

human

which we want explained.

we

If we

want

to

look to the events occurring within (and in

But there

is

more

to

be explained

in the

realm of

action.

So why should we believe the agent-causal picture? Clearly,
we do not have
This

is

especially the case if we believe that there

problems associated with human agency. But
then

I

say

we

should believe

it.

We should believe

are both free and in control of what

we

if

we

think there

unintentionally

is

(i.e.,

a difference

if

we want

feel the force

it

if

we want

We should believe

do.

not just happen to us (and inside of us), but that
it

no requirement for explaining certain

is

we

if

we

we

it

of certain problems,

to

know how

if

we

truly cause them.

it

is that

feel that things

We

we

do

should believe

between doing something intentionally and

to explain

wayward

causal chains).

other views of action can account for these things.
There
alternative theories to explain

to.

how

is

It

appears that no

a considerable burden

these problems can be solved. Thus,

are concerned about these problems,

we

on

seems

to

me,

should believe the agent-causal view

if

we

it

if

can.

Even
that

and

have not been
is

world, there

scientifically

proven

if

is

room

to believing things that, at first,

concrete evidence.

to postulate theories

and believe things

doing so solves certain theoretical

of some positive value. Sometimes even

tantamount
in

in the scientific

in the

seem

Why should we not afford

103

realm of science doing so

utterly mysterious, strange,

the

difficulties

same respect

is

and lacking

to the agent-causal

Of course, none of this

theory?

rule out the possibility

not guarantee

yet.

is to

of agent-causation (the

But

its truth).

ability

of a theory to solve problems does

(as is discussed further in

If agent-causation turns out to

Our most

say that science (or philosophy) could not one day

Chapter

6), this

has not happened

be impossible, then something valuable has been

basic and compelling intuitions of ourselves will have turned out to be

Philosophers worry about the role of intuitions.

Any

given intuition

is

lost.

wrong."

certainly

not always accurate, and not always inescapable. But intuitions are always in play

we admit

whether

must

start

most

basic.

do.

100
It

useless,

Every

this or not.

scientific theory, as well as every philosophical one,

with certain intuitions. Sometimes

When

seems

this

happens,

that in the case

do not share the

we

we do

not agree about which intuitions are

reach a dialectical stalemate and no argument will

of agent-causation, those

intuition that there are

would normally be considered the

who

problems

to

dismiss

it

as explanatorily

be explained beyond what

‘scientific’ ones.

Clarke makes the following point about the relationship between science and the
agent-causal view (as quoted in Chapter 4):

If prediction

understanding,

Timothy O’Connor makes

it

and explanation are paradigmatic of scientific

appears that agent causation neither contributes to nor

a similar point in

Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free

Will.

When

discussing Robert Kane’s incompatibilist non-agent-causal view, he states
If

I

had strong reasons

to think

does anything. Nonetheless,

I

[Kane’s view] were

would say

true,

that our activity

I

wouldn't say that no one ever

comes

to less than

I

freely
100

(we)

The account gives a diminished conception of our capacity
determine our own ends. (O’Connor 2000, 41-2)

prereflectively thought.

Timothy O’Connor says

this

about the competing intuitions

at

work

to

in the compatibilist/incompatibilist

debate:
the late

Alan Donagan commented recently

that philosophical discussion

of

this issue

often resembles a “dialogue of the deaf.”... Although most of the professional

who have thought about this issue and come to a firmly held compatibilism
be moved by further variations on a familiar argument, my discussion is
primarily at them.
am much more hopeful of persuading those without firm

philosophers

are unlikely to

not directed

convictions....

I

(O’Connor 2000,

5)

104

detracts

from such understanding.

would be

contribution, rather,

Its

understanding of ourselves as moral agents.

our

to

We believe, most of us, that

we are morally responsible for much of what we do. Agent causation,
may be argued, is a condition of the possibility of morally responsible

it

agency. Affirming something like the view sketched here, then, would
give us an explication of how

we

can be what

we

seem, from the moral

point of view, to be. Importantly, the explication provided
that

is

consistent with

how we view

would be one

ourselves from the scientific point of

view. (Clarke 1995, 210, his footnote omitted)

Clarke makes an important point here. If we are looking for

strictly scientific

explanations and predictions of human behavior, agent-causation will not suffice

(although admittedly

we would want

explanation in order to

as

it

is

make

to get clearer

is

meant by

scientific

Moreover, as Clarke implies, science

this claim).

(at least

presently construed and practiced) will not suffice to explain moral agency. This

an ‘^unsolved mystery” as far as science

is

on what

attempt to solve the mystery

The

either).

in scientific

is

concerned. Agent-causation does not

tenns (but also, not in anti-scientific ones

difference between agent-causal theories and other theories

causal theories add mystery where others subtract

theories admit that

To many,

it

this

exists

where others pretend

mystery

is

The difference

it.

that

just unacceptable.

it

is

not that agent-

is that

agent-causal

does not.

But why should

it

be? The mysteries

unsolved by science are the springboard for philosophical inquiry and discovery. True
understanding and explanation,

if this is

what we are seeking, requires embracing the

mysterious and supplementing science with philosophical examination. As Albert
Einstein

is

said to

have claimed:

The most

beautiful thing

source of all true

who

art

we can

and science.

experience

He

to

is

whom

the mysterious.
this

emotion

can no longer pause to wonder and stand rapt in awe,

dead: his eyes are closed.

is

is

It is

the

a stranger,

as

good

as

101

I0
The first two sentences of the quote are attributed to Einstein in Adventures of a Mathematician by
Ulam (Ulam 1976, 289). The longer version of the quote is also attributed to Einstein.
'
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S.

M.

Let us keep our eyes open.

102
1

am

102

grateful to Stephen Griffith for helpful discussions

this chapter.
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and valuable insights concerning the material

in

CHAPTER 6
FURTHER OBJECTIONS TO AN AGENT-CAUSAL ACCOUNT
In this chapter,

I

will deal with

against the agent-causal view. First,

Inwagen

in his article,

I

some

further objections that

will discuss a recent

“Free Will Remains a Mystery.” In

have been made

argument by Peter van
this article,

argues that agent causation cannot solve the problem of free will. This
grants that agent causation

will argue that

is

coherent and that

van Inwagen’s argument

is

it

in fact exists

van Inwagen
is

so even

if

(Van Inwagen 2000,

not successful. Then

I

one
11).

I

will discuss a recent

manuscript by Randolph Clarke, in which he argues that there are reasons to believe that
substance causation (and thus agent causation)

is

not possible.

Van Inwagen’s Objection
In the

He

second part of his paper, van Inwagen discusses the problem of free

will.

characterizes the problem in the following way:

Free will seems to be incompatible both with determinism and
indeterminism. Free will seems, therefore, to be impossible. But free will

seems to exist. The impossible therefore seems
Inwagen 2000, 11)

also

He

claims to have already shown, via the

incompatible with determinism

he claims that freedom

is

(I

first

part

of his paper,

that

will not deal with the first part

also incompatible with indeterminism.

to exist.

(Van

freedom

is

of his paper here). Then

Here van Inwagen

employs the popular argument concerning the chanciness of undetermined actions (see

my

Chapter

4).

As van Inwagen

notes, agent causation

of free will (Van Inwagen 2000,

11).

He

is

embraced

as a solution to the

claims that the agent-causal view

is

problem

supposed

solve the problem of free will by claiming that if agent causation exists then freedom

107

is

to

in

fact

compatible with indeterminism (12).

causation

Chapter

posited as a

is

way of getting around

But he goes on

4).

agree with this characterization. Agent

1

to

the chance objection (again see

say that agent causation

is

cannot actually avoid the chance objection. Obviously,

major blow

to

my position

to the problem).

Thus,

I

(because

to

interesting example.

not really a solution because

if

van Inwagen

is

Inwagen

is

it

correct, that is a

embracing the agent-causal view as

will argue that van

Van Inwagen proceeds
means of an

am

I

my

a solution

not correct.

give a more detailed account of the chance objection by

He

tells the

Suppose, for example, that

in

following story:

some

difficult situation Alice

was faced with

between lying and telling the truth and that she freely chose to tell
the truth
or, what is the same thing, she seriously considered telling the
truth, seriously considered lying, told the truth, and was able to tell the lie
she had been contemplating. And let us assume that free will is
a choice

—

incompatible with determinism, and that Alice’s telling the truth, being a
free act,

was

therefore undetermined.

Alice told the truth,

God caused

one minute before Alice

Now

suppose that immediately

the universe to revert to precisely

told the truth (let us call the first

universe was in this state

moment

after
state

its

the

and the second moment the universe was in
things “go forward again.” What would have

‘fi’

and then let
happened the second time? What would have happened after t{! Would
she have lied or would she have told the truth? (Van Inwagen 2000, 14)
this state

Van Inwagen
answer

claims that because Alice’s decision

this question.

He goes on

to ask us to

revert like this a thousand times (14).

What

is

suppose that

if,

after

we

undetermined,

God

cannot really

caused the universe

one thousand replays,

we

to

see that

Alice has lied five hundred and eight times and has told the truth four hundred and

ninety-three times (15)?
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The suggestion van Inwagen

result leads us to believe that the decision

true that as

103

we watch

the replays increase,

The numbers here add up

to

is

is

making

is

a matter of chance (15).

we

shall

108

He

become convinced

one thousand and one. Presumably,

original action plus the one thousand replays.

that seeing this

this is

because

asks, “is

that

it

not

what happens

we have

counted the

in the next replay is a

this conviction (or

we

matter of chance?” (15).

impression as he then calls

He
it)

claims that there

(15). This is

is

no reason

because “there

is

to resist

nothing

could learn about the situation that could undermine the
impression” (15). In other

words, the

initial

conditions and state of the universe are the

exact

same conditions

Thus,

we

same

for each replay.

These

lead both to lying and to truth-telling (each about half of the
time).

are left with the following conclusion about a given replay

seven-hundred-and-twenty-seventh?” as van Inwagen suggests;

15):

(how about “the
“each of the two

possible outcomes of this replay has an objective, ‘ground-floor’
probability of 0.5
there’s nothing

more

to

be said”

(15).

Finally,

a matter of chance and not something that

something she

is

properly termed a free action

why

then goes on to suggest

problem regarding chance. He

details that are

are to conclude that Alice’s decision

(i.e.,

is

not

really able to do) (15-16).

Van Inwagen
the

is

we

and

supposed

to

it

is

that agent causation cannot solve

Alice story with certain details filled in

retells the

be characteristic of the agent-causal view. In

this version

of

the story, Alice “will either agent-cause cerebral events that,
a second or so later, will
result in bodily

movements

events that, a second or so

(Van Inwagen 2000,
what Alice

will

16).

that constitute her telling the truth or agent-cause cerebral

later, will result in

Van Inwagen

bodily

claims that

movements

we

should

that constitute

still

be convinced that

do on the seven hundred and twenty-seventh replay

The obvious

agent-causalist response

mentions, and attempts

to

dismiss (although

is

I

one

will

that

her lying”

is

a matter of chance.

van Inwagen recognizes,

argue that

it

is

somewhat

mischaracterized and thus unfairly dismissed). The agent-causalist response, according
to

van Inwagen

is

as follows: “if it turns out that Alice agent-causes tiuth-antecedent
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cerebral events, this will not be a matter of
chance because

the cause of the event

cerebral events

event

coming

is “its

is

16).

another event that

coming

to

will

Van Inwagen

who

we must

dismisses this response

is

by

regard as a matter of chance. This

pass that Alice agent-causes the event

that Alice agent-causes truth-antecedent
cerebral events’” (17).
that there is a

be she, Alice,

to pass that Alice agent-causes
truth-antecedent

(Van Inwagen 2000,

asking whether there
fiirther

‘its

it

‘its

coming

Van Inwagen

to

pass

suggests

simultaneous occurrence of an infinite series of
agent-caused events (17).

This simultaneous occurrence should be viewed
as a mere matter of chance (17). Again,
this is

because there

nothing more for us to leam (17) (also discussed
above).

is

There are a number of things that are puzzling
about van Inwagen’s argument
here. First

of all,

why

is it

not open to the agent-causal theorist to claim
that in each

event mentioned, and indeed in the infinite series,
the agent determines what happens? In
other words, the further event, “its

coming
is

coming

to pass that

Alice agent-causes the event

to pass that Alice agent-causes truth-antecedent
cerebral events’”

also determined

by Alice and

van Inwagen thinks

is

thus not a matter of chance.

this infinite series will

Earlier in his paper,

It is

‘its

(quoted above)

not entirely clear

why

undermine the agent-causal response.

van Inwagen makes the following remarks concerning

this

infinite regress:

Nor

shall

I

that

Reid

is

raise questions about the cause

of the event “its coming to pass
of the antecedent brain-event.” Again, I think
Chisholm has seen what the friends of agent causation should say
about
the cause of this event, to wit, that Reid was its agent-cause
and was,
moreover, the agent-cause of the event “its coming to pass that Reid
is the
agent-cause of the event ‘its coming to pass that Reid is the
agent-cause of
the antecedent brain-event
and so ad infinitum. Some may object to the
the agent-cause

—

’

,

thesis that, as an indispensable
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component of his writing a

certain

sentence, Reid, without being aware of it, became the agent cause of an
number of events; I don’t. (Van Inwagen 2000, 13) 104

infinite

This passage seems to suggest that van Inwagen recognizes that
any of these events will

be determined (because they will be agent-caused) by the agent.
that

van Inwagen does not take issue with the coherence of this

does he

It

I

just

suggest

to

So why

infinite regress.

recognize that the agent-causalist could respond as

fail to

seems

also

mentioned

(i.e,

the agent-causalist could say that these “further” events are not a
matter of chance

because they are also determined by the agent)? Perhaps van Inwagen’s argument
against the agent-causalist response

puzzling

is

why he makes mention of the

But even

if this regress

rescue her position.

As

I

were

to

not based on this infinite regress, but then
regress

at all.

cause the problem, the agent-causalist could

argue in Chapter

there

5,

is

no reason

why

need accept

this characterization

claims

according to the agent-causalist, Alice causes “the event

that,

of agent-caused action

just

is

what Alice directly causes

her action. There

event that

is

is

of the

we

104

we

I

16).

the exertion of her causal

is

On

power

no separately occurring

would say

that

it is

not because

it is

that Alice’s action is a matter

characterize agent-caused action). This

could possibly learn, nothing

For simplicity,

I

to pass

whether Alice’s action, thus understood,

Inwagen would say

case (regardless of how

And

coming

action.

to decide, then, is

mere matter of chance. Obviously,
Alice. Probably, van

her action.

‘its

Van Inwagen

(Van Inwagen 2000,

no multiplication of events. There

the agent-causing

What we need

is

the agent-causalist

in the first place.

that Alice agent-causes truth-antecedent cerebral events’”

my view,

it is

God knows,

it

a

determined by

of chance

in

any

because “nothing

would seem, should lead us

have omitted van Inwagen’s footnotes.

Ill

is

is

to distrust

our

initial inclination to

say that the outcome of the next replay will
be a matter of chance”

(Van Inwagen 2000,

free actions that leads

him

At the end of his

You

Apparently,

17).

it is

the unpredictability (even theoretically) of our

to this conclusion.

article,

he gives another example:

are a candidate for public office, and

know some
would and
should cost you the election. I am pulled two ways,
one way by the
claims of citizenship and the other by the claims of
friendship. You know
about my situation and beg me not to “tell.” I know
(perhaps God has told
discreditable tact about your past that,

me

it

your best friend,

I,

made

—

public,

this) that there exist exactly

two possible continuations of the
one of which I tell all to the press and in the other of which
I
keep silent; and I know that the objective, “ground-floor”
probability of
my telling” is 0.43 and that the objective, “ground-floor” probability of
my keeping silent is 0.57. Am I in a position to promise you that will
keep silent? (Van Inwagen 2000, 17)
present. .in
.

I

The suggestion he then makes

make

conscience

that

it

indeterminism

he

(‘I’ in

turn, suggests that

he believed he was able

implication then,

is

that

is

that

is true,

freedom

is

to

is

good

a good chance (about 0.5)

he should not see himself as able to keep

keep

silent,

he could make the promise

incompatible with indeterminism

as in the example, the person in the

example

—

is

that

(17).

is,

silent

The

if

not free because he

not able to keep silent (or to “tell” for that matter). Furthermore,
according to van

Inwagen, agent-causation does not do anything
Obviously,

examples?

1

I

disagree.

But how can

I

to

help (18).

get around van Inwagen’s interesting

think the solution lies in recognizing that van

characterizes the problem.

it.

the scenario above) cannot “in

the promise to keep silent because there

he won’t. This, in

because

is

The problem

is

The problem with regard

to

Inwagen inaccurately

chanciness

is

not as he describes

not that free agents are theoretically unpredictable, or that there

nothing more anyone could learn in order to “predict” what an agent

112

is

going

to do.

is

The

problem with chanciness

is

no control afforded

that there is

When

to the agent.

the non-

agent-causal mdeterminist (such as Kane,
discussed in Chapter 4) suggests that our free
actions are intentional terminations of
indeterminate efforts of will (for example), the

problem

is

terminated

tacitly

not that there

is

is

nothing more

to learn.

The problem

that

how

the effort

not controlled by the agent (unless Kane, or
any other such theorist,

adopting some form of agent-causation) 105 but

event within the agent, presumably one the agent

views do avoid

There

is

is

this

is

is

controlled

not even aware

in

of.

Agent-causal

problem.

a sense in

which our

free actions will necessarily be chancy.

any significant way. Our free actions are chancy

no one, not even the agent, knows what she
this affect

is

going

to

in just this

But

away

it.

How does

our freedom?

claims that

if

one comes

to

know

the probabilities of the

but think that the promise cannot be
therefore not free). Is this right?

(I

I

made

think

it

two

silent.

Van Inwagen

alternatives,

one cannot help

(and that the person must conclude that he

more

likely that

one would resist

is

this

don’t think knowledge about ourselves in other possible
worlds detracts

from our deep-seated

intuitions about

our

own

control in this one). But perhaps

grant his point if we add to the story. Let us suppose that
the person in the story
told,

this

way: sometimes

do before she does

Let us return to the example regarding promising to
keep

conclusion

is

by an indetenninate

sense of chanciness (although perhaps regarded as
mysteriousness) does not take

freedom

is

and becomes convinced, that

his actions are indeterminately

we
is

can

also

caused by events within

himself (and thus, that sometimes the events lead one way,
sometimes another). If the

105

This point comes from O’Connor (O’Connor 2000,
39).
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person in the story

come
leam

to the

that

is

truly

convinced that his actions arise

in this

way, perhaps he

will

conclusion that van Inwagen claims. But van Inwagen claims that coming
to

one

is

the agent-cause will not help here.

allow us to more firmly believe what

we

Why not? Won’t this knowledge just

already believe prior to any knowledge “from

above”?

Even
chanciness

is

so,

such questions

may not even be

not a problem concerning belief.

entirely relevant.

It is

a problem concerning

metaphysically, in control of. If we agent-cause our actions,
regardless of whether there

To assume

caused).

assume

The problem of

we

what we

are in control of them,

anything more to leam (except that the action

is

that there

that only event-causes

must be more

to

leam

are,

in order to explain

is

agent-

what we do

is to

can explain anything, and thus to beg the question against

agent causation.

Clarke’s Objections
In a recent manuscript (Chapter 10

of his forthcoming book), Randolph Clarke

argues that although substance-causation (and thus agent-causation, which
substance-causation) can be
possible.

106

Clarke

its intelligibility.

dismissing

first

made

intelligible, there are

many of these

objections, but a

remaining objections are enough

to cast

a kind

reasons to believe that

expounds on the idea of substance-causation

Then he discusses objections

is

to its possibility.

it is

of

not

in order to illustrate

Clarke ends up

few remain. According

to Clarke, the

doubt on the possibility of agent-causation.
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This seems to be a recent change
by Clarke Clarke 1995 was used

—

—

in position, as is

as a

evident

show of support
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in the

previous chapter (in which the article

for the possibility

of agent-causation).

Going through Clarke’s chapter

will

be instructive for several reasons.

107

First, his

attempt to demonstrate the intelligibility of agent-causation helps to support

Secondly, his responses to
support

my view.

argue that

it

many of the

Lastly, if

can), then

it

objections against

my view can withstand

will only

discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter

possibility also help to

I

will

it.

intelligibility

5),

view.

his remaining objections (as

be the stronger for

Clarke begins by demonstrating the

its

my

of the agent-causal view. As

Clarke again appeals to the idea that event

causation and agent (or substance) causation will actually only differ in that the

first

relatum of the causal relation will be different in each case; the causal relation itself will

be the same (Clarke forthcoming, 234). He

also, again, stresses the

realist

conception of causes (Clarke forthcoming, 235).

realist

conception will give the agent-causal view

(as

shown

in

my

asserts that

assuming

this

best chance at success (235). And,

Chapter 5) there are independent reasons for preferring such a

view (Clarke forthcoming, 235). Thus, we are
and uncovering

its

He

need for espousing a

realist

alleviating the mysteriousness of the

view

its intelligibility.

Clarke moves on to a discussion of causal powers.

He

notes that those

who

accept a realist conception of causes “must be serious about causal powers” (Clarke

forthcoming, 236).

He

discusses two different views of causal powers.

On

the first view,

these powers are taken to be “intrinsic to properties,” a view he calls “dispositionalism”.

On

the second view, these

(236).
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He

calls this

powers are “due

to (external) relations

between properties”

second view “relationalism” (238). According

to Clarke, either

view

The reader should note that I will not consider every point discussed by Clarke, either because such
would take us too far afield, because they are not of direct relevance to my particular agent-causal

points

view, or because they have already been addressed in the previous chapter.
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“will

work equally well

Chapter

5)

(or equally poorly)” (236). In

my

discussion of properties (see

do not commit myself to one view or the other.

1

Dispositionalism

is

characterized as follows: “intrinsic to each property

is

a

certain dispositionality, a pointedness or directedness (in combination with certain

dispositional partners) to certain effects” (Clarke forthcoming, 236).

potential problems with this

power

that is directed

(237).

The

tendency

view

is

explaining

how

it

108

One of the

that an agent can

is

towards action without being directed

to

have a causal

any determinate degree

agent-causalist needs to say that the agent does not have “any determinate

to

cause an action” (237). Presumably,

this is

would remove a measure of true freedom and agent

because a determinate tendency

control. Clarke dismisses this

objection (discussed below in the section on directedness). Another problem (a

more

much

serious one, according to Clarke, and one that he does not dismiss) involves

how

the agent-causal property works. Clarke claims that agent-causal properties must

work

He

asks:

differently

from other properties (namely, those involved

How

can

it

be,

we may wonder,

that

in event-causation).

while in a manifestation of the

directedness of another property, the cause

is

an object’s having that

property, in the case of the agent-causal property, the cause

substance that has the property?

from others?

If

How

an agent has certain causal powers

certain property,

why

is it

not

is

the

can this property work differently

(how can

it

in virtue

not be), as

it is

of having a

with other

properties, the agent’s having this property (an event) that brings about the
109

effect? (23 8)

I

will address this

is

108

109

problem below

(in the section

on uniformity), and argue that his worry

unfounded.

For simplicity,
Again,

I

I

have omitted Clarke’s citation of examples and his footnote.

have omitted his footnote.
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On
property

the alternative

may

view of causal powers

(the relationalist view), “a given

carry certain causal powers in virtue of standing in contingent, irreducible

second-order relations, such as causal necessitation or probabilification,
properties

—

relations

to other

between universals rather than between particulars” (Clarke

forthcoming, 238). Moreover, “these second-order states of affairs are causal laws”

(238).

One who holds

this relationalist

view can

observable (or directly perceived) or that

Clarke claims that both of these
raised

it

is

A just happened

latter positions are helpful in

and saying

that

is

observable,

is

having caused

A to happen

someone caused

to

A

the

in a relation that

view

when

between saying, of an

A to happen?’”

(as quoted

view

that the

question by saying that someone

directly observe in certain (specifiable) situations” (240).

the agent caused

A in a certain

worry

A having just happened) means that “the agent stood

that the causal relation is a theoretical relation,

claiming that
stood to

we

to a

that according to the

we can answer Chisholm’s

(unlike

responding

the difference

by Clarke; Clarke forthcoming, 240). Clarke suggests
causal relation

is

an irreducible theoretical relation (239).

by Chisholm. Chisholm asked, “’What

event A, that

either hold that the causal relation

A (again,

unlike

theoretical relation, the very

we

when

same

On

can answer Chisholm by

A just happened), “the agent

relation in

which one event

stands to another” (240). This appears to be an advantage.

I

would add

that the

advantage

is

obtained by holding a realist conception of

causes and by understanding agents to have causal power (not just by holding this
relationalist view, as Clarke

the agent-causal theorist

seems

who

to imply).

Thus, the advantage would also hold for

accepts the dispositionalist view.

causes A, on the dispositionalist view, would differ from
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To

say that the agent

A just happening because when

the agent causes A, she exerts her causal power. This instance of causation will be “a

manifestation of the directedness of a certain property (or properties)” (Clarke

forthcoming, 237).

According

we have
“is

the

to Clarke, the

same problems

arise with the relationalist view.

problem of indeterminate directedness (here the directedness

simply contingent, a matter of external relations of properties

forthcoming, 240).

More

in virtue

seem

to

work

of standing

differently

in this relation to

problem

the substance’s possessing

is

will

be addressed

it,

a

power

later (in the section

it

each other”; Clarke

how

from others. Specifically, Clarke

some

other property (or properties),

the agent-causal property can confer on the substance possessing

event that

differs in that

importantly, Clarke again raises the worry concerning

causal powers of an agent

wonders “how,

to

Again,

to

it,

rather than

on the

cause an effect” (240). This

concerning uniformity).

Explanation

The

first

objection

I

will discuss concerns causal explanation.

The charge

that is

leveled against the agent-causal view starts with the claim that a substance cannot

contribute to causal explanations (Clarke forthcoming, 249). Therefore, the argument

goes, a substance cannot be a cause (249). Although Clarke agrees with the plausibility

of the claim that

in

order for something to be a cause,

it

should contribute to a causal

explanation, he argues against this objection (250). Clarke suggests that causal

explanations can answer two kinds of questions: why-questions, and how-actually

questions (250). If this

second question.

is

It tells

the case,

us

we can

how something

say that citing an agent-cause answers the
actually occurred (by being caused
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by the

agent). This

is

useful if the event in question could have occurred in different

ways

(250).

He goes on
the why-question.

something

say that perhaps citing an agent-cause could even help us to answer

to

He

asks us to consider a case in which the agent (Diana) does

that leads to tragedy.

will involve citing the agent

that the

answer be

causation,

we

in

—

If we ask

i.e., it

why

the tragedy occurred, part of the

occurred ‘because of Diana’.

terms of her actions because unless

can admit that the tragedy did

literally

forthcoming, 251). Clarke goes on to say that even

we have

answer

We need not require
already ruled out agent

occur because of her (Clarke

if

we want

to

know more

about

why

the tragedy occurred (more than just ‘because of Diana’), this does not detract from the

explanatory nature of our original answer. This
true even

when unilluminating

is

because “causal explanations can be

or not relevant to our usual interests in seeking an

explanation” (251).

Moreover, Clarke suggests

that agent-causal

views are not espoused

in

order

to

solve problems of explanation; instead, Clarke suggests, they are concerned with solving

a “problem of control” and “the issue of control

is

different

from

that

of explanation”

(Clarke forthcoming, 251). Clarke rescues the agent-causal view from the objections

concerning explanation, but

I

think

more can be done

with Clarke’s claim that the agent-causal view

control,

I

disagree with the claim that

it

is

in this regard.

Although

asserted in order to solve a

to admit.

As suggested

agree

problem of

cannot solve problems of explanation;

two may be more closely linked than Clarke wants

I

in fact, the

in the

previous chapter, the agent-causal view has explanatory value for several reasons.

of the crucial questions answered by the agent-causal view

1

19

will

One

be explanatorily valuable,

and will also involve the issue of control. This question
both free and in control

is,

“how

is it

that the agent

is

way?” The agent-causal view can explain how

in a significant

this is possible.

Granted, this sort of explanation
the objection. But even so,

is

not the causal explanation that

is at

issue in

not entirely clear that an event cause provides a complete

it is

causal explanation either. If we want to know, for example, what caused the forest

we

can cite some triggering event, such as the

match landing on the brush. But

The complete explanation

not a complete causal explanation.

surrounding circumstances,

lit

etc.

‘

know

is

why

know, or
want

to

i.e.,

the fire

the fire

began

began

to

at that time.

But

it is

not

And

is

know more

answered by appeal

we want

generally

to

why

to

it

know why

happened

temporal things

(e.g.,

it

noticed as something

part

of what

we want

at all clear that that is all

be subordinate.

happened when

at all.

a natural bias

is

about the other conditions that led to the fire? Likewise,

occurrence of the tragedy,

want

at a specific point in time.

that these other contributing conditions should

know

will include the

(mentioned previously). There

towards the triggering event as the cause’ because the effect

—

it

1

1,1

we want

to

in the

did, but

case of the

we

also

The former question can only be

events occurring inside Diana). The latter

tragedy did occur, as Clarke points out, ‘because of Diana.’ This
significant (and even in a causal way).

to

Don’t we also

question, however, can be answered by appeal to Diana’s agent-causal power.
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this is

the other contributing conditions such as the presence of

i.e.,

oxygen, the dryness of the brush,

temporal

fire,

Had Diana not

These points came from a conversation with Stephen

120

is

The

explanatorily

exerted her causal

power so

Griffith (they are also discussed in

Chapter

as to

5).

cause the tragedy,

it

might not have occurred.

presuppose that no substance can be a cause,

can never contribute

to

any

sort

1

1

it is

As Clarke
far

suggests, “unless

we

from clear that citing a substance

of causal explanation” (Clarke forthcoming, 251).
Probability

The next objection
agent-causal view

is

that

it

I

will consider concerns probability.

The problem

for the

appears that event-causes can affect the objective probabilities

of their effects (before the effects occur) but that agent-causes cannot (Clarke
forthcoming, 254-5). But Clarke claims that he does not believe that causation can be
reductively analyzed in terms of probabilities (255); after

He

conception of causes here.

more

likely.

As Clarke

all,

we

are

notes that event-causes do not always

assuming a

make

that a cause

may

their effects

points out, “even an undetermined cause may, with

occurrence, leave the probability of a later effect unchanged; and there
even, with

its

is

realist

its

reason to think

occurrence, decrease the probability of an event that

then causes” (255, his footnotes omitted). But Clarke nevertheless maintains that

seem plausible

to

suppose that event-causes “have something

to

it

it

does

do with objective

appears to be important for this objection that the cause affect the

probabilities” (255).

It

probability of what

causes before this event occurs. Clarke claims that “if a substance

it

directly causes an event,
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it

brings the probability of that effect to

1

,

but only

when

the

of the ‘how-actually’ question, Clarke suggests that agent-causation answers that
us how something that could have been brought about without substance
fact brought about in this case. (Diana’s decision, had she lacked an agent-causal power,

In his discussion

question because
causation was in

it

“tells

might have been brought about only by events. .)” (Clarke forthcoming, 250). This points to why I say,
“might not have occurred” (instead of “would not have occurred”) because it could have been brought
about in some other way. But I think the fact that the tragedy might not have occurred without Diana or
even that it might have occurred in some other way points to more than an answer to a ‘how-actually’
.

—

question.

We may want

to

know why

the tragedy occurred (in this

way) and our answer

will not just be

‘because of Diana,' but will be ‘because Diana has agent-causal power which she exerted on that occasion.’
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effect occurs” (255),

whereas an event-cause supposedly has an effect on probability

before the caused event occurs (255).

Clarke goes on

way.

He

to explain

is

nothing

left for [the

when some

Apparently,

some time

other hand,

it

is

(an event) that affects the probability. Thus,

event, x, occurs that will act as a cause of another event, y, x will

even happens. In the case of a substance,

the event, a, of acquiring

the probability of event b (before

it

some new property

made of an

at

of all,

it is

event-cause. In

property? Clarke would argue that this

is

not entirely clear that the

some circumstances,

is

.

I

am

not certain that this

understand the nature of an event

its

isn’t

the

(this will

is

same

it

acquiring a certain

not the case, because for Clarke,

“the acquisition. .of some property at

256, quoted above).

on

a time, that would affect

conceivable that the event affects the probability only in virtue of

an event just

s,

happens).

find this objection puzzling. First

objection could not be

the acquisition (by the

it is

substance] to do in this regard” (Clarke forthcoming, 256).

affect the probability of y before y

I

substance-causes cannot affect probabilities in this

claims that the substance has no effect because

substance) of some property at

“there

why

it

appears that

some time” (Clarke forthcoming,

the only, or even the best,

be discussed further

way

in the section

to

on

uniformity).

But even

if

we

grant that the

that affects the probability) cannot

same objection

(that

be made of an event,

causes always have this effect on probabilities?

on the probability of y before y occurs?

Is

it

it

is

is

it

the acquisition of a property

really the case that event-

the case that x always has this effect

If causes cannot

be reduced

to probabilities, as

Clarke suggests, and some causes actually leave the probability of their effects
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unchanged (see quote above),

We can

in these cases?

x,

but

if this

Moreover,

upon

this

if

to

do

what sense does x

affect the probability

upon

assign a probability to the occurrence of y

probability

be anything for x

in

is

the

same

of

beforehand

the occurrence of

seem

as before the occurrence of x, there does not

in this regard (to

use Clarke’s

own

causes cannot be reduced to probabilities,

it

phrase

to

—see quote above).

does not seem of value

to insist

requirement. Clarke can only suggest the following:

But

is it

sort

of entity? There

some

really a requirement

entity has a

is,

tendency

the kind of thing that

is

of something’s being a cause that

be

it

this

think, considerable plausibility to the claim. If

I

to

cause a certain effect,

capable, in

it

thereby seems to be

some circumstances

at least,

of

influencing the chance of that effect, even prior to the occurrence of the
affect.

Granted, this claim

may

fairly

be said

to lack

luminous

self-

evidence. Perhaps a good theory of causation will support the suggested

requirement, but no such theory

immensely

is itself

certain. (Clarke

forthcoming, 256)

I

take

must

it

that Clarke’s suggestion is that the

affect probabilities

that is able to in

on

all

be the kind of entity that has

to

on

this effect

are not dated entities
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So

is that

that

it is

this (as

be?

substances cannot be causes,

to

argue that causes must

The only way

to insist

on

this is

—

in the

way

that events are dated

only events that can have this effect on

when he
we have no

says, “it

discussed above).
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might be objected

that,

unless

we

grounds for holding that they cannot have the

indicated influence on probabilities” (Clarke forthcoming, 255).

holding

not that causes

“substances, unlike events, do not

are not in time

Clarke makes an analogous but distinct point

presuppose

it is

Clarke claims that the reason that substances do

—they

entities” (Clarke forthcoming, 255).
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this

probabilities.

not seem to have this effect on probabilities

They

as follows:

be a non-question-begging way

argue that causes must be events.

occur.

is

occasions, but that they should at least be the sort of thing

some circumstances. But why should

There does not seem

to

requirement

He

then goes on to give grounds for

But

probabilities.

how do we

from here

get

to the

claim that causes must be able to effect

probabilities (without presupposing that events are the only kinds of causes)?

Perhaps the intuition

does not seem

to

be

is

that probabilities

Isn’t

right.

probabilities

is

does not cause?

it

somewhat weakened and

be given for the claim
Clarke requires.

I

that causes

this

the case that sometimes something can affect the

it

probability of another thing that

and causes are always linked. But

it

113

If so, the link

between causes and

appears that an independent argument ought to

must be inexorably linked

to probabilities in the

way

do not see any such argument.
Structure

Clarke goes on

to discuss

He ends up

an objection concerning structure.

dismissing one version of the objection and supporting the versions that are “related to
that concerning probability” (Clarke forthcoming, 263).

It is

my

hope, then, that

my

arguments against the objection concerning probability will undennine these versions of
the objection concerning structure. But let us consider

all

versions of the objection.

Clarke begins by giving his account of events and of substances. For him, events
are “structured particulars, particulars’ (such as objects’) having properties (or standing in

relations) at times” (Clarke forthcoming, 256).

but “are not so structured” (256).

according

that

to Clarke.

But

let

us

It is

On

his account, substances are particulars

not entirely clear to

move ahead

to

perhaps only particulars that are structured

me what

a substance

consider the objection.

in the

way

is like

The objection

that events are

is

can act as

causes (256-7).
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For example, suppose

statistically

much more

between these two

that scientists

likely to

were

things; the correlation

underlying disorder. Couldn’t

to

discover that

men who developed

develop heart disease. Suppose further

we

was

that there

receding hairlines were

was no causal link
by the same

instead due to the fact that both were caused

then say that developing a receding hairline increased the probability of
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The

first

version of the objection

concerning probability. The suggestion
has “a time as a constituent,”

is

related (as

is

is

such that

mentioned above)

that perhaps the structure

to the

one

of an event, which

can “have the indicated impact on the

it

objective probabilities of future events;” a substance, on the other hand, cannot because

is

not structured so as to have a time as a constituent (Clarke forthcoming, 257).

being

in

time in this

He goes on

way

is

have the crucial

that a substance

effect

not the substance

it

is

itself.

is

on

is

probabilities (Clarke forthcoming, 257).

has not been

made

explicit as far as

I

can

tell).

the having of a property at a time that affects the probability and

Both of the previous versions of the objection

dubious claim that affecting probability

my previous

“having a property as a constituent”

does not have a property as a constituent (although,

again, his account of what a substance

As discussed above,

And

necessary for being a cause (257).

to suggest in a related vein that

also required so as to

The implication

is

it

rejection of this claim,

I

is

a

rely

on the

requirement of being a cause. Thus, based on

can reject these versions of the objection

concerning structure.
His next version of the objection

is

the one

he

rejects.

This version

is

supposed

to

“provide independent support for the objection that a cause must have the structure of an
event” (Clarke forthcoming, 257). The objection

example

is

a knife

which causes something’s being

certain properties (while

thought that

it

is

its

cut),

when some
it is

object

is

Thus

“it

may be

—

not the knife itself but an entity with a different structure

—

developing heart disease even though

that is the cause, strictly

it

in

no way caused

example).
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it? (1

a cause (his

a cause in virtue of having

other properties are irrelevant) (257).

having the relevant properties

this

that

is

the knife’s

speaking” (257). So perhaps,

would

like to

thank Kristopher Denio for

the objection goes, only entities with that structure can act as causes (257-8). Clarke

dismisses this objection for the following reasons:

When one
virtue
for

object stands in the relation bigger than to another,

of having a certain property

example) are quite irrelevant

object. Still,

it is

(its size); its

to its

it

other properties

does so
(its

in

color,

standing in this relation to the other

the object, not the object’s having that size, that stands in

the relation bigger than to the other object.

Hence

the fact that an object

stands in a causal relation to another in virtue of having certain of its
properties does not alone suffice to

show

that

it

cannot be the object

rather than something with the structure of an event, that

is

itself,

the cause.

(258, his footnote omitted)

Thus, the

final version

of the structure objection can be dismissed as well.
Directedness

Finally, Clarke

comes back

to the issue

of directedness (as mentioned

discussion of dispositional and relational properties).

directedness

is that

One of the

issues concerning

agents are supposed, on the agent-causal view, to cause things in

virtue of their having properties that are directed towards effects to

degree.

in the

Some might

no determinate

see this as problematic because they believe that probabilistic event

causation involves directedness of a determinate degree (“greater than 0 and less than

1

”)

(Clarke forthcoming, 258). If we accept a non-reductive, realist account of causes,

however, then

it

does not seem that event causation must be like

(258). Thus, there

is

this,

according to Clarke

no peculiarity of substance causation on these grounds.

Next, Clarke discusses a different issue involving directedness. There appears to

be another supposed peculiarity with agent-causes. According
account (or

“all

at least certain versions,

and only events

certain reasons

to the agent-causal

including mine), the substance

that are (appropriately)

(i.e.,

the agent) causes

caused also by such events as

its

having

and certain intentions” (Clarke forthcoming, 259). The properties that
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enable the agent to cause things, then, would be directed or disposed to cause only those
things that are also caused

is

by

certain other events (259).

a strange sort of directedness that does not, at

first,

The

objection, then,

is

that this

seem plausible and would be

peculiar to agent-causation.

But, as Clarke points out, the

the

same could be

said

of event-causation. Clarke gives

example whereby “an increase of temperature and an influx of oxygen,

situation, either together cause
114

259).

combustion or neither causes

(Clarke forthcoming,

Thus, even with event-causation there appears to be directedness that involves

the occurrence of other events.

force

it”

in a certain

when we

The objections concerning

directedness, then, lose their

notice that event-causation can involve these kinds of directedness as

well.

Uniformity
Clarke seems to consider the next objection to be the most damning
possibility of substance-causation. This objection centers

on the idea

to the

that “the

way

causation works” should be uniform. If substance-causation occurs, according to this

objection,

it

does not work

in the

forthcoming, 260). Although
section of his chapter,

1

it

same way

as

it

does

in

event-causation (Clarke

does not appear that he makes

it

entirely explicit in this

believe that Clarke supposes a lack of uniformity for the

following previously stated reason:

how

is it

that in the case

of agent (or more generally,

the substance that has the property” while in the case

substance) causation “the cause

is

of event-causation “the cause

an object’s having that property” (238)? This claim

is

appears to be based on Clarke’s construal of an event as ‘the having of a property

114
1

make

similar points in Chapter 5 regarding contributing conditions and partial causes.
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at a

time’. Thus,

itself

causes

property’

when
it,

(i.e.,

whereas when a property confers
the event) causes

Clarke goes on
variation “is a

power on an

a property confers its

to

its

agent, or substance, the substance

power on an

event, the ‘having of the

it.

admit that causation can vary

more fundamental

in

some ways, but

it

would be question-begging

events can be causes and thus causes must be in the same category.

guilty

of this. But

commitment

1

will

admit that his claim seems a

to the idea that there is

As he

causation works.

to

is

how

more uniformity than just

actually substance causation.

(who says

that all causation is

is

no more

to

‘how [substance

the same. Apparently, Clarke

the obtaining of the

As Clarke

more

given his previous

an instance of (direct) event causation works”

Clarke admits that uniformity could be achieved

is

do not think Clarke

I

no problem understanding the way substance-

(235, his footnote omitted) because the relation

requiring

only

to suggest that

bit surprising

states earlier in his chapter, “there is

causation] works’ than there

of

matter, one of the ontological category of causes”

(Clarke forthcoming, 260). Obviously,

is

that this sort

same
if

points out, this

is

relation in both cases.

one claimed

move

is

specifically agent causation).

that all causation

made by Thomas Reid
also

It is

made by

medieval Aristotelians, and contemporary philosophers such as Byerly, Swinburne, and

Lowe

(Clarke forthcoming, 261). Clarke claims that this proposal

is

unsatisfactory

because “familiar instances of causation are best understood as causation by events,
part for reasons discussed in

some of the preceding

not appear to be a very strong argument,

this
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move needs

To be

fair,

to

be made

in

I

sections” (261). Although this does

will grant his point here

because

order to avoid the uniformity objection.

Clarke further discusses the issue in a footnote (Clarke forthcoming).
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in

1

15

I

do not think

So how does the agent-causal
there

not

is

much of an argument

basic intuition that

“it is

theorist avoid the uniformity objection? First of all,

given as

to

why

causation must be uniform beyond the

simply incredible that causation might work in such different

ways” (Clarke forthcoming, 260). Thus, one could claim
uniform (except

in that they

involve the same relation).

I

that they

do not need

to

be

see no further argument in

Clarke’s chapter which would serve to explain the need for uniformity.

But what

if

Then what options
what

sorts

we

grant that Clarke’s intuition concerning uniformity

are

left

for the agent-causal theorist? Perhaps

of uniformity should be required of a

is

we ought

correct?

to consider

Uniformity of ontological

relation.

category should not be required (although Clarke seems to imply that

it

should be

—see

quote above). The spatiotemporal relation, for example, can hold between things of
different categories, such as objects

then,

seems

to

concern

how

and events.

1

16

The main

sort

of uniformity

at issue,

causation works in each case.

This brings us back to the worry about the conferral of causal power (discussed
above). Clarke sees a real problem in that for substance-causation causal

power

is

conferred on the substance itself in virtue of having certain properties but for event-

causation

it

is just

the having of a property at a time (the event). There are a

options open to the agent-causal theorist. In the

not accept Clarke’s assumption that an event
If we reject this

first

is just

view of events, there does not seem

number of

place, the agent-causal theorist need

the having of a property at a time.

to

1

17

be a problem with uniformity (as

discussed below).
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1

Again,

17

It is

this

example comes from Jonathan Schaffer (see Chapter

my understanding

that

although Jaegwon

Kim

5, n. 69).

construes events this way, others, such as Davidson

and Quine, do not (see Lombard 1996, 159).
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Clarke makes

power on

it

clear that the

problem does not reside just

in the conferral

a substance (but, rather, in the fact that this does not also

For instance, during his discussion of structure, Clarke suggests

happen with events).

that

although a relation

obtains due to certain properties of an object and not others (e.g., an object

another due to

its

size but not

its

Thus

problem

is

there

to

view

suppose

no problem

in the conferral

again the problem of uniformity

with events. But
reject the

is

that

it

is

bigger than

color; Clarke forthcoming, 258, quoted above), this does

not point to the fact that the relation does not obtain between the

other.

of

does not seem clear

that an event is just the

to

—

me

object and the

of causal power on a substance. The

i.e,

the

problem

that this

that this could not

having of a property

an event causes another event

first

in virtue

not in virtue of its having other properties (and that

does not occur

occur with events.

at a time,

it

If

we

seems plausible

of its having certain properties but

it is still

the event that stands in the

causal relation).

Clarke seems to be suggesting that

in the

case of event-causation

just those properties that bring about an effect and identify

them

we

can pick out

as the event (that

which

caused the said effect); with substance-causation, on the other hand, the suggestion

we

identify the

some of its

whole substance as the cause (even though

properties).

relation holds in virtue

whole object stands

As Clarke

it

is

is

that

the cause in virtue of only

suggests about the relation ‘bigger than,’ although the

of only certain properties and not others,

in that relation.

But why can’t
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this

we

still

say that the

be true of event causation? For

example, perhaps the event
sorts

in question

has the property of being loud or bright.

1

18

These

of properties need not have any bearing on that event’s causing a future event.

There appears

to

be some inconsistency

in

1

19

what Clarke suggests about events. In

discussing a different objection (concerning time), Clarke claims that events have

temporal parts and that substances do not (Clarke forthcoming, 253). The objection

under consideration (concerning time) has
be. .that the cause existed. ..at
.

(253).

A substance would

some

to

earlier

do with the following question: “how can

it

time and did not bring about the effect then?”

supposedly do so whereas an event would

120

Clarke

not.

considers “whether an event can cause an effect at a certain time even though that event

was occurring

(it

effect” (253).

If so, then the objection

had temporal parts occurring) prior

to the

time

at

which

it

caused that

does not fare well. Clarke appears to answer the

question in the affirmative (although he admits

it

is

not exactly analogous to the

substance causation case) and thus dismisses the objection.

He

suggests the following possibility:

where td is
which was not earlier
than t2. Could it be that IH and not just the temporal part of Ed occurring
at t2, caused E2 ? It seems that this might be so if the constituent property
of Ed, and the property that is causally relevant in the production of E2, is
a property that required, in this case, the interval from td to t2 to be
Suppose

that El_ occurred

over the interval

significantly prior to t2, and

tl

E2 was caused

to t2,

at t3,

,

instantiated. (Clarke forthcoming, 254, his footnote omitted)
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owe

1

these examples to Stephen Griffith.

said to; see
sorts

1

19

Lombard 1996, 159)

We might add here that if one believes (as van

that the causes

of an event are essential to

of properties of an event that need not contribute

Perhaps someone

who

to

its

1

Inwagen

is

these might also count as the

causing a later effect.

accepts Clarke’s view of events would say that these properties do not apply to

the event in question but apply to separate (even simultaneous) events.
120

it,

discuss a similar objection in Chapter

5.
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What

is

puzzling about this passage

sense can an event be “the having of a property

is

possible)

case

it

it

seems

the property

must
that

(i.e,

either

it

is

having of that property.

on the event.

It is

at

a time”?

be the case that the property

not “at a time”, or

before

it is

it

It

is

It

seems

that (if the

“had” over an

must be the case

instantiated), in

121

what

again, the characterization of an event. In

is,

which case Ed

that

is

argument with

which

interval, in

Ef begins before

no longer

it

has

identical to the

appears that in this example, the causal power

difficult to reconcile this

example

is

conferred

his claims about the nature

of

events.

Perhaps

and even

.grant

in the interest

of charity,

we

should ignore any apparent inconsistencies

Clarke’s claim about events. Is there then a uniformity problem as Clarke

suggests? Obviously, there will not be complete uniformity

—

the

relations (in event-causation versus that in agent-causation) will

ontological categories. But as

be required. Thus

we

we have

should return

to

the

grant

power

him

is still

of the property?

his

be from different

what appears
I

be Clarke’s main worry

to

do not see

view of events. Can’t we say

why

there

in the case

is

we

—

i.e.,

the

a problem, even

of event-causation that

conferred upon the event itself even though the event just

If

of the two

already seen, this kind of uniformity should not

uniformity of the conferral of causal power.

when we

first relata

dismiss that the power belongs to the event

itself,

dismiss that events (as events) can actually cause things. Surely that

is

is

then

the having

we must

not something

Clarke would want to do.
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Perhaps Clarke would say

of time.” But
that

I

do not think

an event can exist prior

that “at a

this is
to

what

property during that interval, then

time” can be expanded

something Clarke wants
it

to

to

mean “during

say because he

causes and not yet bring about

why would

it fail

to bring
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about

its

its

is

a

time” or “over an interval

using

effect (if

effect right

it

this

example

really “has” the

away?).

to

argue

Discovery

The

last

objection

I

will consider has to

substance causation could never be discovered

for

its

ought

be discoverable

that there is

if

it

—

that

is,

that

is

no evidence could ever be given

The underlying

existence (Clarke forthcoming, 261).

to

do with discovery. The objection

intuition appears to

really exists. Furthermore, the objectors

we

evidence for event causation in the patterns that

be

that

it

would maintain

find in

what occurs

(261).

Clarke suggests that any evidence that points towards agent-causation,

is

really

just evidence that agents’ having certain properties cause certain behaviors (Clarke

forthcoming, 261). Thus, the implication

is

that the evidence is really just evidence

of

event-causation occurring within agents (the implication comes from applying Clarke’s
notion of events).

I

will put aside

Clarke’s point that there

According
Campbell) claim

seem

to us

is

no

to Clarke,

that

when we

my

misgivings about this notion of events and grant

direct evidence for agent-causation.

some agent-causal

we have

internal evidence

theorists (such as

i: “

O’Connor and

of agent-causation

—

“in the

act” (Clarke forthcoming, 262). Clarke claims that this

way
is

things

not

plausible given that the concept of substance-causation “is a sophisticated philosophical

construct” which would not be apparent to ordinary agents in their ordinary experiences

(262).

I

will (reluctantly) grant this point as well (although

strong inclinations for believing that

events occurring inside of us).
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to

We
be

I

we do

will grant

believe that

we

cause things as agents, not just

it

mostly because

I

do have

in virtue

do not have a

of

sufficiently

(to which I agree) that even those who take the causal relation
and observable (such as Armstrong) need not require that agent causation is directly experienced

should here reiterate Clarke’s claim

real

I

(Clarke forthcoming, 239, discussed above).
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detailed account of what

it

means

for something to count as evidence of a given

phenomenon.

Even granting these

points,

however, there

is

not really a problem for agent-

causation. Clarke himself dismisses the objection because, as he says, “plainly, there can

exist things that are

unknowable by us” (Clarke forthcoming, 262). Undiscoverability

does not equal impossibility (262).
point

is

beings

not uncontroversial. But

to

assume

it

I

agree with Clarke here, although

seems

be extreme hubris on the

that anything that is possible

Perhaps the intuition underlying
explanation. If

to

we cannot

discover agent-causation,

is

how can

it

do admit

part

must be discoverable by

this objection is really the

anything about our world? But this concern

I

that this

of human

us.

concern about

help us understand

misplaced. The possibility of agent-

causation has explanatory value apart from any evidence that

regarding explanation above, as well as Chapter

5).

it

exists (see the objection

A discovery

can indeed help us

to

understand certain things about the world, but so can the postulation of something that
has not yet been (or cannot be) discovered

(e.g., strings

or superstrings in contemporary

physics). These postulations have explanatory value even before there

is

any evidence.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the objections to agent-causation

Van Inwagen’s

do not hold up under

scrutiny.

objections concerning the failure of agent-causation to solve the problem

of free will are not successful. The objections discussed by Clarke are also not
successful. Clarke himself dismisses

many of the

objections he does not dismiss do not

work

either.

134

objections.

The

failure

I

have argued

that the

of these objections,

together with the arguments

made

in previous chapters, leaves the agent-causal

unscathed (and perhaps even stronger ).
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view
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Special thanks to Randolph Clarke for sending

me

a

this chapter.
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copy of his manuscript and allowing

me

to cite

it

in

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
Obviously, there

is

no way

to

prove the

truth

of agent-causation. As Clarke points

out:

There

is

no observational evidence that could

tell

us whether our world

is

an indeterministic world with agent causation or an indeterministic world
without it. We do not introspectively observe agent causation, and even
highly improbable behavior could occur in a world without agent
causation. (Clarke 1995, 210)

Perhaps the best one can ask for
other positions.

also has

many

I

is

an argument for

its

plausibility and superiority over

will reiterate that not only is agent-causation intuitively plausible, but

advantages over other competing views. In

this chapter,

the significance of Chapters 2 through 4 to

my

remarks about non-agent causes. Finally,

will conclude with

I

project as a whole.

my

I

I

it

will illustrate

will then

argument

make some

for

why

an

agent-causal view should be accepted.

Chapter
In

Thus

Chapter

2,

1

2:

Freedom and Alternative

argue that Frankfurt-style counterexamples

the principle that states that

one

is

robust alternative in order to be responsible.

way

it

to

PAP

are successful.

morally responsible for what she does only

could have done otherwise (Frankfurt 1988a,

in the

Possibilities

1), is false.

An

if

she

agent need not have a

The value of Frankfurt’s counterexample

highlights our intuitions about responsibility.

It

is

pulls us out of the rut of

‘could have done otherwise’ and focuses our energies on the actual sequence of action.

His example allows us to understand that what

is

actuality and the control the agent has over

What

whether the agent

is

it.

relevant

is

the

way

the action ensues in

matters to us for responsibility

the true originator of the action in the actual sequence.
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On my

is

view,

of origination and control

this sort

objection, in

there really

own

vs.

is

agent-causal. Recall the “flicker of freedom”

which some incompatibilists have

some

is

doing

it

tried to revive

alternative in every Frankfiirt-style

as a result of intervention).

I

PAP by

example

(e.g.,

suggesting that

doing

it

on one 's

argue, with Fischer, that these flickers are

not robust enough to ground responsibility. But
note the strong intuition lurking
i.e.,

that there

us to explain

is

significance to doing something on one’s own.
Agent-causation allows

this: if the

something the agent

is

action

is

is

agent-caused

responsible

but his agent-causation. Thus,

person

here—

I

for.

am

It is

it

has been done on one

own and

is

thus

not the flicker that grounds his responsibility,

suggesting replacing

morally responsible for what she does only

The reader should note what

’s

if

PAP

with something better: a

she agent-caused her action.

does not say. Like PAP,

this principle

give sufficient conditions for moral responsibility.

Many

it

does not

other factors (besides agent-

causation) must often be present in order for the agent
to be morally responsible. For

example, take a case of coercion. Suppose someone agent-causes
her action of giving in
to a blackmailer's

demand.

not one for which the agent

We might say here that the action, although agent-caused,
is

morally responsible

is

124
.

My new principle also does not mention responsibility for consequences or
omissions, but only mentions actions (i.e, "what she does").

be

that

we

The implication appears

to

are never responsible for consequences or omissions (because
these are not

things that are agent-caused and agent-causation

is

a requirement for moral

124

There mi S ht be however, ways of viewing the agent as responsible in such
cases. Frankfurt makes a
valuable suggestion in “Coercion and Moral Responsibility.” He claims that
in order for coercion to
absolve someone of responsibility, it must compel him to act as he does
(Frankfurt 1988b, 36).
might
be able to say that when true compulsion is involved, the agent does not
agent-cause her action. Thus, we
can say that there are different levels of coercion, some which compel and
thus absolve of responsibility
-

We

and some which do
not

all

duress

is

not. Or, we could say as Frankfurt does, that all coercion involves
compulsion, but
coercion” (37). The difference seems to be merely linguistic.
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responsibility). This

"a person

limits

is

not what the principle says, however.

morally responsible for anything only

is

scope to actions. Although

its

directly responsible for

responsibility),

it

is

I

if

The

principle does not say

she agent-caused

it,"

but instead

argue elsewhere (see Chapter 3) that

consequences (and

that actions are the

important to note that

my view

my main point,

PAP

main

target

we

are not

of

does not limit moral responsibility to

125

•

actions.

But

to return to

once

is

replaced with

my new

principle,

we

can explain the significance of doing something on one's own.

Chapter

3:

Compatibilism and Incompatibilism

Obviously, the idea of doing something on one
appeal to other things besides agent-causation.

I

’s

own could be

explained by

believe Fischer and Ravizza give

it

a

compatibilist spin with their notion of guidance control. This notion involves the history

of the action and whether
In Chapter 3,

1

it

comes from an agent’s own reasons-responsive mechanism.

discuss their view and argue that the kind of control required for

responsibility (and the kind highlighted

they say

it is:

what

guidance control
a person

is

is

is

required

is,

by Frankfurt-style counterexamples)

instead, an incompatibilist kind of control.

not enough for responsibility, because

way

(a situation in

believe that the only

way

125
I

would

like to

to reflect

thank

Owen

it

for her previously

“her own”). Intuitively, this

to obtain the correct result is to rely

incompatibilist control. Guidance control

me

argue that

allows for scenarios in which

which she has taken responsibility

programmed “mechanism” and has made
I

I

not as

morally responsible (on their view) even though she has been programmed to

act a certain

result.

it

is

is

is

the

wrong

on some form of

not enough for moral responsibility because

Herring for comments he made

on responsibility for things other than actions and
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at a talk

of mine. These comments inspired

to clarify the

scope of my principle.

it

does not require that the agent be the true origin of her action. Thus,

it

is

not that an

agent need have robust alternatives, but simply that the agent be the free source of what
she does. Guidance control does not ensure this because
there

is

The burden

another source.

on

is

it

allows for scenarios in which

the compatibilist to

show how such

could enable the agent to be the ultimate source of her action. Thus, the stage

a

view

is set

for

asserting an incompatibilist view.

Chapter
It is

my view that

employ agent-causation
views).

The reason

4:

Kinds of Incompatibilism

agent-causation

(I

am

referring to these latter views, in general, as indeterminist

for this has to

do with

valiant effort to assert an indeterminist

avoids agent-causation,

I

superior to incompatibilist views that do not

is

intelligibility.

view

that solves the intelligibility

think in the end his view

any indeterminist view could succeed. What
to

moral responsibility

is

Although Robert Kane makes a

is

fails.

In fact,

it is

problem and

difficult to see

how

required for the kind of freedom relevant

a sort of control that only agent-causation provides.

Indeterminist views, such as Kane’s, severely limit the control the agent has over his

action

by placing too much weight on indeterminate processes and by

action to be determined

responsible

to

when

by

the agent.

his action

is

It is

failing to allow the

not intelligible to hold an agent morally

not determined by him. Agent-causation allows an agent

determine his (free) action, not merely influence

it

or

make

it

more

likely

—and

this

occurs without the agent being determined to do so by other factors. Thus freedom and

intelligibility are achieved.
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A Word About Non-Agent Causes
On my
need not be
causes can

view, just as there need not be total freedom

total

fit

do otherwise, there also

to

freedom from non-agent causes. The existence of prior non-agent

in quite well

with the agent-causation view. For instance, the causal

influences on the agent’s action can be probabilistic and thus need not necessitate what

As Clarke

the agent does.

points out, “probabilistic causation

is

not the threat to free will

that causal necessitation is” (Clarke 1995, 204). Also, as discussed in previous chapters,

these sorts of causes could be seen as contributing (and not in themselves sufficient)
causes. These causes do

somewhat

what an agent can do, however. But

limit

this is not

usually a threat to the kind of freedom that matters to responsibility. Again, as Clarke
suggests,

the occurrence of certain prior events will be a necessary condition of an

agent’s causing a certain event. Absent those prior events, the later event
will not

be naturally possible, and an agent can cause only what

is

naturally possible. (Clarke 1995, 204)

For example,

it

will

be necessary that the agent was bom, became an agent,

be necessary that the agent came to be in a certain place
to

be able

to

cause something

necessary for him

to

when

come

take

prior causes

away

cause.

be

in the

(e.g., in

at a certain

same place

same

as that person at the

time).

It

may

order for

in

order for an agent to punch someone,

him

it is

But

it is

only

together to determine or necessitate what an agent does that they

the relevant sort of freedom. In these cases, there

Even though we

time

etc.

will often say in

is

no room

left for

the agent-

such cases that the agent “causes” something,

the causal relation really holds between the factors and the action, not the agent and the

action.

We can still, however, retain our usage of ‘cause’

agent-causation in these cases.
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without admitting that there

is

These points

fit

nicely with our intuitions.

We feel strongly that in certain cases,

prior factors control an agent’s action.
For example, suppose

kleptomaniac
his stealing

is

truly

to

steal—i.e., he has an

under certain circumstances.

kleptomania, then

On my view
his action.

compelled

we

we

If

we

illness

this is the truth

of sorts

are convinced that this

are also convinced that the
kleptomaniac

(assuming that

are convinced that the

is

that necessitates

is

the nature of

not morally responsible.

about kleptomania), he did not agent-cause

His action was caused by him only

in

a manner of speaking. Strictly

speaking, the causal relation held between
compelling psychological factors and his
action.

Agent-causation allows us to explain the difference
between the actions of the

true kleptomaniac and the actions

influenced the teenager
necessitate her action.

(e.g.,

She

is

of the teenager

who

shoplifts

peer pressure, upbringing,

etc.),

on

a dare. Certain factors

but presumably did not

responsible because her action was agent-caused.

causal influences in her case did not

crowd out her agent-causal

ability.
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The

Sometimes, of

course, an agent will act spontaneously and
irrationally. Agent-causation allows for
this
possibility, too. This is

because the agent need not act according

Why Agent
Many

factors serve to

make

127

Causation Should be Accepted
agent-causation superior to other views. The

following argument for agent-causation
(Clarke 1995, 210-1

to these influences.

is

adapted from an argument

made by Clarke

128

1):

6

If we were brought to believe that the teenager
was truly compelled by certain factors, then we would no
longer hold her responsible. Likewise, if we were
to be led to the view that kleptomania is not
an illness of
true compulsion, then we might hold the
kleptomaniac responsible.

Again, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which an agent
has no reasons (either conscious or
unconscious) for what she does. It is most likely that something about
the agent’s circumstances or past
plays a role in her acting “spontaneously” and “without
reason.”
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(1)

we are morally responsible agents;
we are morally responsible agents,

(2) if

then

we sometimes

act

with free will;
(3) if

we sometimes

act with free will, then determinism is false;

(4) if determinism is false

and still we sometimes act with
we agent-cause some of our actions; and
therefore, we agent-cause some of our actions.
will,

(5)

Support for premises

seems

as

(1)

good a place

and

free

then

(2) is largely intuitive.

There

to start as any.

is

We must

no doubt that

start

we do

somewhere and

(1)

hold agents morally

responsible, and strong intuitions lead us to believe that these practices reflect the

metaphysical

blame are not

facts.

fairly

As

for premise (2), this stems

placed on one

who

from the basic

lacks control (and control requires

freedom). Theologians have wrestled with a version of this issue.

God justly

hold one accountable for one’s sins

God’s plan? In everyday

life, if

we come

if these sins are

to believe that

and

intuition that praise

How

some

sort

of

can a benevolent

somehow

necessitated

someone lacked

control,

by

we

cease to hold her responsible.

With regard

to the

remaining premises, Clarke claims that

the crucial steps of the argument are, of course, the rejection of

compatibilism and of nonagent-causal libertarian views. What inclines
to follow those steps, I believe, is that we find unsatisfactory

many of us

any view of free will that allows that everything
an agent’s action

is itself

distant past. Certainly

view,

if

that causally brings about

causally brought about by something in the

any freedom of the

not a complete fraud,

will that

we

enjoy on such a

pale imitation of the freedom that

is a

is

characterized by an agent-causal account. (Clarke 1995, 211)

My previous
argument.

I

chapters are an attempt to

suggest

why we

fill

in these crucial

should reject compatibilism and

nonagent-causal libertarian views. Compatibilist control
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Specifically,

replaced his "(5)

I

have added "sometimes"
if

missing elements of the

to

premises (2)

our acting with free will requires that
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-

we

(4)

is

why we

should reject

not enough because

and "some of'

to

premise

(4).

I

it

does

have also

agent-cause our actions, then that freedom

is

ensure that the agent

is

the true free source of
her action. Nonagent-causal
libertarian

views do not work because they
cannot make free and responsible
action
(This

is

intelligible

because the agent does not determine
his free action). Thus,
by process of

elimination, an agent-causal view

the

is

view

to accept.

But furthermore, although

philosophers are skeptical of our
pre-philosophical, man-on-the-street
intuitions,

such intuitions are quite powerful

in this

context and lead us to
agent-causation.

usually quite clear to the
non-philosopher that
certain factors, and that

As Thomas Reid
causation in the

first

we

determine what

we

we

intuitions about our ability to
cause things

own

i

we have

Many philosophers

we

them). Although

I

agree that

recognize our

own

causal powers,

causation in the external world.

we would
as even

effect are central to our understanding

The point here

is

actions.

We

by outside

to

be wary,

In fact, if

I

also think that

Reid

is

correct,

some

much of

us as a result of such intuitions.
If we did not

to

And

own

such intuitions (some even deny
that

we always need
to us.

believe in

We have very strong

causal powers.

faith in

of these intuitions are fundamentally
important
our knowledge of the world comes

start to

and our determination of our

do not put much

by

do.

also have strong intuitions about
being influenced, but not
necessitated,
factors.

It is

are influenced but not
necessitated

insightfblly points out (mentioned
above),

place because of our

think

I

never be able

to

formulate ideas about

Hume recognizes,

the notions of cause and

of this world.

not that these intuitions are infallible or
inescapable, but that

they are strong enough and fundamental
enough to allow them to bolster the arguments

made

above. If agent-causation

is

possible and intelligible (as

as presented in the account sketched
above" with

my conclusion

(see (5) above).
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that

I

argue

in

Chapters 5 and

"we agent-cause some of our actions"

6), if

it is

5 and 6),

the best of the exist.ng options
(as

and if it

agent-causal view

is

is

I

argue via Chapters 2,

supported by strong intuitions
(as
a strong one.
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I

think

it is),

3,

and

4-and

also in

then the case for an
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